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Abstract 
Labour supply modelling is one of the most prevalent research topics in the 
economic literature, and the employment implications are among the most persistent 
characteristics of public policy evaluation. This dissertation examines the 
employment responses of Australian households by developing economic models 
believed to better capture the employment behaviour of three important demographic 
subgroups, namely, partnered parents (married or de facto), single mothers and 
unemployed individuals. For each subgroup, a substantive empirical analysis is 
developed with the key focus on evaluating their employment responses to wage, 
childcare costs and public transfers. The results are of particular interest to policy 
makers who wish to evaluate the effects of a number of policies on household 
employment decisions. 
The first analysis examines the implications of childcare utilisation on employment 
behaviour of partnered parents. For mothers during the childcare phase, there is 
widespread consensus that childcare plays a crucial role in facilitating the transition 
into employment. To capture household childcare implications, this analysis proposes 
a behavioural labour supply model where labour force participation, hours worked 
and the provision of parental care are endogenous. The model establishes 
relationships between optimal time spent in parental care and work by incorporating 
structural time constraints of parents and children within the household, while it is 
sufficiently flexible to characterise a large variety of household responses. 
The model for partnered parents is developed to estimate the effects of wage and the 
price of childcare on employment, parenting behaviour and well-being, using a cross-
sectional dataset formed by pooling three waves of Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) data from 2009 to 2011. The analysis reports wage 
elasticity and childcare price elasticity for the sample and subgroups within the 
sample. Using behavioural simulation techniques, the analysis further investigates 
four alternative payment schemes of the Child Care Rebate (CCR) program that are 
less costly to implement, and their employment implications on partnered parents. 
These simulations have illustrated the effectiveness of childcare subsidies in shaping 
the willingness to supply labour among parents with children. The results suggest 
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that childcare subsidies can be an effective means to promote female labour supply, 
if public transfers target more responsive subgroups, such as low-income households, 
through the use of income means tests. 
The second analysis investigates the sensitivity of single mothers’ labour supply to 
income support programs and tax rules. A structural static model of labour supply is 
formulated to explicitly take into account childcare decisions. The model is applied 
to estimate the labour supply and the provision of parental care for Australian single 
mothers, where a panel dataset is constructed based on five waves of HILDA from 
2006 to 2010. The time structure of the panel data requires the development of an 
econometric specification that is compatible with the nature of panel data. 
The results indicate that childcare expenses significantly undermine labour-market 
activities of single mothers but the effect is small for the average worker. The effect 
is large, however, for individuals at the bottom end of income distribution. Resulting 
from the adjustments of a number of budget set components, this analysis further 
simulates the sensitivity of parents’ labour supply to individual income support 
programs and tax rules. 
The third analysis relaxes the conventional market clearing assumption and considers 
labour supply decisions in a rationed labour market in which some individuals are 
unable to obtain work. Specifically, the probability of being unemployed is 
separately identified to distinguish between the inability to obtain work and not being 
in the labour force. A decision process similar to the double-hurdle model is 
incorporated in the discrete choice labour supply model, in which market participants 
are confronted with the risk of being unemployed. The econometric specification 
assumes that each individual chooses from amongst a set of discrete hour choices to 
maximise a predefined utility function, in which the expected utility from market 
participation is weighted by probability of being in employment. Within the single 
structural labour supply model, the household unemployment risk, preferences for 
consumption and leisure and the fixed costs of work are jointly estimated.  
The dataset is based on three waves of HILDA data between 2009 and 2011 and 
consists of partnered households aged between 25 and 59. The estimation results 
obtained from the extended model are compared to those from the conventional 
discrete choice model. The effects of controlling for the unemployment risk are 
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assessed by discussing the discrepancies in the estimation results. Furthermore, this 
analysis investigates the sensitivity of household labour supply to program 
parameters, in particular, the benefits available to unemployed individuals, by 
simulating employment responses of hypothetical adjustments to unemployment 
benefits in Australia. In particular, the estimation results are applied to simulate the 
employment effects of two alternative payment schemes of Newstart Allowance. The 
results suggest that an absolute increase in the Newstart Allowance payment is likely 
to discourage the labour supply of working females while promoting non-working 
females to participate in the labour market, and a reduction in the Newstart taper rate 
leads to positive employment effects in both hours worked and participation. 
However, the impact of the Newstart Allowance benefits on male labour supply is 
found to be largely insignificant. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Labour supply modelling is one of the most prevalent research topics 
throughout the economic literature, and the employment implications are 
among the most persistent characteristics of public policy evaluation. 
Modelling household labour supply is difficult because the employment 
decision process is complex and is interdependent upon a variety of 
characteristics and behaviours. Many labour studies thus focus on smaller 
subgroups within the general population, such as married couples or single 
parents, so that more specific economic models can be developed to capture 
their employment decision process while keeping the model tractable. The 
same belief also motivates this thesis: that if important employment-related 
decisions could be better accounted for, it would be possible to obtain 
improved simulation results of employment effects and more precise 
evaluation of welfare policies. 
This dissertation examines the employment responses of Australian 
households by developing economic models that are believed to better capture 
the employment behaviour of three important demographic subgroups, 
namely, partnered parents, single mothers and unemployed individuals. For 
each subgroup, a substantive empirical analysis is developed with the key 
focus on evaluating their employment responses to wage, childcare costs and 
public transfers. 
For the first two subgroups, public policy has increasingly focussed on the 
labour market effects of various income support and transfer programs over 
the past few decades. A great deal of attention has been paid to parents, 
amongst whom income support programs were believed to discourage active 
participation in the labour market. Over the long term, such outcomes can lead 
to entrenched poverty among parents and deleterious outcomes for children 
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who reside in low-income households. In Australia, there has been a number 
of policy initiatives designed to encourage parents, especially females, to 
return to the labour market following the birth of a child. The empirical 
evidence indicating a low level of female labour supply during the working 
age for these two subgroups is certainly encouraging in view of assisting 
parents, especially mothers, to achieve their full potential employment 
capacity. A better understanding of the implications of childcare on labour-
market activities is likely of high value in the context of informing policy 
discussion. 
Among partnered parents and single mothers, the implications of childcare 
utilisation and income support benefits are of particular relevance. Childcare 
plays a key role in balancing the trade-offs between work, leisure and other 
family commitments. Unlike households without children, the dominant 
caregiver, usually the mother, faces the choice of not returning to the 
workforce and parenting children on her own, or organising the appropriate 
formal or informal childcare to cover the times that she works. For many 
parents, childcare is a useful option to relieve themselves from care 
responsibilities and to fully participate in market work. 
The costs of childcare services, childcare benefits and income support 
payments, especially among low-income families and households with 
multiple children, may represent a significant fraction of household 
consumption. In Australia, a series of welfare reforms enacted since 2000 
dramatically improved financial assistance to help assist with the cost of 
childcare.1 Although extensive academic research has examined the impact of 
childcare costs, quality and affordability on the labour supply of Australian 
                                                 
1 As of 2007, more than a quarter of all Australian government transfer payments were received by families with 
children (Department of Treasury, 2008). Because childcare is relatively expensive for parents at the bottom end of 
the income distribution, public transfers in the form of childcare assistance will likely be an integral component of 
future welfare packages. 
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women (Breunig, Gong, & King, 2012; Breunig, Weiss, Yamauchi, Gong, & 
Mercante, 2011; Gong, Breunig, & King, 2010; Rammohan & Whelan, 2005, 
2007), very little research has jointly considered the implications of welfare 
programs on the utilisation of formal and/or informal childcare and parents’ 
employment behaviour (Gong & Breunig, 2011; Kalb, 2009). Taking childcare 
decisions into account has important implications on modelling labour supply 
responses of households with dependent children, while continued expanding 
family financial assistance conveys the need for research to fully integrate the 
implications of public transfers. 
The first two substantive analyses presented in this thesis aim to examine and 
quantify the impact of tax and transfers on the employment decision and the 
utilisation of childcare for, respectively, partnered parents and single mothers. 
Specifically, the primary objective is to develop economic models that better 
capture the real-life trade-offs between childcare and work faced by parents. 
The second objective is to fully incorporate the details of relevant income 
support and childcare subsidy programs in Australia and to investigate the 
sensitivity of parents’ labour supply to program parameters. The third 
objective is to examine the impact of parental care provision on the 
employment behaviour and the utilisation of childcare.  
These two analyses attempt to identify the implications of the parental care 
provision and tie them to households’ employment decisions and their 
utilisation of childcare for the first time. Essentially, this research responds to 
the call for a new way of thinking about the provision of parental care and 
draws inspiration from Brock (1991) and Bianchi (2000), who have stressed 
the need to elaborate models into a more challenging research context by 
taking into account decisions related to childcare and other types of non-
labour market activities. In addition, this research also delivers essential 
behavioural simulations on the effects of major childcare subsidy and income 
support programs to inform policy discussions about the effectiveness of 
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family assistance policies in enhancing or compromising labour market 
attachment.  
Few empirical studies have sought to identify the responsiveness of labour 
supply to childcare costs in Australia, especially among single mothers. This is 
partly a result of the difficulty of collecting information on the time allocation 
of work and childcare and the incorporation of institutional details of income 
support programs, which makes it difficult to measure the employment effect 
of childcare benefits. To remedy these difficulties, these two analyses make 
use of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
dataset. 2  In the data, time-spent in labour-market activities and parenting 
children can be identified. This enables the analysis to incorporate a set of 
time constraints to capture household childcare considerations in a way that 
both decisions of childcare and the supply of labour are incorporated into a 
single framework. In particular, the relatively small number of single mother 
households in any given wave of HILDA necessitates the pooling of data 
across waves to form an unbalanced panel data which is suitable for analysis. 
As a result, the time structure of the panel data imposes further challenges to 
the conventional estimation method and requires the development of an 
econometric specification that corrects for standard errors as the result of 
observing an individual in multi-periods. 
The estimation results are used to obtain elasticity estimates of the wage and 
childcare price for partnered parents and single mothers. The model estimates 
are then used to assess the employment responsiveness to incentives inherent 
in government policy at both macro and micro levels and to estimate the 
                                                 
2 This thesis uses unit record data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. 
The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded by the Australian Government Department of Social Services (DSS) 
and is managed by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (Melbourne Institute). The 
findings and views reported in this chapter, however, are those of the author and should not be attributed to either 
DSS or the Melbourne Institute. 
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behaviour of subgroups within a population, while providing measures of the 
fiscal implications of government policy.3 The simulation examines the impact 
of childcare subsidies on the employment behaviour of parents and 
demonstrates the effectiveness of childcare policy in facilitating female labour 
supply, especially amongst low-income families. 
Next, this thesis investigates the modelling issues related to unemployed 
individuals and integrates their employment effects into the discrete choice 
labour supply model. Past research on the labour supply modelling has 
concentrated on two broad issues: employment decisions of non-participants 
and working individuals. The literature is largely silent regarding the labour 
supply of unemployed individuals and their employment responses to 
unemployment benefits and welfare programs. There has been virtually no 
evidence in Australia and very little evidence exists in other developed 
countries (Bargain, Caliendo, Haan, & Orsini, 2010; Bingley & Walker, 2001; 
Blundell, Ham, & Meghir, 1987). Consequently, there is an incomplete picture 
of the way in which employment behaviours are modelled. These studies have 
acknowledged the need for a greater understanding of how the identification 
of unemployed individuals influences model estimates and simulated 
                                                 
3 Thanks to the comments from Dr Fisher, one might expect that the wage and childcare cost trade-offs being 
considered may also affect the choice of a single parent to repartner, or of a couple to separate, thus creating a single 
parent family. 
The childcare costs play an important role in shaping the labour supply decisions of single-parent or couple-parent 
households, especially among females. The current welfare system provides substantial assistance to single-mother 
families to lower their financial burden and assist with other aspects of childrearing. Although recent legislation 
change initiated in 2013 has reduced some of the government transfers specifically designed for single-mother 
families (such as the Parental Payments), the policy context considered in the thesis existed prior to the legislation 
change. It would be reasonable to assume some parents engage in opportunistic behaviours to remain single in status 
or claim to be a single parent, so that they receive higher welfare payments than they would otherwise receive. 
This factor increases the feasibility of surviving as a single parent and has an impact on the model estimates. Due to 
data limitations, statistics on such opportunistic behaviours are not available and it is not possible to quantify the 
extent to which this factor affects the forecasted elasticities of labour supply. Theoretically, the implications of higher 
subsidies for single parents are two-fold. If a segment of welfare payments is not dependent upon working hours or 
childcare costs, as predicted by the model in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, these payments increase the benefits of not 
working and discourage labour supply. Second, if a segment of payments is work and childcare-related, such as 
higher allowance for childcare rebates, this may result in higher willingness to work. Without further research, the 
overall effects on the model estimates are thus unclear at this stage and would be an interesting direction for future 
research. 
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employment behaviours, and how to address employment responses in the 
presence of unemployment benefits and a range of income support programs. 
The model considered in the third analysis relaxes the potential erroneous 
assumption that unemployed individuals can freely adjust their level of labour 
supply, which has been either explicitly or implicitly assumed in many labour 
supply models, and takes into account the risk of being unemployed and the 
implications of unemployment benefits. The formulation of the extended 
model follows the double-hurdle model originally proposed by Cragg (1971) 
and more recently by Bargain et al. (2010), Bingley and Walker (2001), 
Blundell et al. (1987) and Duncan and MacCrae (1999). In the extended 
model, the decision to participate in the labour market depends upon the wage 
earnings weighted by the probability of being in employment, which is 
identified using the characteristics of individuals and local labour markets. 
The analysis makes use of cross-sectional data of partnered households, which 
is pooled from the HILDA data between 2009 and 2011. This analysis 
compares the estimated employment effects from the standard discrete choice 
model and those from the extended model. The discrepancy in the model 
estimates reveals the relative size of bias in the estimated employment effects, 
as the result of integrating the labour supply decisions of non-participating 
individuals. The results reveal that the standard model overpredicts 
employment responses of unemployed individuals, which leads to an upward 
bias in the overall employment effects. 
Furthermore, this study investigates the sensitivity of household labour supply 
to program parameters, in particular, the benefits available to unemployed 
individuals. The study achieves this by simulating employment responses of 
hypothetical adjustments to the unemployment benefits in Australia, jointly 
with other income support programs. A sectoral breakdown of the employment 
effects is attempted, in particular, for households with and without preschool 
children and also for various educational levels. The results suggest that the 
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Newstart Allowance program can be an important means to facilitate the 
labour supply of females, while its impact on the employment decisions of 
males is small. 
Although the scope of this thesis is limited to Australia, the institutional 
context considered in this research is very similar to a number of developed 
countries, where governments have taken initiatives to promote the labour 
force attachment of females through the provision of more affordable 
childcare services. In the last decade, Australia has witnessed significant 
policy changes in relation to childcare subsidy and family assistance policies. 
This shift in policy focus has resulted in rapid expansion of childcare benefits 
and subsidies and has made Australia a compelling case study. Although cross-
country comparisons help to uncover the assumptions underpinning 
employment decisions, a comparative analysis would have gone beyond the 
manageable scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, elasticity estimates reported 
from this thesis are compared to estimates from studies for selected developed 
countries. Discussions of cross-study comparison on elasticity estimates of 
labour supply, participation and childcare prices are presented for partnered 
households and single mothers. 
1.1. Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 initially presents a brief discussion of studies related to this thesis. It 
starts by reviewing the evolution of the approaches of modelling household 
employment decisions in the last three decades. The literature on labour 
supply modelling is categorised into three segments, namely, the local 
linearization approach, the piecewise linear approach and the discrete choice 
approach. Since childcare is an essential component to evaluating the 
employment responses of households with dependent children, Chapter 2 
further draws on the literature to discuss two noteworthy dimensions of 
childcare and labour supply studies. The first consists of studies that directly 
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evaluate the employment implications of childcare costs. The second focuses 
on the joint evaluation of employment decisions and the utilisation of formal 
and/or informal childcare. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of methodology and data source that is 
relevant to the thesis. The first part presents the framework for the theoretical 
model that sets out the groundwork for three substantive empirical analyses 
(Chapter 4 to Chapter 5). It starts by describing the specifications of the 
conventional consumption-leisure utility maximisation framework, then 
moves on to discuss the individual component in the discrete choice labour 
supply models. The key assumptions required and the methodology used to 
estimate the model parameters are also discussed. The second part presents a 
brief discussion of the dataset used for each analysis, with a focus on 
describing the construction of childcare related variables. In particular, the 
calculation method of childcare usage and childcare prices is discussed. 
The analysis of the Australian partnered parents begins in Chapter 4 by 
developing a behavioural labour supply model, which explicitly accounts for 
household childcare decisions. The analysis estimates the effects of wage and 
price of childcare on household behaviour and well-being. Specifically, 
parents’ time allocations of parental care and work are presented in structural 
quantity relationships, which are sufficiently flexible to characterise a large 
variety of household responses. The employment effects of partnered 
households with dependent children are estimated using HILDA data from 
2008 to 2011. The analysis also simulates the employment outcome of four 
alternative payment schemes of the Child Care Rebate. The results show that 
childcare subsidy programs can be important policy instruments to promote 
female labour force attachment, especially for low-income families. 
Following a similar approach, Chapter 5 investigates the employment and 
childcare decisions of single mothers in Australia. The analysis makes use of 
the unbalanced panel data pooled from the HILDA dataset from 2006 to 2010. 
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To accommodate the panel nature of the data structure, the empirical 
specification corrects for standard errors as the result of observing an 
individual in multi-periods. The structural model controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity simultaneously estimates the labour supply and parental care 
provision for single mothers. The estimated results are used to simulate the 
impact of a change in the budget set components on the labour supply, 
participation and parental care of single mothers. 
Chapter 6 examines a different issue to that explored in the previous two 
chapters. This chapter relaxes the conventional assumption of market clearing 
and considers labour supply decisions in a rationed labour market in which 
some individuals are unable to obtain work. Specifically, the probability of 
being unemployed is separately identified to distinguish between the inability 
to obtain work and not being in the labour force. A decision process similar to 
the double-hurdle model is incorporated in the labour supply model, in which 
market participants are confronted with the risk of being unemployed. 
Heterogeneity in unemployment risk is controlled for by using regional 
variables and individual characteristics and is simultaneously estimated with 
other parameters in the model. The estimation results are then used to simulate 
the effects of hypothetical reforms of the Newstart Allowance. 
The thesis concludes in Chapter 7 by reviewing the main findings in relation 
to the research questions. The analytical approaches adopted in the thesis and 
their policy implications are reflected upon, while highlighting potential new 
research questions. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
During the past three decades, the economic understanding of the household 
employment decision process has evolved rapidly. Economists have started to 
investigate several types of non-labour market behaviour previously deemed 
irrelevant to employment decisions, for example, the utilisation of childcare 
services. These considerations have fostered economists to elaborate models in 
a more challenging research context where the decisions that relate to a variety 
of non-labour market activities are taken into account. This chapter discusses 
related literature on modelling household employment decisions, with a 
particular focus on the literature of childcare implications. 
Rather than identifying a definitive approach to capture the implications of 
childcare, this chapter aims to develop an understanding of existing 
approaches. The modelling methodologies applied in three substantive 
analyses from Chapter 4 to Chapter 6 are based on a consistent framework - 
the discrete choice approach - which is elaborated upon in Chapter 3. In this 
respect, an overview of the discrete choice approach and its variants is useful 
to supplement the preceding analyses. 
Furthermore, the empirical analyses presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 seek 
to offer institutionally well-versed evaluations of employment responses of 
parents, whereby careful attention is given to the utilisation of childcare. The 
research objective is not to simply regard childcare expenses as work costs, 
but to carefully consider how the use of childcare facilitates the labour supply 
of parents. As such, this chapter presents a review of the literature on the 
impact of childcare utilisation on the labour supply of parents. 
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Whilst few studies have investigated the labour supply of unemployed 
individuals in the presence of unemployment benefits and other welfare 
programs, Chapter 6 develops an extended model to relax the potentially 
erroneous assumption that unemployed individuals can freely adjust their 
supply of labour. Relevant studies of this analysis are discussed in Chapter 6. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 first presents a brief 
overview of existing approaches of modelling labour supply decisions. These 
approaches are in line with the conventional labour theory that employment 
choices are formulated in an optimisation problem subject to budget constraint 
and other constraints applied to the household. Section 2.3 is devoted to a 
review of studies which evaluate the employment effects of childcare, with a 
focus of the literature on modelling childcare decisions within the labour 
supply models. This chapter concludes in Section 2.4. 
2.2. Review of Labour Supply Models 
The studies of household employment responses have attracted significant 
interest from economists. A variety of approaches have been applied, from 
simple regressions of hours on wage rates to the structural estimation of the 
consumption-leisure space choice models. Needless to say, there are countless 
variations of these techniques such as difference-in-difference estimators, 
collective labour supply models and life-cycle models. Structural labour 
supply models are useful as they can be utilised for behavioural simulations to 
assess the employment responsiveness to incentives inherent in government 
policy at both macro and micro levels. It is also possible to obtain measures of 
welfare losses, fiscal implications of government policy and to estimate the 
behaviour of subgroups within a population. 
Changes in labour supply models have been prompted by the need to address 
the sample selection problem, endogeneity issue, measurement errors, non-
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linear budget set and to capture other factors relevant to employment 
decisions. An example of these developments is the use of the two-stage 
model proposed by Heckman (1979), which corrects for sample selection bias 
due to the unobservable wage rates for non-working individuals, and allows 
the decision to participate in the labour force and the hours worked to be inter-
related. In addition, the endogeneity issue arising from unobserved factors 
influencing both wage rates and hours worked, such as the ability to work, can 
be addressed using instrumental variables (Mroz, 1987). Furthermore, the 
difficulties that arise from the non-linear nature of the tax and benefit system 
lead to the development of the discrete hour choice model, in contrast to 
continuous hours, for example, Van Soest (1995) and Keane and Moffitt 
(1998). As such, an individual’s wage rate is no longer exogenous to the 
model. Rather, it is a function of an individual’s hours worked and the tax and 
benefit system.  
The progression of the labour supply modelling can be categorised into three 
segments in a rough chronological order: the local linearization approach, the 
piecewise linear approach and the discrete choice approach. The following 
discussion reviews related work on these three segments.  
2.2.1. Local Linearization Approach 
The local linearization approach is the prevailing approach associated with 
labour supply models prior to the 1980s. In this approach, the budget set is 
replaced by a hypothetical linear budget line that is tangent to the actual 
budget set at the observed hours worked. Labour supply models that use the 
local linearization approach generally involve the regression of an individual’s 
hours worked on wage rates, non-labour income and personal characteristics. 
Owing to the limited availability of unit record data prior to the 1980s, there 
has been no published work using the local linearization approach on 
Australian households. Among labour supply studies in the United States, a 
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useful review of reported wage elasticity estimates for men is presented by 
Pencavel (1986, pp. 67-70) and one for women is presented by Killingsworth 
and Heckman (1986, pp. 185-192). The range of the reported elasticities is 
wide. The reported wage elasticity estimates for men range from -0.63 to 0.08, 
with the central tendency of estimates being negative and lying between -0.29 
to -0.14. For women, the wage elasticities range from -0.89 to 4.50, with the 
majority positive and predominantly in the range from 1.04 to 2.26. 
The reported estimates from studies using the local linearization approach 
should be interpreted with caution. There is general agreement that the local 
linearization approach suffers a number of limitations. First, in general, issues 
arising from the endogeneity problem and the sample selection bias are not 
addressed (Blundell, Meghir, Symons, & Walker, 1988). Next, local 
linearization will yield inconsistent estimates in certain circumstances, even if 
instrumental variables are used (Moffitt, 1990). In addition, it is unclear what 
net wage and virtual income should be imputed for observations at the kinked 
points of the budget set (Killingsworth & Heckman, 1986). Furthermore, this 
approach ignores participation decisions and focuses solely on marginal 
changes in hours. The exclusion of participation decisions is clearly 
undesirable for some subgroups with low participation rates, such as single 
and married women.  
2.2.2. Piecewise Linear Approach 
Beginning with Burtless and Hausman (1978) and continuing with Hausman 
(1979), Hausman (1981) and Hausman and Ruud (1984), the piecewise linear 
approach was developed to explicitly accommodate non-linearity in the budget 
set, such as the outcome of the non-proportional tax system and public 
transfers. This approach typically estimates the labour supply functions 
derived from the explicit utility maximisation framework, which is formulated 
in the consumption-leisure space. The decision of market participation and 
hours worked are jointly formulated and the estimation thereby corrects for the 
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sample selection bias. The parameters of the labour supply models are 
generally estimated via maximum likelihood. 
In a pioneering study, Burtless and Hausman (1978) explicitly take into 
account the differently sloped segments of the kinked budget curve, by linking 
the choice of the segment to the utility function. Unlike the local linearization 
approach, the piecewise linear approach explicitly accounts for the 
heterogeneity in individual preference for work, the endogeneity issues arising 
from the interrelation among hours worked, the tax and benefits. The 
advantages of the piecewise linear approach include the ability to incorporate 
more complex tax and transfer systems into the continuous hours labour 
supply models (Arrufat & Zabalza, 1986; Blomquist, 1983), accounting for 
labour market entry costs (Dixit, 1989) and modelling multi-period 
employment behaviours (Blundell & Walker, 1986; Heckman & Macurdy, 
1980). This approach is frequently used in labour supply studies in the 1980s 
and 1990s, such as Arrufat and Zabalza (1986), Blomquist and Hansson-
Brusewitz (1990), Van Soest, Woittiez, and Kapteyn (1990) and Flood and 
MaCurdy (1992).  
The magnitudes of wage elasticity estimates reported in overseas studies vary 
significantly. A number of Australian studies use the piecewise linear 
approach to evaluate the employment responses. The wage elasticity estimates 
range between 0.36 and 1.30 for married women and are close to zero for 
married men (Apps, 1991; Apps & Rees, 1996, 1999; P. W. Miller & 
Chiswick, 1985; Ross & Saunders, 1993; Scutella, 2000). Note that the 
majority report elasticities at the means, with the exception of Ross and 
Saunders (1993) who report point estimates. The small elasticities reported for 
married men are not surprising given that the majority of Australian men work 
full-time and their propensity to change working hours is low. 
The piecewise linear approach has been criticised for two main reasons. First, 
it suffers from the coherency problem, in that the likelihood function is 
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undefined if preferences are not quasi-concave in some relevant region 
(Kapteyn, Kooreman, & Van Soest, 1990). Second, it improperly imposes 
negative Slutsky constraints. Amongst others, MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch 
(1990) and MaCurdy (1992) show that the likelihood function employed by 
the piecewise linear approach implicitly enforces a negative Slutsky term at 
the kink points of the budget set. As such, in order for parameters to satisfy the 
Slutsky conditions at all kink points in the data, the uncompensated 
substitution effect is essentially constrained to be positive and the income 
effect is constrained to be negative. 
2.2.3. Discrete Choice Approach 
The discrete choice approach models the labour supply decision as choosing 
between non-work and a set of discrete working hour points. It requires the 
imputation of disposable income and associated household utility for each 
discrete choice. It is assumed that households choose the discrete choice that 
results in the highest utility. The labour force participation and hours worked 
are jointly formulated in the same utility maximization problem. Common 
applications of the discrete choice approach typically account for the problem 
of unobserved wage rates of non-working individuals and heterogeneous 
household preferences. 
One aspect of employment behaviour generally not replicated in these models 
is the large proportion of non-working individuals. Partly in response to this 
feature of empirical analyses, Callan and Van Soest (1996) refined the model 
to introduce the fixed costs of work or fixed savings of non-working. The 
inclusion of fixed costs of work lowers household income by a fixed amount if 
the household chooses to participate in the labour market. In general, fixed 
costs of work are estimated using observed individual and market 
characteristics. This approach at least partially resolves the problem of 
underpredicting the proportion of part-time employed individuals. 
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The discrete choice approach has a number of advantages relative to the other 
two approaches in modelling household employment behaviour. First, Van 
Soest, Das, and Gong (2002) suggest that although the discrete choice 
approach requires the specification of a direct utility function, the exact 
functional form is not required to be known a priori. The non-parametric 
specification provides robust estimation results. Their findings indicate that 
using a household utility function of the second-order polynomial expansion in 
its arguments have provided a good approximation of different functional 
forms and is useful to describe a variety of decision-making processes. 
Next, the discrete choice approach provides an opportunity to incorporate 
important features of real world labour supply decisions, such as non-linear 
taxes and income support benefits, without affecting model tractability. In the 
Australian context, incorporating the details of taxation rules and transfer 
programs for households is likely to result in a non-convex and non-piecewise 
linear budget set. The piecewise linear approach, which estimates the 
continuous hours dimension of labour supply, may require either a more 
restrictive utility functional form, or the imposition of Slutsky constraints on 
the parameters of the model. Discretising the choice set avoids the need to 
impose ad hoc restrictions, even in the presence of a non-convex and non-
piecewise linear budget set. 
A further advantage is that incorporating details of tax and benefit rules into 
the model is a straightforward process. In Australia, many income support 
benefits are income-tested, with the implication that individuals in different 
tax brackets face varying taper or withdrawal rates. It is necessary to 
accurately assess the eligibility of these income benefits and their payment 
rates. For example, Breunig, Cobb-Clark, and Gong (2008) incorporate details 
of the existing tax system and a number of income support programs (such as 
Family Tax Benefit (FTB)) and used their model to analyse employment 
effects for households in Australia. 
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Finally, discretisation of working hours also provides the benefit of avoiding 
burdensome smoothing techniques used in the continuous hours approach 
(Van Soest et al., 2002). The decision making process is simplified by 
selecting the discrete choice that yields the highest utility, and is less 
computationally onerous. 
Amongst Australian studies using discrete choice approaches, wage elasticity 
estimates range between 0.33 to 0.60 for married females, between -0.03 and 
0.26 for married males and between 0.41 to 1.58 for single parents (Breunig et 
al., 2008; Creedy & Duncan, 2002; Creedy & Kalb, 2005; Kalb, 2000; Kalb, 
Kew, & Scutella, 2005; Kalb & Lee, 2008). In particular, higher elasticities are 
found for women with lower levels of educational attainment and married 
women are more responsive than married men to a change in their own wage 
(Breunig et al., 2008; Kalb, 2002). A cross-comparison of the estimated 
elasticities in Australia and those from selected developed countries for 
partnered parents are presented in Chapter 4. Single mothers are explored in 
Chapter 5. 
The discrete approach is not, however, without limitations. Critiques of the 
discrete choice approach focus on two issues: failure to use all available 
information and the introduction of rounding errors while formulating discrete 
choices. Creedy and Duncan (2002) claim that the authenticity of the 
parameters may suffer a potentially detrimental effect as the result of rounding 
errors. The formulation of discrete points theoretically influences the 
estimation parameters and may potentially bias results. Also, measurement 
errors in hours worked may cause a serious problem in the discrete choice 
approach and as such result in biased estimates (Flood & Islam, 2005; Van 
Soest & Das, 2001). 
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2.3. Employment Implications of Childcare 
The objective of this section is to provide an overview of employment 
implications of the utilisation of childcare. The discussion will review in more 
detail by reviewing analytical findings from related work in the following 
subsections. In particular, each subsection includes a brief discussion of 
elasticity estimates of the price of childcare from selected studies in Australia. 
The evaluation of employment implications of childcare can be addressed in a 
variety of ways. Within the labour supply models, the emphasis is generally on 
the monetary expenses of childcare for employment purposes, rather than the 
quality, availability and other attributes of childcare. The evaluation of non-
monetary attributes of childcare is hindered by the lack of solid data on the 
supply of childcare services, particularly given that a large share of the 
childcare market is in the informal sector. Studies that use data from the 
supply side of the childcare market include Blau and Hagy (1998), Breunig et 
al. (2011) and Hofferth and Wissoker (1992). In particular, Blau and Hagy 
(1998) find positive educational effects of early childhood programs 
embedded in many childcare services, especially amongst economically 
disadvantaged households. 
Modelling childcare usage for employment purposes is not straightforward, 
because the employment decision of the mother is likely to be endogenous in 
childcare choices. To fully participate in market work, parents may need to 
coordinate parenting activities, or organise childcare to relieve themselves 
from care responsibilities. Through childcare, care responsibilities are 
transferred to service providers. If childcare must be organised to facilitate 
labour activities, the costs incurred from using childcare likely lowers the 
expected earnings from work and in turn undermine parents’ willingness to 
supply labour. Parents may even be induced to exit the labour market. 
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Withdrawal from the labour market may have serious economic consequence 
in the form of depreciation of human capital over time, especially for less 
educated women. Many studies have found significant long-term detrimental 
effects on working hours among parents who return to the workforce after 
children-related labour market withdrawal (see for example, Blundell, Dias, 
Meghir, & Shaw, 2013; Blundell et al., 1987). The deterioration of human 
capital hampers future entrance and lowers the expected earnings after a future 
return to work. Despite those who permanently leave the labour force after 
childbirth, the labour supply of women who keep working after childbirth is 
significantly reduced owing to the need to coordinate work and to care for 
children (Kalenkoski, Ribar, & Stratton, 2009; A. R. Miller, 2011). 
Both the number and age of children are pivotal in determining how 
households respond to work incentives, and affect the value that women place 
on their time at home (Havnes & Mogstad, 2011; Kalenkoski et al., 2009). For 
example, using a sample of Australian married women, Apps and Rees (2001) 
find employment responses to wage incentives vary considerably with respect 
to the presence of children. Their results suggest that in the presence of 
children, market and domestic work are close substitutes for married women 
who are secondary earners. In large families, parents, especially mothers, are 
more likely to withdraw from the labour market and look after children on 
their own (Berger & Black, 1992). Part of the reason is that in many cases 
parental care can be provided on a one-to-many basis, whereas the 
productivity of parenting activities increases with respect to the number of 
children. The specialisation of childrearing activities lowers the relative 
attractiveness of working and women with more children thus have lower 
participation rates or work fewer hours (Berger & Black, 1992; Crompton & 
Harris, 1998).  
To facilitate the analysis of labour supply among households who actively 
balance their child rearing needs and work commitments, many studies 
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develop structural labour supply models that take into account household 
childcare considerations (for Australian studies, amongst others, see Breunig 
et al., 2012; Breunig et al., 2011; Doiron & Kalb, 2002, 2005a; Kalb, 2009). 
An economic model that jointly captures labour supply and childcare decisions 
becomes necessarily complicated because available income, time and energy 
is limited for parents to fully satisfy their work and family commitments. On 
one hand, the monetary expenses incurred from using childcare offset wage 
earnings and non-labour income. On the other hand, childcare frees parents of 
care responsibilities and facilitates work engagement, which in turn leads to 
higher earnings given per unit market wage and childcare cost. In two-parent 
families, Craig (2006) suggests that fathers are rarely alone with their children 
while undertaking childcare to relieve women of care responsibilities, whereas 
mothers are generally the primary caregivers in a family. Among single 
mothers, their work participation generally requires the arrangement of a 
similar number of childcare hours to look after the children. 
One issue associated with childcare modelling is that childcare prices are 
frequently endogenous as parents choose among a variety of providers 
offering differing levels of quality, price structure and other attributes, which 
are typically unobserved by researchers. A number of studies model the 
variations in childcare at the level of individuals, owing to regional differences 
in service charges and the type of childcare purchased (Averett, Peters, & 
Waldman, 1997; Connelly, 1992; Kimmel, 1995, 1998). Some other studies 
only control for geographic variation in the costs of childcare (Blau & Robins, 
1988; Han & Waldfogel, 2001). In more recent estimates, Breunig et al. (2011) 
and Breunig et al. (2012) employ different estimation methods that capture 
variations in regions and age-specific childcare types. Their results indicate the 
importance of accounting for the measurement imprecision stemming from 
data on the childcare price and childcare usage and find larger effects of 
childcare costs than earlier Australian estimates. 
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The following two subsections summarise the literature on the effects of 
childcare expenses on the employment decisions of parents from two 
noteworthy dimensions: the direct evaluation of employment implications of 
childcare costs (Averett et al., 1997; Breunig et al., 2012; Breunig et al., 2011; 
Connelly, 1992; Heckman, 1974; Klerman & Leibowitz, 1990; Powell, 1997), 
and the joint estimation of employment decisions and the utilisation of formal 
and/or informal childcare (Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, & Meghir, 2000; 
Blundell & Shephard, 2012; Connelly & Kimmel, 2003b; Doiron & Kalb, 
2005a; Kalb, 2009; Kimmel, 1995, 1998; Ribar, 1995). The results reveal that 
the estimated magnitude of the implications of childcare and associated 
monetary expenses on the employment of mothers remains largely in debate, 
while this effect is largely insignificant for men. The wide range of empirical 
results is not surprising given the vast differences that exist across studies with 
respect to modelling and estimation specifications, categorisation of childcare 
choices and the method used to calculate childcare prices.  
2.3.1. Direct Evaluation 
Many of the studies that directly evaluate employment responses to childcare 
costs have employed a similar approach, which involves estimating discrete 
employment decisions (for example, a Probit model) with the key explanatory 
variables being wage rates and childcare costs (see, for example, Anderson & 
Levine, 1999; Averett et al., 1997; Breunig et al., 2012; Connelly, 1992; 
Kimmel, 1995, 1998). In this approach, corrections are typically made to the 
estimation of the prediction equations to account for possible sample selection 
bias as the result of not observing wage rates and childcare costs for non-
working individuals. Traditionally, the separation of childcare costs and other 
fixed costs of work is not obvious. For example, Keane (1995) incorporates 
regional-specific work expenses in the household budget constraint, in which 
childcare expenses are implicitly controlled for. Unlike other components of 
work costs, information on childcare becomes readily available in recent 
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household surveys and can be explicitly identified. Several recent studies have 
incorporated childcare expenses into household budget constraint (Anderson 
& Levine, 1999; Rammohan & Whelan, 2007; Viitanen, 2005). 
An alternative is to examine the preferred household choice from a 
combination of discrete employment choices and modes of childcare. For 
example, Connelly and Kimmel (2003b) categorised childcare into three 
modes: centre-based care, in-home care and other informal care. They 
formulated the choice of childcare modes in a multinomial Logit model, 
whereas the predicted employment status is used as the explanatory variable. 
The reported price elasticity for centre, home-based and other informal care is, 
respectively, -2.30, -1.07 and 0.25 for married mothers and -4.02, -4.43 and 
0.27 for single mothers. Using a similar methodology to examine the 
employment choice of full-time and part-time versus different modes of 
childcare (centre-based care, relative, non-relative and parental care), 
Michalopoulos and Robins (2000) find that higher childcare costs significantly 
reduce the likelihood of using formal childcare. Their results are consistent 
with a number of studies that show the demand for care, in particular, centre-
based care, to be sensitive to the childcare price (see for example, Gordon, 
Gunderson, & Hyatt, 1996; Hofferth & Wissoker, 1992). Also, Blau and Hagy 
(1998) use a multinomial Logit model to consider the choice among a 
combination of discrete employment status and modes of childcare (centre-
based care, family day care, parental care and other childcare). They control 
for the potential endogeneity of the employment decision in demand for 
childcare and have found the demand for care is sensitive to employment 
decisions. 
Overall, overseas literature generally finds a negative relationship between 
formal childcare costs and maternal employment. Amongst studies that 
examine the employment effects of formal childcare costs, the range of 
estimated childcare price elasticities across studies is rather large, ranging 
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from -0.20 (Connelly, 1992) to -0.78 (Averett et al., 1997). Part of the reason 
for the large variation is related to substantial differences in their sample data. 
For example, Averett et al. (1997) restricted their analysis to a sample of 
mothers with preschool age children (under the age of six) and reported the 
largest employment elasticity of -0.78. Kimmel (1995) investigated the 
employment effects of low-income mothers in the United States and reported a 
childcare price elasticity of -0.35. 
Compared to overseas literature, the range of childcare price elasticity 
estimates for Australia is somewhat smaller lying between -0.65 and zero (see, 
for example, Breunig et al., 2012; Doiron & Kalb, 2005b; Rammohan & 
Whelan, 2005, 2007). At the lower end of estimates, for example, adopting a 
strategy similar to that in Connelly (1992) and Powell (1997), Rammohan and 
Whelan (2005) report an insignificant price elasticity of -0.06 for labour force 
participation. At the higher end, significant negative childcare price elasticities 
with respect to hours worked (-0.65) and with respect to participation (-0.29) 
are reported by Breunig et al. (2012), who relaxes the homogeneous 
assumption of childcare prices and allows children to face age-specific prices. 
The few studies of single mothers have also found that higher childcare costs 
decrease their labour supply (Berger & Black, 1992; Connelly, 1992; Kimmel, 
1995). Among the studies that compared the effects on married and single 
mothers, the effect of childcare costs on employment of single mothers is 
found to be larger than those on married mothers (Anderson & Levine, 1999; 
Michalopoulos, Robins, & Garfinkel, 1992). The exception is Kimmel (1998), 
who finds the effect of childcare costs greater for married mothers than for 
single mothers.  
2.3.2. Structural Approach 
A number of existing studies have extended beyond the conventional 
consumption and leisure space and household preference for childcare is 
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captured within the structural labour supply model. This approach recognises 
that childcare may be seen as beneficial to the child and not solely driven by a 
mother’s desire to work (see for example, Andrén, 2003; Apps & Rees, 2001; 
Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, & Meghir, 2007; Kalenkoski et al., 2009). For 
example, using the discrete choice approach, Andrén (2003) factors in the 
utilisation of paid childcare as a binary indicator in the utility function, and 
investigates the relationships of childcare costs, welfare program participation 
and the labour supply of single mothers. In this approach, the number and the 
ages of children are often used as taste shifters to capture heterogeneity in 
household preference for childcare, along with information that characterises 
the childcare market. Each household is assumed to make choices regarding 
consumption of non-childcare goods, leisure and childcare services so as to 
maximise household utility, subject to a series of constraints that apply to the 
household.  
An alternative approach is to formulate complete structural models based on 
utility maximizing behaviour and specific functional form assumptions, and 
estimate the quantity usage of childcare jointly with other parameters in the 
model. One of the key advantages of adopting the structural approach is the 
ability to incorporate the effects of childcare subsidies on the joint behavioural 
decisions across choices of employment and childcare modes, and to evaluate 
the employment effects of childcare subsidy programs. The use of childcare is 
typically captured through the incorporation of a time constraint, which is 
driven by complicated household decision-process and has often been 
implemented under restrictive assumptions. For example, under the strict 
equality assumption of hours worked and non-maternal childcare, Jenkins and 
Symons (2001) examine the effect of childcare costs on partnered women’s 
labour force participation. In their specification, each hour of work must be 
accompanied by an hour of childcare. As such, the cost of using market care 
contributes fully towards the costs of work. However, Blau (2001) points out 
that the strict equality assumption may overstate work costs in some cases, for 
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example, children being looked after by informal caregivers which involves 
little monetary costs. 
Several recent studies attempt to relax the strict equality assumption and allow 
hours worked to exceed the hours of market childcare (see, for example, 
Duncan & Harris, 2002; Kornstad & Thoresen, 2007). These studies typically 
make use of flexible time constraints to categorise a range of childcare and 
labour supply behaviour. Further, Blundell and Shephard (2012) and Blundell 
et al. (2013) extend the perspective of analysis from the static period into 
multi-periods and examine the inter-temporal decisions relating to 
employment and childcare over a life cycle. 
Regarding two-parent households, the male chauvinist assumption is often 
applied to the estimation of the structural models for identification purposes. 
Under this assumption, fathers’ time-input in work and care is typically fixed 
at the observed level, which implies that household employment-related usage 
of childcare is largely dependent upon the mother’s labour supply.4 The male 
chauvinist assumption provides a reasonable approximation for many families 
in which mothers are the primary caregivers. The use of the male chauvinist 
assumption dramatically simplifies the task of setting out time constraints for 
childcare usage and hours worked and has been applied in a number of studies 
(Connelly, 1992; Parera-Nicolau & Mumford, 2005). For example, using a 
cross-sectional dataset of married British parents, Parera-Nicolau and 
Mumford (2005) refined the male chauvinist assumption so that the mother is 
the only caregiver, and examined the impact of childcare costs on mothers’ 
labour supply.  
                                                 
4 The male chauvinist assumption takes the view that the parental contribution and labour supply of the male partner 
remains fixed, regardless of the labour responses of the female partner. This approach implies that the labour supply 
of the female is entirely independent of the labour supply of the male, which is unlikely to be completely true. As 
such, an increase in the male’s labour supply may result in an increased household disposable income while reducing 
the female’s labour supply, conditional on positive marginal utilities for consumption and negative marginal utilities 
for work. 
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For married couples, the estimated employment responses to childcare costs 
from studies taking a structural approach are lower in general. Several 
overseas studies have reported no significant relationship (amongst others, see 
Vera-Toscano, Phimister, & Weersink, 2004), in contrast to the large effects 
found in many developed counties (Anderson & Levine, 1999; Blau, 2001). In 
Australia, some earlier studies also reported small or insignificant impacts 
from childcare costs to labour supply (Doiron & Kalb, 2002, 2005a; Kalb, 
2006, 2009; Kalb & Lee, 2008). For example, Doiron and Kalb (2005a) and 
Kalb and Lee (2008) estimate a childcare cost equation alongside the labour 
supply model, enabling them to draw the distribution of formal and informal 
childcare costs. Results from these studies suggest that parents’ supply of 
labour is not very responsive to childcare affordability in Australia and 
imposing quantity constraints directly on the demand for childcare has 
potentially large effects on elasticity estimates. 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the literature on labour supply modelling, with a 
focus on the literature of childcare implications. It is in economists’ interests to 
unravel the complicated ways in which childcare is organised to facilitate 
work decisions. 
The first part of the chapter has reviewed the literature on the modelling 
household labour supply to highlight what is specific about theoretical 
frameworks. The literature on labour supply modelling is categorised into 
three segments, namely, the local linearization approach, the piecewise linear 
approach and the discrete choice approach. For each approach, a discussion of 
important features and properties is presented. 
Childcare is an essential component of the evaluation of employment 
responses of parents. The second part of this Chapter draws on the literature 
- 27 - 
from the segment of employment implications of childcare. It examines in 
more detail how childcare decisions have been incorporated in the past and 
what assumptions have been made. In particular, the discussion is led by two 
noteworthy dimensions. The first dimension includes related studies, which 
directly evaluate the employment implications of childcare costs. The second 
dimension focuses on the evaluation of employment decisions and the 
utilisation of formal and/or informal childcare. 
In short, this chapter has reviewed some of the theoretical arguments which 
will be elaborated at greater length in later chapters, where an analysis of the 
theoretical framework will be accompanied by empirical evidence. 
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Chapter 3. Background and Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
This thesis has set out to fulfil two important aims: to consider the 
employment implications of childcare and to account for employment effects 
of unemployed individuals. The research problems are clearly multi-layered 
and can be addressed by employing a variety of perspectives and approaches. 
Drawing on different stands of literature, Chapter 2 has provided an overview 
of the existing approaches to set the scene for the preceding empirical studies. 
In this chapter, the first objective is to present the specifics of the methodology 
and institutional context that the empirical analyses will address. The discrete 
choice approach is employed throughout all three substantive analyses in the 
thesis. It is therefore easier to discuss the methodology first and to discuss 
model variants in the subsequent chapters, which are developed for different 
research purposes. The second objective is to present a discussion of the data 
source used for empirical analyses in the thesis. In particular, the methodology 
used to construct and extract childcare variables is discussed. It follows that 
familiarity of these variables would facilitate an understanding of the 
preceding empirical analyses. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The first section presents the model 
specification of the discrete choice labour supply model, followed by a brief 
overview of the data source in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 concludes with some 
reflections on the use of the discrete choice method. 
3.2. Discrete Choice Labour Supply Model 
The specification of the discrete choice labour supply model presented in this 
section follows the common practices in modelling labour supply (Creedy & 
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Duncan, 2002; Creedy & Kalb, 2005; Van Soest, 1995). The labour supply 
model is formulated in a constrained optimisation problem, in which each 
household is assumed to maximise a predefined utility function subject to a 
household budget constraint. The model specification can be easily modified 
to capture the decision-process of single households.5 
In line with economic theory, the household utility function is formulated in 
the arguments of leisure and consumption. The nature of the model is static, 
which implies that decisions related to savings and investments are not 
modelled and the investment income is realised as part of the non-labour 
income. From the modelling perspective, household consumption is equivalent 
to disposable income and depends upon labour supply, wage rates, non-labour 
income, and tax and transfer rules.  
A unitary utility model is a specific type of structural labour supply model in 
which a unitary utility function is defined for the two partners residing in the 
same household. The household is assumed to act as if it is maximising a 
household utility function, and individuals are not assumed to be making an 
independent labour supply decision. The unitary household utility function is 
more efficient to model the employment decision process at the household 
level, especially among couple households, than some alternative approaches 
that model the bargaining process of intra-household members, such as the 
collective models applied in Blundell, Chiappori, et al. (2007) and Chiappori, 
Fortin, and Lacroix (2002). 6  In many cases, it is empirically difficult to 
measure non-labour income for each household member and to consider the 
                                                 
5 The single household specification can be derived straightforwardly by dropping relevant decision variables of a 
spouse. 
6 Some recent studies, for example, Bargain (2005) and Browning and Chiappori (1998), find that the implications of 
the general utility theory may be rejected when the unitary model is applied to households with more than two 
members. However, Blundell, MaCurdy, and Meghir (2007) recognise the collective model as better developed 
theoretically than applied empirically and provide a review of recent applications. 
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sharing rule of joint assets. The empirical analyses presented in the thesis thus 
impose no restrictions on the distribution rules of income and consumption. 
For illustration purpose, consider a household with a set of measured 
characteristics, 𝑋. The household maximises utility by selecting the number of 
hours worked, ℎ , subject to a number of constraints that apply to the 
household. Utility is determined by the amount of leisure and disposable 
income, and increasing in both the arguments and bound by time and budget 
constraints. The amount of leisure per week is defined as the total amount of 
time available per week, less the hours worked. 7  Total weekly income is 
restricted by the available amount of non-labour and labour income.  
Following the conventional setting, hours worked is used rather than leisure as 
the argument in the utility function, because labour supply is typically the key 
variable of interest. This formulation is consistent with the traditional 
consumption-leisure space view of model specification. The income tax and 
income support benefit rules are assumed to be fully known to the household. 
The household budget constraint is given as: 
𝑦 = 𝜇 +𝓌𝑓ℎ𝑓 +𝓌𝑚ℎ𝑚 − 𝑇(𝜏, 𝑋) + 𝐵(𝜏, 𝑋), (3.1) 
where 𝜇  is household non-labour income,  ℎ𝑓  and ℎ𝑚  represent the weekly 
labour hours of the female and male respectively;  𝓌𝑓 and 𝓌𝑚 are the hourly 
wage rates for female and male respectively, 𝜏 = 𝜇 +𝓌𝑓ℎ𝑓 +𝓌𝑚ℎ𝑚,  𝑇(∙) is 
the function of tax liabilities and 𝐵(∙) is the function of income support or 
transfer benefits and weekly household disposable income is denoted by 𝑦. 
The household utility function is formulated in the arguments of disposable 
income, 𝑦, and hours worked of both spouses, ℎ𝑓 and ℎ𝑚, and is given as:  
                                                 
7 That is, given a fixed time endowment, 𝑇, the hours of leisure, 𝑙, is thus determined by hours worked as 𝑙 = 𝑇 − ℎ. 
- 31 - 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑦, ℎ𝑓 , ℎ𝑚|𝑋). (3.2) 
The formulation of discrete choices is based on the nature of employment. 
Because most employment contracts require working hours in integers, the 
likely result is limited number of hours in employment (Gong & Van Soest, 
2002). In this regard, individuals are essentially choosing a set of discrete 
working hours, especially when facing demand side constraints. The 
traditional piecewise linear approach can thus be viewed as an approximation 
of the discrete choice problem. For each couple household, respectively, 𝐽𝑓 
and 𝐽𝑚 discrete points are formulated for the female and the male, resulting in 
a total of 𝐽 = 𝐽𝑓 × 𝐽𝑚 discrete choices. The construction of the choice set is 
typically based on rounding reported working hours to the nearest discrete 
points. The first discrete point, 𝑗 = 1, has value of zero hours and corresponds 
to not working. 
Each spouse within the household simultaneously chooses her or his time-
spent in work from the choice set 𝐻 = (ℎ𝑓 , ℎ𝑚) to maximise equation (3.2), 
subject to equation (3.1) and non-negativity constraints, ℎ𝑓 ≥ 0, ℎ𝑚 ≥ 0. The 
decision rule of a household is given as: 
Choose alternative 𝑗 iff 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘 ∀ 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐽, 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗, (3.3) 
where 𝑈𝑗 denotes the evaluation of the equation (3.3) for the choice 𝑗 obtained 
by inserting time and budget constraints evaluated at that combination. The 
household is assumed to choose the discrete choice 𝑗, which yields the highest 
utility 𝑈𝑗 subject to all constraints. 
3.2.1. Empirical Specification 
The subscript 𝑖 is used to index households. The labour supply model assumes 
that household, 𝑖 , maximises over the predefined utility function, 𝑈 , by 
choosing from a finite choice set, 𝐻. Following the common practice (Breunig 
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et al., 2008; Van Soest et al., 2002), an additive stochastic term 𝜖𝑖  is 
introduced in the household utility function, 𝑈𝑖:  
𝑉𝑖 = 𝑈(ℎ𝑓𝑖 , ℎ𝑚𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖|𝑋) + 𝜖𝑖. (3.4) 
The residual term, 𝜖𝑖, can be interpreted as capturing unexplained process by 
the individual in evaluating labour supply. The inclusion of the individual-
specific errors ensures a non-zero probability of each choice.  
The likelihood contribution of each household is the probability that the 
observed choice results in the highest utility in the choice set. That is, the 
probability for household, 𝑖, to choose the observed choice, 𝑗, is given as: 
𝑃𝑖,𝑗 = Pr(𝑈𝑖,𝑗 > 𝑈𝑖,𝑘 ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗) 
= Pr(𝜖𝑖,𝑗 − 𝜖𝑖,𝑘 < 𝑉𝑖,𝑗 − 𝑉𝑖,𝑘 ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗) 
= ∫ 𝐹(𝜖𝑖,𝑗 − 𝜖𝑖,𝑘 < 𝑉𝑖,𝑗 − 𝑉𝑖,𝑘 ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗)𝑓(𝜖𝑖)𝑑𝜖𝑖
∞
−∞
. 
(3.5) 
Equation (3.5) implies that the absolute level of utility is irrelevant to the 
optimal choice; rather, the choice probability depends only on the relative 
utility differences. 
The random disturbance, 𝜖𝑖 , are assumed to follow Type I Extreme Value 
distribution.8 Applying the Daly-Zachary-Williams theorem, the probability of 
choosing the alternative, 𝑗, can be expressed in a closed form: 
                                                 
8 The probability density function of Type I Extreme Value distribution is 𝑓(𝜖) = 𝑒−𝜖𝑒−𝑒
−𝜖
 and the cumulative 
distribution function is 𝐹(𝜖) = 𝑒−𝑒
−𝜖
, 𝜖 ∈ 𝑅. 
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Pr[𝑈𝑖,𝑗 > 𝑈𝑖,𝑘 for all 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗] =
∂ ln(∑ 𝑒𝑉𝑖,𝑗𝐽𝑗=1 )
𝜕 ln𝑉𝑖,𝑗
=
𝑒
𝑈(𝑦𝑗,ℎ𝑓𝑖,𝑗 ,ℎ𝑚𝑖,𝑗|𝑋)
∑ 𝑒
𝑈(𝑦𝑗,ℎ𝑓𝑖,𝑗 ,ℎ𝑚𝑖,𝑗|𝑋)𝐽
𝑘=1
. 
(3.6) 
The model thus results in a probability function similar to a conditional Logit 
model with random preferences (Train, 2009, pp. 153-163).  
3.2.2. Heterogeneity in Preference for Work 
Both spouses are assumed to decide simultaneously their time-spent in hours 
worked. The utility function is expressed as the second polynomial expansion 
in the arguments of hours worked and household consumption.9 The use of 
second polynomial expansion of its arguments provides a good approximation 
of a variety of utility functional forms, while remaining relatively flexible to 
allow each pair of arguments to be substitutes or complements. As such, the 
household utility function is defined as: 
𝑈(ℎ𝑓 , ℎ𝑚, 𝑦|𝑋) = 𝑣
′𝐴𝑣′ + 𝑏′𝑣, (3.7) 
where 𝐴 is a symmetric matrix and 𝑏 is a coefficient vector with element 𝑏𝑘. 
For couple households 𝑣 = (𝑦, ℎ𝑓 , ℎ𝑚)
′
, matrix 𝐴 has elements 𝐴𝑝𝑞 , (𝑝, 𝑞 =
1,2,3) and vector 𝑏 has elements (𝑏𝑦, 𝑏𝑓 , 𝑏𝑚).  
In order to account for heterogeneity in household preferences, the preference 
coefficients for work are parameterised with respect to both observed and 
unobserved characteristics. In addition, the common practice incorporates 
                                                 
9 Similar settings have been applied in Keane and Moffitt (1998) and Van Soest et al. (2002). Alternative utility 
functional forms of the discrete choice method include linear (Lokshin, 2004), log-linear specification (Domeij & 
Flodén, 2006; Van Soest, 1995). 
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unobserved heterogeneity terms, 𝜀s, in the preference equations linearly and 
additively: 
𝑏𝑓 = 𝑋𝑓𝛽𝑓 + 𝜀1, and 
𝑏𝑚 = 𝑋𝑚𝛽𝑚 + 𝜀2, 
(3.8) 
where 𝑋𝑓 and 𝑋𝑚 are vectors of exogenous characteristics.
 10 The error terms 
𝜀1  and 𝜀2  can be interpreted as random preferences due to unobserved 
characteristics. 
3.2.3. Modelling Unobserved Wages 
One of the problems faced by studies of labour supply behaviour is that wage 
rates are generally not observed for individuals who are unemployed or not in 
the labour force. In the discrete choice setting, this poses a problem because 
the budget constraint requires the imputation of wage earnings for all labour 
supply choices.  
Existing studies have applied different approaches to resolve this issue, such 
as the Tobit wage model, the Heckman (1979) model and simultaneous wage 
estimation. The important difference between the Tobit and Heckman method 
is that the latter specifically incorporated an endogenous selection equation to 
control for labour force participation in a binomial model. A large variety of 
studies apply the Heckman method to impute wage rates for non-working 
individuals (see, for example, Blundell, Duncan, & Meghir, 1998; Creedy & 
Duncan, 2002). An alternative approach is to simultaneously estimate wage 
rates and the probability of labour force participation in the labour supply 
model (Breunig et al., 2008; Fraker & Moffitt, 1988; Gerfin, 1993; Van Soest 
                                                 
10 The independent variables used to estimate the linear part of the utility parameters are assumed to be exogenous to 
the model. Such exogeneity assumption is necessary to facilitate the estimation of the structural model, following Van 
Soest et al. (2002) and Breunig et al. (2008). This specification is simple but flexible in that it allows for the 
possibility of diminishing marginal utility for consumption and for leisure with respect to different observed 
characteristics.  
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et al., 2002). Estimating wage rates for non-working individuals tends to 
increase the computational burden because it increases the dimensions of the 
covariance matrix of error terms and the tax and benefits need to be calculated 
for each imputed wage. This thesis thus adopts the more parsimonious 
approach to estimate wage rates prior to the discrete labour supply model. 
Wage rates for females and males are estimated separately. 
The Heckman (1979) model is applied to correct for possible selection bias as 
the result of only observing wages for working individuals. The before tax 
wage rates and hours worked are assumed to be independent, since wage rates 
are observable only for the discrete choice that corresponds to the observed 
hours worked.11 The wage estimation consists of estimating a system of two 
equations simultaneously. The first equation, the selection equation, estimates 
the probability of labour force participation given observed individual 
characteristics. The second equation, the wage equation, estimates wage rates 
conditional on employment. The error terms of these two equations are 
allowed to be correlated in the bivariate normal distribution. 
In the selection equation, individual, 𝑖, is assumed to be employed if market 
wage exceeds her reservation wage. Introducing a latent variable, 𝑧∗ , the 
selection equation is formulated as: 
𝑧𝑖
∗ = 𝑋𝑧𝑖
′ 𝜃𝑧 + 𝜀𝑧𝑖 , (3.9) 
where 𝑋𝑧𝑖 is the matrix of individual characteristics and 𝜃𝑧 is a vector of the 
estimated coefficients. 
                                                 
11 A number of studies have also applied this assumption, see for example, Van Soest and Das (2001) and Kornstad 
and Thoresen (2007). Note that Moffitt (1984) and Tummers and Woittiez (1991) imposed structural relationships 
between hours and pre-tax wage rates and specified choice-specific wage equations to relax the independence 
assumption. 
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Denote the binary indicator of employment as 𝑧𝑖, which takes the value 1 if 
household member, 𝑖 , is employed and 0 if not. The realisation of 𝑧𝑖
∗ 
determines whether the individual is working (𝑧𝑖 = 1) or not working (𝑧𝑖 =
0): 
𝑧𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖
∗ > 0 
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖
∗ ≤ 0
. (3.10) 
Let 𝓌𝑖  denote the wage rate and let 𝑋𝓌𝑖  be a matrix of characteristics of 
individual, 𝑖. The wage equation is given as: 
ln(𝓌𝑖) = {
𝑋𝓌𝑖
′ 𝜃𝓌 + 𝜀𝓌𝑖 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖
∗ > 0
n.a.                    𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖
∗ ≤ 0
, (3.11) 
where 𝜃𝓌  is the parameter vector measuring the impact of the observed 
characteristics 𝑋𝓌𝑖 on the log of wage rates, and 𝜀𝓌𝑖 is the stochastic terms in 
the wage equation. 
In equation (3.9) and (3.11), the error terms, 𝜀𝓌𝑖  and 𝜀𝑧𝑖 , are assumed to 
follow a bivariate normal distribution, which is given as: 
(
𝜀𝓌i
𝜀𝑧𝑖
)~𝑁 ((
0
0
) , (
𝜎𝓌𝑗
2 𝜌𝑧𝓌𝑗𝜎𝓌𝑗
𝜌𝑧𝓌𝑗𝜎𝓌𝑗 1
)), (3.12) 
where 𝜌𝑧𝓌 represents the correlation coefficient between the error term of the 
wage equation, 𝜂𝓌𝑗 , and the error term in the selection equation, 𝜀𝑧𝑖 . The 
term, 𝜎𝓌𝑖,  is the standard deviation of the error term, 𝜀𝓌𝑖 . Note that the 
variance of 𝜀𝑧𝑖 is normalised to one for identification purposes. 
The parameters of the Heckman wage equation and the selection equation are 
jointly estimated using maximum likelihood. The individual specific log 
likelihood is given as: 
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ln ℒ𝓌𝑖 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
lnΦ
{
 
 
𝑋𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑧𝑖 +
(ln(𝓌𝑖) − 𝑋𝓌i𝜃𝓌i)𝜌𝑧𝓌i
𝜎𝓌i√1 − 𝜌𝑧𝓌i
2
}
 
 
−
(
ln(𝓌𝑖) − 𝑋𝓌i𝜃𝓌i
4𝜎𝓌i
)
2
− ln(√2𝜋𝜎𝓌i)  𝑖𝑓 𝓌𝑖  observed
lnΦ(−𝑋𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑧𝑖)  𝑖𝑓𝓌𝑖  not observed 
, (3.13) 
where Φ(. ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
Using the conditional expected wage rates from the Heckman selection model 
may lead to inconsistent estimators because the labour supply model is highly 
non-linear. Van Soest and Das (2001) suggest that the wage distribution must 
be considered when using the predicted wages in the discrete labour supply 
model. The selectivity of labour force participation is determined by the 
correlation term, 𝜌𝑧𝓌𝑖, and would lead to biased conditional means if wage 
rates are predicted with errors. In order to derive consistent estimators, errors 
of the wage estimation are explicitly incorporated in the labour supply model 
using simulation techniques, following Van Soest and Das (2001). 
Specifically, the conditional means of log wage rates are given as: 
𝐸[ln(𝓌𝑖) |𝓌𝑖  is observed] 
= 𝐸[ln(𝓌𝑖) |𝑧𝑖
∗ > 0] = 𝑋𝓌i𝜃𝓌i + 𝐸[𝜂𝓌i|𝜂𝑧𝑗 > −𝑋𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑧𝑗], and 
(3.14) 
𝐸[ln(𝓌𝑖) |𝓌𝑖  is not observed] 
= 𝐸[ln(𝓌𝑖) |𝑧𝑖
∗ ≤ 0] = 𝑋𝓌𝑖𝜃𝓌𝑖 + 𝐸[𝜂𝓌𝑖|𝜂𝑧𝑖 ≤ −𝑋𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑧𝑖]. 
(3.15) 
Applying the theorem of Moments of the Truncated Normal Distribution 
(Greene, 2012, p. 866), equation (3.14) and (3.15) yield: 
{
 
 
 
 𝐸[ln(𝓌𝑖) |𝓌𝑖  is observed] = 𝑋𝓌i𝜃𝓌i +
?̂?𝑧𝓌i?̂?𝓌i𝜙(𝑋𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑧𝑖)
Φ(𝑋𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑧𝑖)
𝐸[ln(𝓌𝑖) |𝓌𝑖  is not observed] = 𝑋𝓌i𝜃𝓌i −
?̂?𝑧𝓌i?̂?𝓌i𝜙(𝑋𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑧𝑖)
Φ(𝑋𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑧𝑖)
. (3.16) 
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If wage rates are not observed, the linear prediction is biased upwards because 
the expected means of the second terms in equation (3.16) are non-zero. It is 
possible to integrate out the second term in the labour supply model estimation 
by recovering the distribution of unobserved wage rates. The distribution of 
this term conditional on unobserved wage is given as: 
𝜂𝓌𝑖|𝓌𝑖  is not observed 
~𝑁(−
?̂?𝑧𝓌i?̂?𝓌i𝜙(𝑋𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑧𝑖)
Φ(𝑋𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑧𝑖)
, ?̂?𝓌i
2 [1 − ?̂?𝑧𝓌i
2 𝛿(𝑋𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑧𝑖)]), 
(3.17) 
where 𝛿(𝑋𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑧𝑖) =
𝜙(𝑋𝑧𝑖?̂?𝑧𝑖)
Φ(𝑋𝑧𝑖?̂?𝑧𝑖)
∙ [
𝜙(𝑋𝑧𝑖?̂?𝑧𝑖)
Φ(𝑋𝑧𝑖?̂?𝑧𝑖)
+ 𝑋𝑧𝑖𝜃𝑧𝑖]. 
Let 𝑅  pseudo random numbers for each individual be drawn from the 
distribution described in equation (3.17), and the wage rate for the 𝑟th draw is 
predicted as: 
ln(?̂?𝑖,𝑟) = 𝑋𝓌𝑖𝜃𝓌i + ?̂?𝓌i,𝑟 𝑖𝑓 𝓌𝑗  is not observed, or 
?̂?𝑖,𝑟 = 𝑒
𝑋𝓌i?̂?𝓌i+?̂?𝓌𝑖,𝑟  𝑖𝑓 𝓌𝑖  is not observed. 
(3.18) 
Equation (3.18) implies that the likelihood contribution of an individual hence 
depends on her or his employment status. 
In the discrete choice labour supply model, wage earnings for working 
individuals are based on the actual wages rates. For non-working individuals, 
𝑅 pseudo draws are taken from the estimated wage distribution to correct the 
selectivity bias and to calculate wage income for each discrete choice. 
3.2.4. Modelling Non-Participation 
In a number of studies, the costs associated with working have been 
incorporated in the labour supply estimation (Breunig et al., 2008; Creedy & 
Duncan, 2002; Van Soest et al., 2002). The costs of work can be interpreted as 
monetary and non-monetary expenses that are incurred to engage in market 
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work and to recover from work. The costs of work are likely to be large 
relative to explicitly monetary costs and concave in the hours worked (Heim & 
Meyer, 2004). 
Traditionally, the treatment of work costs has been relatively straightforward 
where many empirical studies have specified these costs as fixed costs of entry 
into the labour force. For example, Cogan (1980) has incorporated fixed costs 
of work in a structural model of participation, wages and hours worked. 
Although implications of the tax system are not incorporated in the model, the 
results show that the estimated costs of work for married women are negative 
and significant. Since Cogan (1980), work costs have been an essential 
component in formulating labour supply models and have also been extended 
to the discrete choice approach literature. Callan and Van Soest (1996) 
incorporate fixed costs of work in the discrete choice model and suggest that 
the inclusion of fixed costs of work provides the benefit of correcting the 
problem of underestimating the non-working population. The discrete choice 
model without fixed costs of work may result in a large observed portion of 
unemployment left unexplained.  
The fixed costs of work is incorporated additively in the budget constraint 
equation (3.1), following common practice (Callan & Van Soest, 1996; Creedy 
& Duncan, 2002; Creedy & Kalb, 2005). Household disposable income is 
lowered by the fixed costs if an individual works positive hours. The inclusion 
of the fixed costs of work allows discrete income difference between market 
participation and non-participation and thus can be viewed as an 
approximation of the reservation wage. With fixed costs of work, the equation 
of household disposable income is defined as: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 +𝓌𝑓𝑖ℎ𝑓𝑖  +𝓌𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑚𝑖 − 𝑇(𝜏𝑖, 𝑋) + 𝐵(𝜏𝑖, 𝑋) − 𝐹𝑚𝐼(ℎ𝑚 > 0)
− 𝐹𝑓𝐼(ℎ𝑓 > 0). 
(3.19) 
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In equation (3.19), the 𝐹𝑓 and 𝐹𝑚 are the fixed-costs coefficients for females 
and males respectively, and 𝐼(∙) is a binary indicator function equal to one if 
the argument in the parenthesis is true, and equal to zero otherwise. 
In practice, costs of work are largely unobservable and household surveys are 
unlikely to gather complete information on the costs arising from working. 
The problem is compounded by the fact that only work costs associated with 
actual working hours are observable. If there were no heterogeneity in these 
costs, data from a large enough number of individuals working a sufficiently 
large variety of working hours could be used to construct an overall cost of 
work function (Kalb & Scutella, 2003). However, such datasets generally do 
not contain enough observations spread out over the entire continuum of 
possible hours of work to make such a procedure feasible. Hence, the fixed 
costs of work within the discrete choice model are imputed rather than being 
estimated and are parameterised with respect to individual characteristics to 
capture variations at the individual level. 
𝐹𝑠 = 𝑋𝜃𝑠
′𝜃𝑠, 𝑠 = 𝑓 or 𝑚, (3.20) 
where 𝜃s represent the vector of the estimated coefficients, 𝑋𝜃s represents a 
vector of observable taste shifters, and 𝑠 equals 𝑓 for females, 𝑚 for males. 
Note that equation (3.20) is an imputation rather than the estimation of fixed 
costs and stochastic terms are therefore not included. 
3.2.5. Slutsky Equations 
Satisfaction of regularity conditions implied by economic theory is essential 
since the specification of the utility function is non-parametric. The general 
consumption theory requires utility function to be increasing in disposable 
income. That is, the consumption composites are normal goods and 
individuals are rational by consuming only on the frontier of the budget 
constraint rather than in the interior. This implies that the marginal utility of 
income must be positive for all individuals: 
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2𝛼1𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼6ℎ𝑓𝑖 + 𝛼7ℎ𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽1 > 0. (3.21) 
Violating condition (3.21) suggests that income is interior and leads to an 
outcome that is inconsistent with the optimisation assumption. It implies that 
estimation results cannot be easily interpreted and are not suitable for the 
evaluation of policy implications.12 
Unlike the concavity condition with respect to net income, marginal utility for 
hours worked is not a regularity condition. The marginal utility of hours 
worked is allowed to be either positive or negative. For example, an individual 
with a strong taste for work may be associated with positive marginal utility of 
work. These regularity conditions are calculated for each individual and tested 
once the estimation results are obtained. 
3.2.6. Estimation and Forecast 
The final specification of the model consists of two stochastic terms, 𝜀s, from 
parameterising the linear part of utility parameters. Hence, a total of four 
elements in the covariance matrix need to be estimated. The likelihood 
function for household, 𝑖, is given as: 
ℒ𝑖 = ∫ ∏(
𝑒𝑈(𝑦𝑗,ℎ𝑓𝑗,ℎ𝑚𝑗,𝑐𝑓𝑗,𝑐𝑚𝑗|𝑋)
∑ 𝑒𝑈(𝑦𝑗,ℎ𝑓𝑗,ℎ𝑚𝑗,𝑐𝑓𝑗,𝑐𝑚𝑗|𝑋)𝐽𝑘=1
)
𝐼(𝐻𝑖=𝑗)𝐽
𝑗=1𝜀
𝜙(𝜀)𝑑(𝜀), (3.22) 
where 𝜙(∙) is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. 
The evaluation of the likelihood function involves multiple integrals, which 
requires the use of the Maximum Simulated Likelihood (Train, 2009). The 
expectation of the log likelihood is replaced by simulated means where the 
                                                 
12 If the condition (3.21) is violated, a feasible solution is to impose restrictions on the model parameters and to re-
estimate the model. However, the condition does not need to be imposed a priori in the discrete choice model. Instead, 
it may be checked after the model has been estimated. 
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residual terms are randomly drawn from the corresponding distribution for 
each observation in the sample. Van Soest et al. (2002) suggest that 20 draws 
are sufficient to yield robust results and the estimation in this thesis is carried 
out using the same number of draws. 
To forecast the supply of labour, the unconditional estimated probability 
associated with each discrete choice is calculated based on observed 
characteristics and tax and benefit rules (Creedy & Kalb, 2005). From 
equation (3.22), it is straightforward to derive the unconditional probability of 
each discrete choice: 
𝑃?̂? =
𝑒𝑉𝑖,𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝑉𝑖,𝑘𝐽𝑘=1
, (3.23) 
where 𝑃?̂? denotes for the probability associated with choice 𝑗. 
The expected value of the labour supply can be derived by aggregating the 
unconditional probabilities over the expected value of each choice: 
E(ℎ𝑞𝑗) =∑?̂?𝑞𝑗
𝑗
ℎ𝑞𝑗 , 𝑞 = 𝑚 or 𝑓, (3.24) 
where 𝐸(ℎ𝑓𝑗) and 𝐸(ℎ𝑚𝑗) represent the expected hours worked for choice 𝑗 
by female and male respectively. 
Alternatively, the estimated employment responses can be evaluated using the 
calibration method proposed by Creedy and Kalb (2005). The calibration 
method consists of drawing for each household a set of random terms from the 
Extreme Value Type I distribution to generate a perfect match between the 
predicted choice and the observed choice. Specifically, the random error terms 
are added to the expected utility as in equation (3.4). For each household, the 
predicted labour supply corresponds to the discrete hour point that yields the 
highest probability. The random error terms are accepted if the model results 
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in the observed labour supply being the optimal choice for the household. 
Otherwise another set of error terms are drawn and checked. The same set of 
random terms are then used to predict the employment effects as the result of 
marginal increase in the wage or change in tax and benefit rules. Given an 
individual’s characteristics and draws of error terms, the probability of each 
discrete choice after the change can be determined. The marginal effects are 
calculated from the proportional change in the working hours of the optimal 
choice. Averaging the marginal effects over a large number of draws provides 
robust transition matrices, especially for those discrete hour points with low 
probability.  
3.3. Data Source 
Data for the thesis is sourced from the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA).  
The HILDA Project is managed by the Melbourne Institute of Applied 
Economic and Social Research and is a longitudinal panel of representative 
Australian households since 2001. The HILDA is particularly well-suited for 
the purpose of this dissertation for a number of reasons. First, it was 
specifically designed to collect detailed information on income, childcare and 
household demographics and to provide better data on these variables than that 
obtained from most other surveys in Australia. Second, it was conducted after 
the enactment of the welfare reform legislation and many other important 
policy changes of the late-1990s. Third, the HILDA is one of the few national 
household surveys with information on childcare usage and costs. Finally, it 
provides national-wide coverage and a relatively large sample of households. 
In HILDA, approximately 8,000 survey respondents are interviewed on an 
annual basis. Responding households are asked questions regarding household 
demographics, health and economic characteristics and information on other 
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family members who reside in the same household. The main variables of 
interest are employment, childcare, marital status, age, educational attainment, 
hours worked, wage rates, work experience, non-labour income and health 
status. Information on these variables are extracted from different waves of 
HILDA and then merged to form a sufficiently large sample suitable for 
analysis. Specifically, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 make use of information on 
childcare, including childcare arrangements, time-use and monetary expenses 
for each child.  
A possible source of confusion is that the term children may refer to various 
age ranges in different studies.13 While in HILDA, children refers to young 
dependent children under the age of 14 within a household, in this thesis, 
children specifically refers to those aged less than 12 years. Part of the reason 
is that the data suggest childcare is rarely used for children older than 12 years 
(see Section 3.3.1 for descriptive statistics). 
The following sections present firstly a brief discussion of the Australian 
childcare sector, followed by the procedure to construct variables related to 
household childcare usage and childcare prices. 
3.3.1. Types of Childcare Services 
The childcare sector, commonly referred to as Early Childhood Education and 
Care (ECEC), is complicated in Australia, not least because there is a mixture 
of overlapping services with different organisational and availability forms.14 
                                                 
13 A number of studies or institutions have defined the age range of children differently. For example, Australian 
Bureau of Statistics uses the term children to refer to preschool age children, to children aged between 1 and 12 years 
(Andrén, 2003), to children under the age of 12 (Breunig et al., 2012; Doiron & Kalb, 2005a), to children under the 
age of 14 (Breunig et al., 2011) and to children under the age of 18 (Kalb & Scutella, 2003). 
14 Throughout the thesis, the term childcare is used to refer the entire range of early childhood education and care 
services in Australia.  
- 45 - 
Parents may use one or several childcare types of childcare services, which 
vary markedly in their availability and characteristics.  
The Commonwealth Government of Australia provides different types of 
financial assistance to the childcare sector, including payments to the users 
and the providers. The amount of public funding has more than doubled since 
2004, increasing from $1.7 billion in 2004-2005 to $4.4 billion in 2012-2013 
(Department of Education Employment and Workplace Relations, 2010). In 
the interim, the proportion of parents using formal childcare has been 
significantly increased. According to Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011a), 
the percentage of children under the age of 12 who received formal childcare 
has increased from 14 percent in 1996 to 24 percent in 2011. 
In HILDA, respondents report their time-use and costs with respect to a total 
of 19 types of childcare: care delivered by parents at the workplace or 
elsewhere, siblings, child self-care, grandparents at home or elsewhere, other 
relatives at home or elsewhere, friends or neighbours at home or elsewhere, 
babysitters or nannies, family day care, outside of school hours care at the 
child’s school or elsewhere, long day care at the workplace or elsewhere, 
kindergartens or preschools, ex-partner and other arrangements such as 
playgroups. In this thesis, the range of childcare services is categorised into 
two broad modes, namely, informal childcare and formal childcare.  
Informal care refers to childcare services delivered in-home or out-of-home by 
siblings, relatives, friends and neighbours. Such services are usually 
unregulated and are often cheaper in monetary terms for the user. However, 
they may be associated with other costs and are subject to the availability of 
providers.  
Compared to informal childcare arrangements, formal care generally produces 
better outcomes than informal care in terms of factors such as relationships 
with peers at preschool, independence, task focus and learning capabilities at 
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school age (Harrison & Ungerer, 2005). For many households, formal 
childcare functions as a form of early childhood education to facilitate the 
growth of children, to enhance school and later educational outcomes, and/or 
to augment the learning and development that occurs within the home. Formal 
care includes paid sitters or nannies, outside of school hours care, family day 
care, long day care, kindergarten and preschool. A key difference between 
informal childcare and formal childcare in Australia is that formal childcare 
services are largely regulated under the National Quality Framework.15 This 
framework puts in place compulsory national standards and a quality rating 
system to ensure high quality early childhood education and care across 
Australia. Childcare providers in the formal childcare sector must be properly 
qualified and licensed.  
Centre-based care is the most dominant form of formal childcare in Australia.  
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011a) reveals that approximately 57 
percent of all children using approved childcare services attended centre-based 
care services such as long day care, kindergarten and preschools, followed by 
outside school hours care (33 percent) and family day care or in-home care (9 
percent). In centre-based care, supervision is typically provided by registered 
or approved caregivers to meet the casual or long-term needs of childcare, and 
is conducted in group sessions. Ideally, centre-based care is suitable for 
children under the school-age. Family day care centres differ, since they 
typically operate on a smaller scale, while offering higher staff-to-child ratios 
and flexible time schedules. Kindergartens and preschools in general offer 
early childhood education programs suitable for children between four to six 
years of age. These programs generally match school schedules, however, are 
not a pre-requisite for school entry. For school-aged children, the after-school 
                                                 
15  The National Quality Framework has been introduced over a number of years with formal implementation 
beginning in 2012. It has moved towards integrating childcare and education, with a stronger emphasis on the 
educational aspect of services (Australian Children's Education and Care Quality Authority, 2013). 
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care function is akin to centre-based care and aims to provide safe and 
educational coverage for children before and after school and possibly during 
school holidays if parental supervision is unavailable.  
Other less common forms of formal childcare include babysitters, playgroups 
and occasional care. Parents may also opt for a registered baby sitter, most 
likely on a one-to-one basis for in-home and out-of-home care. However, the 
market for babysitters is largely unregulated and the costs of using such 
services are sometimes difficult to identify.16 Next, playgroups refer to self-
managed voluntary sessions typically set up by parents and designed to 
provide family activities in which children learn through play. The majority of 
playgroups are managed by parent committees and parents are also typically 
involved on a rolling basis in the actual running of the playgroup (Hancock et 
al., 2012). Finally, occasional care is provided to meet the irregular demand 
for childcare, which can often be booked with short notice, for example, when 
parents are called for a job interview. Childcare services in this category are 
less standard and may exist in a variety of forms. 
3.3.2. Childcare Usage 
Information on parenting activities and childcare usage are extracted from 
separate questionnaires in HILDA. In particular, households report their 
weekly time spent in parenting activities in self-completed questionnaires and 
the childcare usage and payment for each child in the household survey 
questionnaires. The information from self-completed questionnaires and the 
household survey questionnaires are matched at the household level to 
construct relevant childcare variables. 
                                                 
16 For example, some babysitters are not members of the family but frequently live with the family. 
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In the self-completed questionnaire, respondents in HILDA need to report 
their weekly time-spent in a variety of activities, including parental care 
activities. Within parental care activities, individuals are asked to identify the 
time spent playing with their own children, helping with personal care, 
teaching, coaching, supervising children or transporting children to childcare 
or school. 
Table 3-1 sets out information on childcare usage by the age of the child for 
two important subgroups: partnered parents and single mother households. 
The first dataset is based on pooling information pertaining to partnered 
households across HILDA wave 9 to wave 11, corresponding to the period 
from 2009 to 2011. These households are identical to the sample data used for 
the analysis in Chapter 4 and the process of sample formulation is described in 
detail in Section 4.4. The sample consists of 2,555 children under the age of 
12 years, who reside in partnered households. The second dataset is derived 
from the empirical analysis for single mothers in Chapter 5. The sample 
formulation criteria is presented in Section 5.4. The sample data is pooled 
using HILDA waves 6 to 10, collected between 2006 and 2010, and consists of 
1,884 children who live in single mother households. The pooling across 
waves of HILDA has raised a dataset consisting sufficient sample observations 
to provide robust estimates of childcare usage by the age of child. The 
construction of measures for informal and formal care use is based on the 
aggregation of child-specific usage of corresponding childcare types, as 
discussed in 3.3.1. 
The reported parental care hours are assumed to be provided to all children 
simultaneously because the HILDA data does not provide an opportunity to 
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distinguish parental care for each child. As a result, the amount of parental 
care in multi-children households is likely to be overstated.17 
TABLE 3-1 HOUSEHOLD WEEKLY TIME SPENT IN PARENTAL CARE AND CHILDCARE BY AGE OF CHILD 
AGE OF 
CHILD 
OBS.  
HOURS OF CARE 
PER WEEK (1) 
 
HOURS OF PARENTAL 
CARE PER WEEK (2) 
 PROPORTION OF TIME-USE BY TYPE (3) 
(a) Single Mothers† Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev.  Mother Father Formal Informal 
< 1 73  49.40 (34.31)  45.55 (34.76)  0.94 - 0.02 0.03 
1 86  52.67 (31.10)  37.52 (25.91)  0.72 - 0.16 0.12 
2 98  63.34 (41.58)  40.68 (31.40)  0.65 - 0.20 0.15 
3 101  58.64 (36.19)  31.79 (25.73)  0.55 - 0.27 0.18 
4 100  52.79 (31.23)  28.01 (21.48)  0.53 - 0.29 0.18 
5 113  39.77 (27.85)  29.67 (22.73)  0.75 - 0.14 0.11 
6 110  31.32 (20.08)  22.99 (17.62)  0.75 - 0.10 0.15 
7 137  30.32 (22.34)  23.36 (18.43)  0.78 - 0.08 0.14 
8 144  27.86 (22.48)  20.04 (16.82)  0.72 - 0.09 0.19 
9 148  26.92 (21.18)  19.30 (18.42)  0.74 - 0.08 0.19 
10 143  26.75 (23.98)  20.44 (22.98)  0.80 - 0.07 0.13 
11 154  26.59 (23.12)  20.88 (20.60)  0.80 - 0.04 0.16 
12 141  20.95 (19.58)  17.39 (18.17)  0.85 - 0.01 0.14 
13 155  18.25 (16.47)  14.34 (13.34)  0.81 - 0.00 0.19 
14 181  15.72 (13.56)  13.35 (12.70)  0.88 - 0.00 0.12 
Total 1884  32.34 (29.01)  23.63 (22.57)  0.76 - 0.09 0.15 
             
(b) Partnered households‡          
< 1 169  74.70 (29.02)  65.56 (30.90)  0.66 0.22 0.07 0.05 
1 171  77.89 (27.97)  56.73 (27.85)  0.50 0.23 0.18 0.09 
2 153  73.51 (26.74)  53.45 (25.82)  0.52 0.20 0.18 0.10 
3 166  76.43 (29.02)  54.11 (28.51)  0.48 0.23 0.22 0.07 
4 154  63.62 (25.85)  44.52 (23.04)  0.47 0.23 0.23 0.07 
5 175  49.17 (23.84)  42.60 (23.46)  0.58 0.28 0.09 0.05 
6 182  43.90 (22.29)  39.79 (21.70)  0.60 0.31 0.04 0.05 
7 167  39.52 (20.12)  34.67 (20.08)  0.57 0.31 0.06 0.06 
8 170  38.38 (21.26)  33.86 (19.35)  0.57 0.31 0.05 0.06 
9 156  35.44 (17.93)  31.60 (17.41)  0.58 0.31 0.04 0.07 
10 180  31.77 (18.44)  28.64 (18.10)  0.57 0.33 0.03 0.07 
11 156  26.45 (14.70)  23.41 (13.94)  0.58 0.30 0.04 0.08 
12 181  27.47 (16.98)  24.73 (16.13)  0.56 0.34 0.02 0.08 
13 190  21.82 (16.00)  19.86 (15.19)  0.57 0.34 0.00 0.09 
14 185  21.58 (15.17)  20.35 (14.28)  0.58 0.36 0.00 0.06 
Total 2,555  46.14 (29.95)  37.88 (25.61)  0.56 0.29 0.08 0.07 
† Sample data is sourced from HILDA wave 2006 – 2010. The sample selection criteria is presented in 
Section 4.4. 
‡ Sample data is sourced from HILDA wave 2009 – 2011. The sample selection criteria is presented in 
Section 5.4. 
Table 3-1 presents summary statistics related to the childcare usage for 
partnered households and single mothers. The ‘Hours of Care’ (column (1)) is 
                                                 
17 Approximately 43 percent of single mother households and 58 percent of partnered parents have more than two 
children. 
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summed across parental care, formal care and informal care for each 
individual child in the household. The total time-spent in caring for children is 
on average 32.3 hours per week for single mothers and 37.9 hours per week 
for partnered households. This is in line with a priori expectation, since single 
mothers likely provide less care due to the absence of the other parent. In two-
parent households, mothers are likely to be the dominant caregivers and on 
average spend twice as much time as their spouse on parenting activities. 
The first pattern to note is that younger children require significantly more 
hours of care, as shows in column (1). Among partnered households, a child 
less than one-year old receives on average 65.6 hours of care per week, most 
of which are provided by parents rather than formal or informal caregivers. 
Once the child reaches 12 years of age, the average provision of care falls to 
approximately 24.7 hours per week. With respect to single mother households, 
the pattern of childcare usage is largely consistent.  
The demand for childcare is generally lower for older children, in part due to 
school enrolment and increasing independence of children. In many 
circumstances, those younger children can be looked after by their older 
siblings, which in turn lowers the overall need for childcare. Note that for 
single mothers, the number of care hours peaks at two years of age, where 
each child is reported to require an average of 63.3 hours of care per week. 
Slightly fewer hours (49.4 hours per week) are observed among infants less 
than one year of age. The observed fall in childcare hours for infants may be 
related to the difficulty for survey respondents to disaggregate time-spent in 
parental care from other home activities, such as house cleaning.  
A second observation is that hours of care decline sharply from age four to age 
six, coinciding with school attendance. For partnered households, the number 
of hours of care per week declines from 63.6 hours at the age of four to 
approximately 43.9 hours at the age of six. A similar trend similar trend is also 
observed amongst single mother households. In particular, a significant 
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proportion of the reduction is attributed to the fall in the use of formal care, 
where the fraction of formal care falls from 23 percent at the age of four to 4 
percent at the age of six for partnered households and from 29 percent to 10 
percent for single mothers (as shown in column (3)). The data suggest that 
parents likely replace preschool childcare services with school attendance, 
once the child reaches school-age. As such, the proportion of time-spent in 
formal care gradually declines to approximately one percent at the age of 
twelve. On the other hand, informal childcare accounts for 5 to 10 percent of 
overall care for partnered households and 11 to 19 percent for single mothers. 
The fraction of informal care remains relatively stable for most age groups.  
The patterns reported in Table 3-1 are consistent with those identified in a 
study based in the United Kingdom - Kalenkoski, Ribar, and Stratton (2005) 
analysed the time use of parents with children aged less than 18 years. In their 
study, household members were asked to complete a weekday and weekend 
time diary to identify primary and secondary activities for each ten-minute 
interval over a weekday and a weekend. Their results indicate that an average 
of 2.58 hours per day (approximately 18 hours per week) is allocated to 
parental childcare activities in single mother households, while an average of 
4.4 hours per day (approximately 30.8 hours per week) is allocated to parental 
childcare activities for cohabiting households.18  
The results in Table 3-1 provide not only an overview of childcare usage by 
age of child, but also essential information on care usage which can be used to 
capture a range of work and care activities in the preceding analyses. The 
mean values of childcare usage are used to formulate structural time 
constraints to describe the amount of childcare required for children. The 
formulation of time constraints will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 
                                                 
18 Note that Kalenkoski et al. (2005) calculated the time-spent by aggregating a weekday and a weekend time diary.  
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for the analysis of partnered households and in Chapter 5 for the analysis of 
single mothers.  
3.3.3. Childcare Prices 
This section discusses the formulation of childcare prices, an essential 
component of the calculation of childcare expenses. In Australia, childcare 
services exhibits large regional variations in availability, quality and fee 
structures (Breunig et al., 2012; Kalb, 2006). Self-reported prices are likely to 
be endogenous if childcare is offered with varying attributes, which are 
unobserved by the researcher. One challenge in any analysis of childcare is to 
identify the appropriate price faced by users. 
The calculation of childcare prices in this thesis follows Breunig et al. (2012). 
As discussed earlier in Section 2.3, this approach has the advantage of relaxing 
the homogeneity assumption of household childcare prices and at least 
partially resolves the endogeneity issue of price. Their findings suggest that 
the bias as the result of using a ‘single price’ for all age groups is more 
pronounced for less homogeneous samples, such as in those samples 
consisting of both preschool and school-aged children. This is particularly 
relevant to the research scope in this thesis, since the analyses presented in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are confined to households with children under 12 
years of age. The following section briefly discusses the procedure to 
construct childcare prices from the HILDA dataset. 
In HILDA, information on childcare usage and costs are offered at different 
levels. HILDA provides detailed information on childcare time-use for each 
child and for each type of childcare. However, information on childcare costs 
is aggregated across all children in the household. The monetary childcare-
costs for each child is available to the researcher, but the type-specific 
childcare costs need to be estimated. As such, price construction begins with 
the calculation of the net childcare hourly price for each childcare type. 
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Specifically, the reported childcare hours are first rounded to the nearest length 
of session to reflect childcare pricing schemes. The childcare usage for 
preschool children is rounded up in multiples of five hours (half-day). The 
childcare usage for school-aged children is rounded up in multiples of three 
hours.19  
Next, the entitlement of Child Care Benefits (CCB) is recovered based on 
household demographics and taxable income since the reported childcare 
expenses in HILDA is net of CCB (Breunig et al., 2012; Rammohan & 
Whelan, 2005). It is necessary to note that some types of care, in particular, 
paid sitters, nannies, kindergartens and preschools are assumed to be ineligible 
for childcare subsidies in the form of CCB. Other types of formal care, in 
particular, family day care, long day care, out of hours care and vocational 
care are eligible for CCB payments. Further, net childcare costs for each child 
are calculated as proportional usage of gross childcare costs. For each child, 
the gross hourly price of each type of childcare is defined by dividing the sum 
of net costs and CCB by childcare usage. Let subscript 𝑛 index children in the 
household, 𝑡 index the type of childcare: 
𝑝𝑘,𝑡 = (𝑒𝑡 ∙
𝑐𝑘,𝑡
∑ 𝑐𝑘,𝑡𝑘
+ 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝑘,𝑡) /𝑞𝑘,𝑡, (3.25) 
where 𝑝𝑘,𝑡 is the gross hourly price of childcare for type 𝑡 and child 𝑘, 𝑒𝑡 is the 
net cost of childcare type 𝑡 across all children in the household, 𝑞𝑘,𝑡  is the 
number of hours spent in childcare type 𝑡  by child 𝑘 , and 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝑘,𝑡  is the 
estimated CCB payments for child 𝑘 type 𝑡.  
                                                 
19 Childcare sessions at a long day care centres and family day care centres are generally at least five hours in duration. 
After-school care sessions are typically three hours for school-aged children. 
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Consider the following example in which a hypothetical household reports a 
net cost of $100 using 20 hours of family day care. The first child consumes 
10 hours per week of family day care. If the estimated CCB benefit of 10 
hours care is $25, the estimated gross childcare price for the first child is 
($100 ×
10
20
+ 25) /10 = $7.50 per hour. 
The child-specific price 𝑝𝑘 is constructed by aggregating the gross childcare 
expenses across all childcare types. 
𝑝𝑘 =
∑ 𝑝𝑘,𝑡𝑞𝑘,𝑡𝑡
∑ 𝑞𝑘,𝑡𝑡
. (3.26) 
Childcare prices are assumed to be specific with respect to three age groups: 0 
to 2 years, 3 to 4 years and 5 to 12 years. The price of each age group is 
replaced by the median values in the Labour Force Survey Region (LFSR) in 
which the household resides. 20 Calculating childcare prices by age group at 
the level of LFSR thus captures regional variations of childcare characteristics 
and taste variations of different age groups. 
Breunig et al. (2012) has provided a summary of descriptive statistics of 
constructed childcare prices. These statistics are consistent with the State-
specific average prices from Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011a). A 
limitation of the childcare price calculation is that the reported childcare prices 
from the HILDA dataset may be subject to selection effects and other 
constraints in which the childcare is provided. The selection effects refer to the 
situation in which families choose the type of care that is most affordable. If 
the selection factor is significant, the full distribution of prices available to 
                                                 
20 The labour force survey regions are established by the Australian Bureau of Statistics with the objective to provide 
information on the quality of estimates in small area data from the Labour Force Survey. In 2011, there were 77 
labour force survey regions across Australia. A list of regions is provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(2013). 
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everyone will be higher than the distribution of actual expenditures. On the 
other hand, other constraints may limit the availability of childcare, such as 
fixed duration and increased fees in after-hours care. Powlay (2000) found that 
the observed prices are frequently not constant with respect to the length of 
childcare. For example, the hourly prices for long day care centres of less than 
ten hours per week are found to be significantly higher than those using more 
than ten hours. However, this implication is ignored in this analysis, and can 
be an interesting issue to be addressed in future research.  
Note that in this thesis, preschools are treated in the same way as other formal 
childcare services. Unlike other formal childcare, preschools typically operate 
during school term and have educational programs. In addition, the duration of 
preschools is generally fixed, which means that observed hours may not reflect 
demanded hours (Kalb et al., 2005). From the modelling point of view, the use 
of preschools facilitates parent’s labour supply by relieving care 
responsibilities from parents. Hence they are considered as formal childcare in 
this thesis, even though the Australian Bureau of Statistics does not categorise 
them in this way.  
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to provide an overview of the methodological 
framework, and to explain the data source used throughout the thesis. 
Relatively more space has been given to the first part, because the process of 
deriving the sample data will be discussed in more detail in the following 
chapters. 
The first part of this chapter presents the framework of the theoretical model 
that sets out the groundwork for three substantive empirical analyses from 
Chapter 4 to Chapter 5. It starts by describing the specification of the 
conventional household utility maximisation framework, and moves on to 
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discussing the individual component in the discrete choice labour supply 
model. The key assumptions required and the methodology used to estimate 
the model parameters are also addressed.  
The second part presents a brief discussion of the dataset used for each 
analysis, with a focus on describing the construction of childcare-related 
variables. In particular, the time-spent pattern in three modes of care, namely, 
parental care, formal care, and informal care, is summarized by the age of the 
child for partnered parents and single mothers. Not only do these empirical 
statistics provide an overview of the childcare usage pattern, they also provide 
essential information on care usage to form the fundamentals of the structural 
time constraints, which are used to capture a range of work and care activities 
in the preceding analyses. 
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Chapter 4. Labour Supply and Childcare Decisions of 
Partnered Parents 
In Australia, public policies have increasingly provided assistance to families 
with dependent children and encouraged parents, especially females, to return 
to the labour market following the birth of a child. In this context, there is 
widespread consensus that childcare plays a crucial role in facilitating the 
transition into employment during the childrearing phase. A better 
understanding of the implications of childcare on labour-market activities is 
likely of high value to inform policy discussion. This chapter provides an 
insight into the impact of childcare costs and childcare subsidy programs such 
as the Child Care Rebate (CCR), on labour market activities of partnered 
parents.  
Specifically, the analysis presented in this chapter investigates the sensitivity 
of the labour market outcome of partnered parents to wage rates and childcare 
price, while accounting for a range of income support programs in Australia. 
The standard discrete choice model, which is discussed in Chapter 3, is 
extended to capture the behaviours of parenting activities and labour supply of 
partnered parents. Structural time constraints are incorporated to capture 
household childcare considerations in real-life and are imposed so that both 
decisions of childcare and the supply of labour are considered in a single 
framework.  
The model estimates are then used to simulate household employment 
responses following an increase in wage rates and childcare price. In addition, 
this analysis inspects the employment effects of four hypothetical payment 
schemes that can be considered as alternatives to the current settings of the 
Child Care Rebate (CCR). The results suggest that childcare subsidy programs 
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can be important policy instruments to promote women’s labour force 
attachment, whereas their impact on men is small. 
4.1. Introduction 
Childcare plays a key role in balancing the trade-offs between work, leisure 
and other family commitments among households with young dependent 
children. To fully participate in market work, couple households may 
coordinate their provision of parental care or organise childcare to relieve 
themselves from care responsibilities. Unlike households without children, the 
dominant caregiver, usually the mother, faces the choice of not returning to the 
workforce and parenting children on her own or organising appropriate formal 
or informal childcare to cover the times that she works. The costs of childcare 
services, especially among low-income families, may represent a significant 
fraction of household consumption. Taking childcare decisions into account 
thus has important implications on modelling labour supply responses of 
households with dependent children. 
Within the neoclassical labour supply models, economists generally positioned 
household labour supply decisions in an optimisation problem in which the 
household maximises utility in the space of consumption and leisure, subject 
to constraints that apply to the household. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, a 
number of studies have disaggregated general household consumption into 
childcare and non-childcare consumption to capture household preference for 
childcare and to facilitate the evaluation of employment decisions among 
families with dependent children. For example, Andrén (2003) and Lokshin 
(2004) incorporate the use of paid childcare into the household utility function, 
thereby allowing for a fixed utility difference between childcare and non-
childcare users. In addition, recent studies that incorporate structural time 
constraints to characterise childcare usage (see, for example, Blundell et al., 
2000; Creedy & Kalb, 2005; Kalb & Lee, 2008), estimate childcare expenses 
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conditional on the level of observed labour supply. These studies serve to 
illustrate the diversity of earlier attempts to integrate the childcare decisions in 
the labour supply models.  
In this chapter, an extended discrete labour supply model is formulated to take 
into account household childcare decisions. The labour supply decisions of 
parents can be viewed as the result of the optimisation process of balancing 
childcare commitments and the preferences over leisure and income. The 
development of the model is based on two important employment implications 
of childcare. First, childcare services relieve parents from care responsibilities 
and free up time for work and other activities. In a simple situation where the 
mother is the dominant caregiver of a single child, the mother must organise 
childcare to cover desired working hours. Parents, in general, have a tendency 
to use childcare services to free up care responsibilities for both employment 
and non-employment purposes. Second, childcare expenses reduce household 
disposable income and childcare costs and usage are interdependent upon the 
supply of labour (Connelly, 1992; Doiron & Kalb, 2005a; Heckman, 1974). 
Costs of childcare are part of work disincentives and are likely to have 
negative effects on the female labour supply.21  
Specifically, a set of childcare time constraints for each parent and the child is 
incorporated in the structural labour supply model to capture the effects of 
time substitutions between work and childcare in real-life. Two specifications 
of the model are estimated, namely, the male chauvinist specification and the 
                                                 
21 Changes to childcare prices and subsidies may affect household fertility decisions. Fertility decision has been 
considered as a decisive factor in the level of labour supply and found to be sensitive to the expected costs of 
childcare (see, among others, Blau and Robins (1989), Moffitt (1984), and Schultz (1990)). In response to improved 
childcare subsidies, households may shift their fertility to earlier stages of their lifecycle or increase the number of 
childbirths. These considerations have significant impact on parents’ labour supply and can be addressed using multi-
stage models or life-cycle models, which incorporate the decisions of fertility (see, for example, Keane and Wolpin 
(2010) and Sommer (2013)). In the thesis, we follow the assumptions adopted in many static structural labour supply 
models (Callan & Van Soest, 1996; Euwals & Van Soest, 1999; Van Soest, 1995; Van Soest et al., 2002), that the 
fertility decisions are assumed to be exogenous in the model. As such, rather than considering the implications of 
fertility decisions, our models focus on the short-term labour supply effects of the proposed policy changes. 
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two-agent specification. The male chauvinist assumption treats the fathers’ 
decisions as exogenous and has been widely applied in earlier studies 
(Kornstad & Thoresen, 2007; Parera-Nicolau & Mumford, 2005). In the male-
chauvinist specification, the mother in the household is assumed to be the 
single decision maker and chooses the optimal time allocation between work 
and parental care to maximise a predefined utility function, subject to all 
constraints. The second specification, the two-agent model, relaxes the male 
chauvinist assumption by including the arguments of the father in the 
household utility function. The two-agent model fits better to the situation in 
which coordination of parental care between two spouses takes place. 
The decisions of time allocation in work and parental care activities are jointly 
estimated in a single structural model using Maximum Simulated Likelihood 
(MSL). In particular, the time allocation is discretised into a set of discrete 
hour points, at which the choice probabilities are simulated using Monte Carlo 
methods rather than evaluated by conventional numerical methods. The use of 
the simulation method has a number of advantages. These include overcoming 
the problem of evaluating multiple integrals arising from limited dependent 
variable equations and avoiding the need to derive an analytic solution to the 
choice problem.  
The chapter begins by describing the theoretical model in Section 4.2 and is 
followed by Section 4.3, which outlines its empirical specification. Section 4.4 
details the descriptive statistics of the sample data and Section 4.5 presents the 
results of the wage estimation and the labour supply model. The estimated 
results are compared with other relevant empirical studies in Section 4.6, 
which is followed by policy simulations in Section 4.7. Section 4.8 concludes 
the chapter. 
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4.2. Theoretical Model 
The model specification follows some of the common practices in the existing 
literature. Households are assumed to maximise a predefined utility function 
which is formulated in the arguments of consumption and leisure (Van Soest, 
1995). The specification of the budget constraint is similar to Andrén (2003), 
which consists of labour income, non-labour income, childcare expenses and 
tax and income support benefits. 
In the labour supply model, each parent chooses their time-spent in work and 
parental care to maximise a predefined household utility function subject to 
time and budget constraints. The household utility function is defined in the 
arguments of disposable income, 𝑦, and the leisure of both spouses, 𝑙𝑓 and 𝑙𝑚: 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑦, 𝑙𝑓 , 𝑙𝑚|𝑋), (4.1) 
where 𝑙𝑓  and 𝑙𝑚  represent hours of leisure for the female and male 
respectively; 𝑦 denotes for household disposable income, and 𝑋 represents the 
observed household characteristics.22 
To better capture the decision-making process of parents, leisure time is 
disaggregated between time-spent in caring for children and in non-parenting 
leisure time. This has been motivated by two reasons. First, parental care 
represents a significant proportion of parents’ time, especially for mothers of 
preschool aged children. Data suggest that the average time-spent in parental 
care is 30 hours for mothers and 14 hours for fathers per week (see Section 
3.3.2 for descriptive statistics). The average time-spent in parenting activities 
of females exceeds their working hours. Females’ time-spent in the provision 
of parental care is also close to their hours worked among cohabited or couple 
                                                 
22 Recent studies that specify the household utility function in arguments of consumption and leisure include Van 
Soest (1995), Van Soest et al. (2002) and Breunig et al. (2008).  
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households in other developed countries, for example, see Hill and Stafford 
(1980) for the United States and Kalenkoski et al. (2005) for the United 
Kingdom. The significant time-spent in the provision of parental care thus 
prompts the need to factor the decision of parental care in the labour supply 
model. 
Next, from the perspective of parents, it is natural to evaluate time-spent in 
parental care separately from work and non-parenting leisure time. Since 
parents can rarely look after their children while at work, time-spent in 
parental care and work are unlikely to overlap. The provision of parental care 
reduces time and energy available for work and other activities. In addition, 
parenting activities such as educating children and looking after children 
typically require costly effort. The negative interaction between the preference 
for parental care and labour market activities has been evidenced in a number 
of studies. For example, Arpino, Pronzato, and Tavares (2010) suggest that 
women with a strong preference for parental care have a higher tendency to 
exit the labour market and look after their children at home.  
In the labour supply model, three sets of structural time constraints are 
introduced to characterise household employment and childcare decisions. The 
first set of time constraints, equation (4.2), assumes that parents only spend 
time among work, parental care and leisure activities. 
𝑙𝑠 + ℎ𝑠 + 𝑐𝑠 = ?̅?, 𝑠 = 𝑓 or 𝑚. (4.2) 
In equation (4.2), ?̅? is the fixed time endowment in a week, ℎ𝑠 denotes hours 
worked, 𝑐𝑠  denotes hours of parental care, 𝑠 equals to 𝑓  and 𝑚  to represent 
female and male, respectively.23 
                                                 
23  The empirical specification defines the fixed time endowment as the sum of the largest discrete hour point 
formulated for hours worked and hours of parental care, which is equal to 124 hours per week (seven days). Different 
values of ?̅? have been attempted and the results suggest that the choice of any reasonable ?̅? values hardly affects the 
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The second set of time constraints assumes that each child requires a certain 
amount of childcare (𝐶?̅?): 
𝑞𝑘 ≥ 𝐶?̅? − 𝑐𝑓 − 𝑐𝑚 − 𝑟𝑘 (4.3) 
In equation (4.3), for child 𝑘, 𝑞𝑘 is the quantity of formal childcare purchased 
in the market; 𝑟𝑘 includes the amount of other childcare activities in a given 
week, such as childcare provided by relatives or friends, or the amount of time 
children stay alone; 𝑐𝑓 and 𝑐𝑚 denote for the weekly parental care by females 
and males respectively.24 The hours worked and parental care must be non-
negative, 𝑐𝑓 ≥ 0, 𝑐𝑚 ≥ 0, ℎ𝑓 ≥ 0, ℎ𝑚 ≥ 0.  
Equation (4.3) is introduced to ensure that child, 𝑘, receives sufficient care to 
meet her childcare needs, 𝐶?̅?.
 Note that the data is insufficient to identify the 
period when parental care is simultaneously provided to more than one child, 
or whether supervision of both parents takes place at the same time. To cope 
with this data issue, two further assumptions are necessarily made. Parents are 
assumed to maximise coordination in providing parental care and the 
provision of parental care is delivered to all children within the household.25 In 
this respect, the sum of parenting activity of both parents represents the upper 
bound for the actual provision, because full coordination in parental activities 
                                                                                                                                
model estimates. The time-spent in leisure activity is assumed to equal the slack of time during which an individual is 
neither working nor parenting, 𝑙𝑠 = ?̅? − ℎ𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠, 𝑠 = 𝑓 or 𝑚. 
24 The time constraint rules out the possibility that children look after themselves. However, in the dataset a small 
fraction of school-aged children reported having been left alone. The amount of time being alone is included in the 
‘other childcare activities’. In addition, the formulation of time constraints denies the possibility that non-participating 
mothers may be observed using no informal care. As the cost of informal care is generally lower than formal care, the 
model tends to overestimate the costs of childcare, and to report lowered preferences for work and underestimated 
wage elasticities. 
25  Some earlier studies find little evidence that a male’s involvement in care activities relieves females of the 
responsibility to pursue other activities such as paid work. For example, Craig (2006) uses data from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Time Use Survey (TUS) collected in 1997 and finds that men are more likely to adopt the 
role of helper in parenting tasks than substituting their parenting time for their wives’. A sensitivity test has been 
conducted by removing fathers’ contribution in parental care, and it finds little impact on the estimation results. 
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is not always possible. Equation (4.3) suggests that sufficient market childcare 
must be arranged to meet any unmet childcare responsibility. As such, one can 
interpret the usage of market childcare, 𝑞𝑘, as the minimum level of formal 
childcare to fulfil the unmet care responsibility for child, 𝑘, conditional on the 
provision of parental care and informal care. 
It is assumed that the mean values of the total childcare hours presented in 
Section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3 are indicative of the level of supervision or care that 
children of different ages require. The mean values of total care hours for 
different child ages are first rounded to the nearest multiple of five hours and 
are used to define the expected level of childcare, 𝐶?̅?, in equation (4.3).  
The third set of time constraints ensures a minimum level of childcare to be 
attached to each level of labour supply. Parents cannot freely choose to work 
any desired hours, simply because they cannot care for their children while at 
work. In order to work, children can be either looked after by the other spouse 
or a non-parental caregiver. Consider the mother of a child who works for ℎ𝑚 
hours, the sum of the childcare arrangement net of parental care input by the 
mother, 𝑐𝑓 + 𝑞𝑘 + 𝑟𝑘, must greater or equal to ℎ𝑚 for each child if ℎ𝑚 ≤ 𝐶?̅?. 
Assume ℎ𝑚 ≤ 𝐶?̅? and ℎ𝑓 ≤ 𝐶?̅?, the minimum level of childcare required for 
the mother to work ℎ𝑚, and for the father to work ℎ𝑓 is given as: 
𝑐𝑓 + 𝑞𝑘 + 𝑟𝑘 ≥ ℎ𝑚, and 
𝑐𝑚 + 𝑞𝑘 + 𝑟𝑘 ≥ ℎ𝑓 . 
(4.4) 
The inequality signs in equation (4.4) state that the sum of child 𝑘’s formal 
care 𝑞𝑘, informal care 𝑟𝑘 and parental care by the male 𝑐𝑚 must be sufficient 
to cover the period in which his spouse is away at work, ℎ𝑓 . A similar 
interpretation applies in the case of the female. 
From equation (4.3) and (4.4), the minimum amount of formal childcare, ?̃?𝑘, 
for child 𝑘 associated with working hours ℎ𝑚 and ℎ𝑓 is given as: 
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?̃?𝑘|ℎ𝑚, ℎ𝑓 = max{
𝐶?̅? − 𝑐𝑓 − 𝑐𝑚 − 𝑟𝑘
min(ℎ𝑚 − 𝑐𝑓 − 𝑟𝑘, 𝐶?̅?)
min(ℎ𝑓 − 𝑐𝑚 − 𝑟𝑘, 𝐶?̅?)
}. (4.5) 
Consider a simple numerical example of a hypothetical household with a four-
year old child. Given that the child requires 60 hours of childcare per week 
and the mother and father respectively provide 30 and 20 hours of parental 
care, the minimum requirement of childcare implied in equation (4.3) is 60 −
30 − 20 = 10 hours per week. Suppose that the mother engages in 25 hours 
of market work and the father fully coordinates by contributing his 20 hours of 
parental care when the mother is away, equation (4.4) suggests that an 
additional 5 hours of childcare must be arranged. Similarly, if the father works 
40 hours per week, the corresponding amount of formal care required to 
support the same level of labour supply will be 10 hours, netting out the 
parental care contribution of the mother. Equation (4.5) suggests that the 
minimum required level of childcare for this household is max{10,5,10} = 10 
hours per week.26  
Informal childcare consists of childcare provided by friends and relatives, 
either in-home or out-of-home. Unlike market childcare, it is typically 
associated with little or no monetary costs to the user. To keep the model 
tractable, the decision of using informal care is assumed to be exogenous.27 
The use of informal care is assumed to be fixed at the observed level and 
remain exogenous to labour supply and parental care decisions. 
                                                 
26 The condition, min(. , 𝐶?̅?), is required to account for the possibility that the level of formal childcare does not 
increase in hours worked if the required level of childcare, 𝐶?̅?, is sufficiently low. For example, suppose the required 
childcare for a 12-year old child is 20 hours per week and there is no provision of parental care and informal care. If 
the mother works 30 hours a week, in this case, a total of 20 hours of childcare is required for this child. 
27  Similar assumptions have been applied in a number of earlier studies; see for example, Parera-Nicolau and 
Mumford (2005). 
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The income tax and income support benefit rules are assumed to be fully 
known to the household. To complete the model, the household budget 
constraint is given as: 
𝑦 = 𝜇 +𝓌𝑓ℎ𝑓 +𝓌𝑚ℎ𝑚 −∑𝑝𝑘?̃?𝑘
𝑘
− 𝑇(𝜇,𝓌𝑓 , ℎ𝑓 ,𝓌𝑚, ℎ𝑚, 𝑋)
+ 𝐵(𝜇,𝓌𝑓 , ℎ𝑓 ,𝓌𝑚, ℎ𝑚, 𝑋), 
(4.6) 
where 𝜇  is non-labour income, 𝓌𝑓  and 𝓌𝑚  are the hourly wage rates for 
females and males respectively, 𝑝𝑘 is the hourly price of formal childcare, and 
child 𝑘’s expected level of formal childcare is ?̃?𝑘. 𝑇(∙) is the function of tax 
liabilities, and 𝐵(∙) is the function of income support benefits. 
The inclusion of childcare expenses in the budget constraint in equation (4.6) 
is supported by evidence of the interrelation between female labour supply and 
childcare costs (Del Boca, 2002; Viitanen, 2005). In fact, for economically 
disadvantaged families, childcare expenses may be a significant component of 
the budget set. 
4.3. Empirical Specification 
This section presents the empirical specification of the labour supply model. 
The labour supply and parental childcare decisions are modelled as the 
outcome of choosing among a finite set of choices, similar to the formulation 
in Van Soest (1995) and Keane and Moffitt (1998). The specification is close 
to the conditional Logit specification with random preferences. In addition, the 
correlations of unobserved heterogeneity in household preferences are 
explicitly modelled in the estimation. 
Consider household, 𝑖, which chooses among a finite number of alternatives, 𝐽, 
where 𝑗 is used to index the choice set. Each spouse within the household 
simultaneously chooses between time-spent in work and parental care from the 
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choice set 𝐻 = (𝑙𝑓 , 𝑙𝑚, 𝑐𝑓 , 𝑐𝑚) to maximise equation (4.1) subject to equation 
(4.3), (4.6) and non-negativity constraints, 𝑙𝑓 ≥ 0, 𝑙𝑚 ≥ 0, ℎ𝑝 ≥ 0, ℎ𝑓 ≥
0, ℎ𝑜 ≥ 0. In particular, assume the decision process of the household is given 
as: 
Choose alternative 𝑗 iff 𝑈𝑖𝑗 > 𝑈𝑖𝑠 ∀ j, 𝑠 = 1,… , 𝐽, 𝑠 ≠ 𝑗, (4.7) 
where 𝑈𝑖𝑗  denotes the evaluation of equation (4.1) for the choice 𝑗  of 
household 𝑖 obtained by inserting time and budget constraints evaluated at that 
combination. 
The empirical specification requires an additive stochastic term in household 
utility, following common practices in discrete choice models: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑖(𝑦𝑗, 𝑙𝑓𝑗, 𝑙𝑚𝑗 , 𝑐𝑓𝑗, 𝑐𝑚𝑗|𝑋) + 𝜖𝑖𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽. (4.8) 
The choice specific error terms 𝜖𝑖𝑗  capture unobserved factors that affect 
utility but are not included in 𝑉𝑖𝑗. They can be viewed as idiosyncratic tastes of 
the individual. The inclusion of choice specific errors has the implication of 
ensuring a non-zero probability of each state.  
The random disturbances 𝜖𝑖  are assumed to follow Type I Extreme Value 
distribution. Applying the Daly-Zachary-Williams theorem, the probability of 
choosing the alternative 𝑗 can be expressed in a closed form: 
Pr[𝑈𝑖𝑗 > 𝑈𝑖𝑠 for all 𝑠 ≠ 𝑗] =
∂ ln(∑ 𝑒𝑉𝑗𝐽𝑗=1 )
𝜕 ln 𝑉𝑗
=
𝑒𝑈(𝑦𝑗,𝑙𝑓𝑗,𝑙𝑚𝑗,𝑐𝑓𝑗,𝑐𝑚𝑗|𝑋)
∑ 𝑒𝑈(𝑦𝑗,𝑙𝑓𝑗,𝑙𝑚𝑗,𝑐𝑓𝑗,𝑐𝑚𝑗|𝑋)𝐽𝑘=1
. 
(4.9) 
The model thus results in a probability function similar to a conditional Logit 
model with random preferences. Section 4.3.1 to Section 4.3.3 presents the 
remainder of the empirical specification. 
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4.3.1. A Male Chauvinist Model Specification 
This section outlines the empirical specification of the model with the male 
chauvinist assumption. The male chauvinist assumption implies that the 
decisions of the father are exogenous and the mother is the single decision-
maker in the model. In the next subsection, Section 4.3.2, the male chauvinist 
assumption is relaxed and both spouses within the household simultaneously 
decide and coordinate their employment and care activities.  
A number of studies indicate that fathers rarely undertake care activities in a 
manner that relieve women of the responsibility for care (see, for example, 
Craig, 2006). Men are more likely to adopt the role of parental helper in the 
parenting tasks rather than substitute for their wives’ parenting time. This 
assumption has also been adopted in a number of earlier studies. 28  If the 
employment and care decisions of husbands are less responsive to the 
decisions made by their wives, the male chauvinist view provides a reasonable 
description of actual household behaviours.  
In the male chauvinist assumption, the female is the sole decision maker. As 
such, only parameters relevant to the female are estimated. The deterministic 
part of the household utility function consists of three arguments, 𝑦, 𝑙𝑓 and 𝑐𝑓. 
For the 𝑗th discrete choice, the household utility function is formulated using 
the second polynomial expansion of these arguments, following Van Soest et 
al. (2002) and Breunig et al. (2008). 
𝑉𝑗 = 𝛼1𝑦𝑗
2 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑓𝑗
2 + 𝛼3𝑐𝑓𝑗
2 + 𝛼4𝑦𝑗𝑙𝑓𝑗 + 𝛼5𝑦𝑗𝑐𝑓𝑗 + 𝛼6𝑙𝑓𝑗𝑐𝑓𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑓𝑗
+ 𝛽2𝑐𝑓𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑦𝑗 . 
(4.10) 
                                                 
28  See, for example, Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) for a review of overseas studies and Kalb (2002) for 
Australian labour supply studies. 
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From equation (4.5), the expected formal childcare conditional on hours 
worked by the mother is given as: 
?̃?𝑘|ℎ̅𝑚, 𝑐?̅? = max {
𝐶?̅? − 𝑐?̅? − 𝑐𝑓 − ?̅?𝑘,
min(ℎ𝑓 − 𝑐?̅? − ?̅?𝑘, 𝐶?̅?)
}, (4.11) 
where ℎ̅𝑚, 𝑐?̅?, ?̅?𝑘 represents hours worked by the male, hours of parental care 
undertaken by the male and hours of information care for child 𝑘 , these 
variables are assumed to be exogenous in this specification. Equation (4.11) 
ensures that sufficient time coverage is provided for each child in the 
household and for the period in which the mother is away for work. 
In short, the model consists of the utility equation (4.10), the time constraints 
equations (4.3) and (4.4), the budget constraint equation (4.6) and relevant 
non-negativity constraints, and can be summarised as: 
Max𝑉𝑗 (𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽), 
𝑠. 𝑡. T̅ = 𝑙𝑓 + ℎ𝑓 + 𝑐𝑓 , 
?̃?𝑘𝑗|ℎ𝑓𝑗 = max {
𝐶?̅? − 𝑐?̅? − ?̅?𝑘 − 𝑐𝑓𝑗
min(ℎ𝑓𝑗 − 𝑐?̅? − ?̅?𝑘, 𝐶?̅?)
} , 
𝑦𝑗 = 𝜇𝑗 +𝓌𝑓ℎ𝑓𝑗 +𝓌𝑚ℎ̅𝑚𝑗  
−∑𝑝𝑘?̃?𝑘𝑗
𝑘
− 𝑇(𝑦𝑗 , 𝑋) + 𝐵(𝑦𝑗 , 𝑋), 
 and 𝑐𝑓𝑗 ≥ 0, ℎ𝑓𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑙𝑓𝑗 ≥ 0. 
(4.12) 
In the male-chauvinist model specification, the mother acts as the sole 
decision maker within the household and chooses the discrete choice, which 
yields the highest utility subject to all constraints.  
4.3.2. A Dual-agent Model Specification 
The dual-agent model specification allows both spouses to decide 
simultaneously their time-spent in parental care and work. That is, the wife is 
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assumed to adjust her labour supply and parental care and the husband, in turn, 
reacts to his spouse’s decisions. 
From equation (4.2), the deterministic part of the household utility function, 
𝑉(𝑦, 𝑙𝑓 , 𝑙𝑚), consists of five arguments, 𝑦, 𝑙𝑓, 𝑐𝑓, 𝑙𝑚 and 𝑐𝑚. For each discrete 
choice, the second-order polynomial expression in these arguments forms the 
utility function, which consists of twenty terms.  
𝑉𝑗 = 𝛼1𝑦𝑗
2 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑓𝑗
2 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑚𝑗
2 + 𝛼4𝑐𝑓𝑗
2 + 𝛼5𝑐𝑚𝑗
2 + 𝛼6𝑦𝑗𝑙𝑓𝑗 + 𝛼7𝑦𝑗𝑙𝑚𝑗
+ 𝛼8𝑦𝑗𝑐𝑓𝑗 + 𝛼9𝑦𝑗𝑐𝑚𝑗 + 𝛼10𝑙𝑓𝑗𝑙𝑚𝑗 + 𝛼11𝑙𝑓𝑗𝑐𝑓𝑗
+ 𝛼12𝑙𝑓𝑗𝑐𝑚𝑗 + 𝛼13𝑙𝑚𝑗𝑐𝑓𝑗 + 𝛼14𝑙𝑚𝑗𝑐𝑚𝑗 + 𝛼15𝑐𝑓𝑗𝑐𝑚𝑗
+ 𝛽1𝑙𝑓𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑚𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑓𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑚𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑦𝑗, 
(4.13) 
where 𝛼s and 𝛽s are the estimated parameters of interests. 
Following the theoretical framework outlined in Section 4.2, the dual-agent 
model specification consists of the following utility maximisation problem:  
Max𝑉𝑗 (𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽), 
𝑠. 𝑡. T̅ = 𝑙𝑠 + ℎ𝑠 + 𝑐𝑠, 𝑠 = 𝑓,𝑚. 
?̃?𝑘𝑗|ℎ𝑚𝑗 , ℎ𝑓𝑗 = max{
𝐶?̅? − ?̅?𝑘 − 𝑐𝑓𝑗 − 𝑐𝑚𝑗
min(ℎ𝑚𝑗 − 𝑐𝑓𝑗 − ?̅?𝑘, 𝐶?̅?)
min(ℎ𝑓𝑗 − 𝑐𝑚𝑗 − ?̅?𝑘, 𝐶?̅?)
} , 
𝑦𝑗 = 𝜇𝑗 +𝓌𝑓ℎ𝑓𝑗 +𝓌𝑚ℎ𝑚𝑗 −∑𝑝𝑘?̃?𝑘𝑗
𝑘
− 𝑇(. ) + 𝐵(. ), 
and 𝑐𝑓𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑐𝑚𝑗 ≥ 0, ℎ𝑓𝑗 ≥ 0, ℎ𝑚𝑗 ≥ 0. 
(4.14) 
Both females and males are assumed to simultaneously choose the discrete 
choice, 𝑗, which yields the highest utility subject to all constraints. 
4.3.3. Estimation and Forecast 
To complete the model, household heterogeneity in their preferences for work 
and parental care are explicitly modelled using observed and unobserved 
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characteristics. Such unobserved characteristics may include, for example, the 
availability of childcare services. Parents living in regions with better 
childcare availability may receive childcare at lower costs and of higher 
quality and may increase their labour market attachment in accordance. 
Ignoring the potential sources of endogeneity may result in biased estimated 
parameters. 
Following earlier studies, the linear coefficients in the utility function are 
parameterised with respect to both unobserved and unobserved household 
characteristics. An additive stochastic term is also included in each of the 
parameterized coefficients (Van Soest, 1995; Van Soest et al., 2002). Such 
parameterisation is given as follows: 
𝛽𝑛 = 𝑋𝑛
′ ?̃?𝑛 + 𝜀𝑛, (4.15) 
where 𝛽𝑛s represents the vector of the estimated coefficients, 𝑋𝑛 represents a 
vector of observable taste shifters, and the stochastic terms, 𝜀𝑛 s, reflect 
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. The size of 𝛽𝑛 determines the impact 
of the linear coefficient on the level of utility. Note that 𝑛 = 1 or 2 for the 
male-chauvinist specification and 𝑛 = 1,2,3 𝑜𝑟 4  for the dual-agent 
specification. 
The introduction of the unobserved heterogeneity terms, 𝜀s, allows households 
with identical observed characteristics to make different decisions about 
labour supply and parental care. Unobserved heterogeneity thus affects 
marginal utilities and choice probabilities through stochastic terms. In 
addition, these unobserved error terms, 𝜀s, can then be correlated. This has the 
important implication of relaxing the assumption of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) (McFadden, 1974). All error terms are assumed to follow 
multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix Θ . 
Within the model, the elements of Θ are unrestricted and estimated jointly with 
other parameters. 
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Fixed costs of work are also included in the budget set. A binary indicator for 
positive working hours for the female is included in the male-chauvinist 
specification and two binary indicators for the female and the male are 
included in the dual-agent specification. By incorporating the fixed costs of 
work, it is possible to replicate the large proportion of part-time employed 
individuals observed in the sample (Euwals & Van Soest, 1999; Van Soest et 
al., 2002). The household disposable income equation in the dual-agent 
specification is defined as: 
𝑦 = 𝜇 +𝓌𝑓ℎ𝑓 +𝓌𝑚ℎ𝑚 −∑𝑝𝑘?̃?𝑘
𝑘
− 𝑇(𝜇,𝓌𝑓 , ℎ𝑓 ,𝓌𝑚, ℎ𝑚, 𝑋)
+ 𝐵(𝜇,𝓌𝑓 , ℎ𝑓 ,𝓌𝑚, ℎ𝑚, 𝑋) − 𝐹𝑚𝐼(ℎ𝑚 > 0)
− 𝐹𝑓𝐼(ℎ𝑓 > 0). 
(4.16) 
In equation (4.16), 𝐹𝑚 and 𝐹𝑓 are the coefficients of fixed costs of work for 
female and male respectively. 𝐼(∙) is a binary indicator function equal to one if 
the argument in the parenthesis is true, or zero otherwise. Note that after 
excluding 𝐹𝑚𝐼(ℎ𝑚 > 0), equation (4.16) becomes the budget set for the male-
chauvinist specification. 
With the inclusion of fixed costs of work, the household disposable income is 
lowered by the amount of fixed costs of work when an individual participates 
in market work. The presence of fixed costs allows for a discrete difference in 
the income level between non-participation and other discrete choices. The 
fixed-costs indicators are further parameterised with respect to observed 
characteristics to allow heterogeneous effects at an individual level. 
Specifically, the fixed-costs coefficients are parameterised as: 
𝐹𝑠 = 𝑋𝑠
′𝛽𝑠, 𝑠 = 𝑓 or 𝑚, (4.17) 
where 𝛽s represents the vector of the estimated coefficients, and 𝑋s is a vector 
of observable taste shifters. Note that equation (4.17) is an imputation within 
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the maximum likelihood estimator rather than estimated directly, thus 
stochastic terms are not included.  
The estimation of the male chauvinist specification includes simultaneous 
estimation of the fixed-costs equation (4.17) for the mother, heterogeneity 
equations (4.15) with respect to a mother’s labour supply and parental care, 
and three elements from the 2 × 2 covariance matrix, which is the result of the 
two stochastic terms from the heterogeneity equations. The dual-agent model 
specifies two fixed-costs equations (4.17) for both mother and father, and four 
linear terms in the utility function are parameterised to introduce heterogeneity 
in household preferences, as shown in equation (4.15). These six equations are 
estimated jointly, together with ten elements of the 4 × 4 covariance matrix of 
the four stochastic terms from the heterogeneity equations.  
The estimation procedure optimises the parameter values for the utility 
function to maximise the log likelihood function using observed sample data. 
The likelihood function for household 𝑖 is given as: 
ℒ𝑖 = ∫ ∏(
𝑒𝑈(𝑦𝑗,𝑙𝑓𝑗,𝑙𝑚𝑗,𝑐𝑓𝑗,𝑐𝑚𝑗|𝑋)
∑ 𝑒𝑈(𝑦𝑗,𝑙𝑓𝑗,𝑙𝑚𝑗,𝑐𝑓𝑗,𝑐𝑚𝑗|𝑋)𝐽𝑘=1
)
𝐼(𝐻𝑖=𝑗)𝐽
𝑗=1𝜀
𝜙(𝜀)𝑑(𝜀), (4.18) 
where 𝜙(∙) is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. 
The evaluation of the likelihood function involves multiple integrals. 
Following Train (2009), Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) is used to 
evaluate this likelihood function. The expectation of the log likelihood is 
replaced by the simulated means in which the residual terms are randomly 
drawn from the corresponding distribution for each observation in the sample. 
Van Soest et al. (2002) suggest that twenty draws are sufficient to yield robust 
results and the estimation in this chapter is carried out with the same number 
of draws. 
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To forecast the supply of labour and time-use of parental care, the 
unconditional-estimated probability associated with each discrete choice is 
calculated based on observed characteristics and tax and benefit rules. The 
predicted utility, ?̂?𝑖𝑗 , is calculated for different discrete choices for each 
household by substituting the estimated coefficients into equation (4.13), 
along with estimated household disposable income and childcare expenses. 
Deriving the unconditional probability for each discrete choice is 
straightforward from equation (4.9): 
P̂j =
𝑒𝑉𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝑉𝑖𝑘𝐽𝑘=1
, (4.19) 
where P̂j denotes for the probability associated with state 𝑗. 
The expected value of the labour supply and parental care can be derived from 
the probability of each discrete state, P̂j . For example, in the dual-agent 
specification, the expected value is calculated by aggregating the 
unconditional probabilities over the expected value of each state: 
E(ℎ𝑞) =∑P̂qj
𝑗
ℎ𝑞𝑗 , 𝑞 = 𝑚, 𝑓, and (4.20) 
E(𝑐𝑞) =∑P̂qj
𝑗
𝑐𝑞𝑗, 𝑞 = 𝑚, 𝑓, (4.21) 
where 𝐸(. )s represent the expected hours respectively.  
4.4. Descriptive Statistics 
To raise a sufficiently large sample to obtain robust model estimates and 
childcare prices, three waves of HILDA have been pooled together to form the 
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cross-sectional sample data.29 HILDA waves 9 to 11 were selected to form the 
data set for analysis, corresponding with the period between 2009 and 2011.30  
For each non-working individual, an expected wage rate is imputed from the 
Heckman wage model discussed in Section 3.2.3. To improve data quality, a 
selection criteria is implemented to reduce the number of low quality sample 
observations. This affects individuals earning less than half of the minimum 
wage rate or those above the 99th percentile of wage distribution, since these 
observations are likely influenced by measurement error.31  Observed wage 
rates for individuals who meet the selection criterion are replaced by predicted 
values of the Heckman wage model.  
TABLE 4-1 SAMPLE FORMULATION AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 
SELECTION CRITERIA NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 
Married or de facto couples 8,198 
Exclude if the youngest child is older than 12 years -4,353 
Exclude if the number of children is more than 6 -2 
Exclude self-employed and negative non-labour income -1,304 
Exclude full-time students -57 
Exclude missing key variables -690 
Exclude observations with excessive working/parenting hours (>100 p.w.) -15 
Number of observations in the sample 1,777 
Source: HILDA wave 2009 – 2011. 
The process of generating the sample involves steps indicated in Table 4-1. 
The sample formulation begins with choosing partnered (married or de facto) 
couples aged between 25 and 59 years. The sample is further restricted to 
                                                 
29 The formation of cross-sectional data by pooling three waves of HILDA has also been applied in earlier studies; see 
for example, Breunig et al. (2008) and Breunig et al. (2012). 
30 One reason that this thesis does not utilise HILDA waves prior to 2009 was that the childcare policy context 
changed significantly in 2009. In particular, the reimbursement rate of out-of-pocket childcare expenses of CCR 
increased from 30 percent to 50 percent in 2009, with the maximum payable benefit per child lifted from $4,354 to 
$7,500 per annum. The CCR benefits in the post-2009 period significantly lower childcare costs for many eligible 
households in terms of both hourly childcare prices and total benefits received.  
31 The minimum wage is set to $14 per hour for both females and males, reflecting the level of payment rate 
implanted in 2009 (Sloane, 2010). The 99th percentile of the wage distribution is $55.56 per hour for females and 
$70.58 for males for HILDA wave 9 to 11. 
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households with at least one child aged 12 years or younger. Two observations 
with more than 6 children are dropped because of increasing complexity of 
imputing income support benefits. The self-employed and negative non-labour 
income earners are excluded because of poor data quality on income and 
hours. If one of the spouses is a full-time student, the household is excluded 
because full-time students are likely to face a different set of time constraints. 
Individuals with missing self-completed questionnaires and other key 
variables are excluded. Excessive reported hours of work and parental care are 
likely due to measurement error and are excluded, affecting a total of 15 
individuals who report more than 100 hours in either work or parental care. 
The final sample consists of 1,777 couple households across three waves. 
The time-spent in parental care and informal care is calculated based on the 
appropriate time aggregation across childcare usage of each arrangement. The 
information on time-spent in different childcare activities is collected in the 
household questionnaire and time-spent in parenting activities is reported in 
the self-completed questionnaire.32 If a household does not use a specific type 
of childcare, this is associated with a time-use value of zero.  
4.4.1. Discretising Choice Set 
Central to the discrete choice approach is the defining of a finite number of 
hour-choices. There is no obvious way to map continuous hours into discrete 
states. The standard practice is to place the observed hours to their nearest 
discrete points.33 Many earlier studies that attempt to quantify the sensitivity 
using different discrete points have found that their main results are insensitive 
to the rule that is used to assign discrete hour points (Van Soest, 1995; Van 
                                                 
32 The response rate to the household questionnaire is slightly higher than the self-completed questionnaire. A total of 
55 households (3 percent) are excluded due to incomplete information on the time-spent in parenting activities, 
leaving a final sample size of 1,777 observations. 
33 See Train (2009) for a discussion of other methods. 
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Soest et al., 2002). However, it is obvious that increasing the number of 
discrete points reduces rounding errors. Van Soest et al. (2002) suggest that 
using four discrete points provides a reasonable mapping of the distribution of 
working hours.  
 
FIGURE 4-1 HISTOGRAMS OF WEEKLY HOURS WORKED (PARTNERED PARENTS)34 
Figure 4-1 presents the histograms of hours worked by both parents. For 
mothers, the majority of hours occur between zero and 45 hours per week. 
Most spikes are clustered between 20 and 40 hours. Fathers typically do not 
work part-time and their actual working hours are heavily concentrated 
between 35 and 50 hours per week, corresponding to full-time employment.  
To formulate discrete choices for female labour supply, the lower limit of the 
choice set is set to zero hours, representing inactivity in the labour market. 
Discrete hour points are formulated in an equal distance between zero and an 
upper limit. In the male chauvinist specification, ten discrete choices are 
formulated at multiples of five hours with the upper limit of 45 hours per week 
to provide a good coverage of the observed pattern. Females who report hours 
worked between 45 and 100 hours are rounded to 45 hours. This rounding 
affects a total of 60 observations (3 percent).  
                                                 
34 Non-working individuals are excluded from the histogram. 
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In the dual-agent model, the number of discrete choices expands dramatically 
because the decisions of fathers are accounted for. Five discrete points are set 
up for hours worked at multiples of 16 hours from 8 to 56 hours per week for 
both males and females. A total of 75 fathers (4 percent) who reported working 
hours between 56 and 100 hours per week are rounded to the largest discrete 
point. 
 
FIGURE 4-2 HISTOGRAMS OF WEEKLY PARENTING HOURS (PARTNERED PARENTS) 
Figure 4-2 presents the distribution of weekly parental care hours by both 
spouses. Note that HILDA is not a time use survey and the survey respondents 
self-report their weekly time-spent in parenting activities alongside other 
activities. Spikes are observed in multiples of ten hours, which suggests that 
survey respondents may experience difficulties in reporting their actual time-
spent in parenting activities and tend to round the reported values to multiples 
of ten.  
The discrete points are purposely formulated in multiples of ten hours to 
match the observed spikes in the sample data. In the male chauvinist 
specification, ten discrete points are formulated for mother’s parental care 
hours (5 hours to 95 hours per week). In the dual-agent specification, fewer 
discrete points are formulated to keep the size of the choice set manageable. 
The five discrete points formulated for mothers’ parental care hours are in 
equal periods of 20 hours, ranging from 10 to 90 hours per week. Four discrete 
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points are formulated for fathers’ parental care hours, which correspond to 3, 
9, 15 and 21 hours per week.  
The total number of discrete choices in the male chauvinist specification is 
100 and in the dual-agent specification the total number is 600.35 Once the 
discrete choice set is formulated, the observed hours are replaced by the 
nearest discrete value. However, the observed labour supply may not be 
optimal if individuals are limited in their labour market by demand side 
factors. Some studies replace the actual hours worked by the desired hours to 
remove the demand side factors (Bingley & Walker, 2001; Euwals & Van 
Soest, 1999). This approach is not followed because the reported time-spent in 
parental care is associated with the actual hours worked.  
4.4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4-2 presents the descriptive statistics of the personal information of the 
parents in the sample data.  
 
                                                 
35 In the male chauvinist specification, there are ten discrete points in both ℎ𝑚 and 𝑐𝑚, and the number of different 
choices is given as 10 × 10 = 100. In the dual agent specification, ℎ𝑚, ℎ𝑓, 𝑐𝑚, and 𝑐𝑓 are discretised into 5, 5, 6 and 
4 discrete hour points respectively, resulting in 5 × 5 × 6 × 4 = 600 discrete choices. 
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TABLE 4-2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 
PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 
DESCRIPTION 
MOTHER  FATHER 
Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev. 
Age indicators       
Age Age in years 36.31 (6.56)  38.57 (7.26) 
15-20 1 if aged between 15-20 0.00 (0.05)  0.00 (0.02) 
20-25 1 if aged between 20-25 0.03 (0.18)  0.01 (0.11) 
25-30 1 if aged between 25-30 0.13 (0.34)  0.09 (0.29) 
30-35 1 if aged between 30-35 0.22 (0.41)  0.19 (0.39) 
35-40 1 if aged between 35-40 0.30 (0.46)  0.28 (0.45) 
40-45 1 if aged between 40-45 0.21 (0.41)  0.22 (0.41) 
45-50 1 if aged between 45-50 0.08 (0.28)  0.13 (0.33) 
50-55 1 if aged between 50-55 0.02 (0.15)  0.06 (0.24) 
55+ 1 if aged 55 or more 0 (0)  0.02 (0.13) 
Education       
University 1 if postgraduate, graduate, bachelor or 
honours 
0.37 (0.48) 
 
0.32 (0.47) 
Vocational 1 if diploma or certificates I/II/III/IV 0.28 (0.45)  0.45 (0.50) 
Year 12 1 if year 12 0.19 (0.39)  0.12 (0.32) 
Year 11 1 if year 11 or less 0.16 (0.36)  0.12 (0.33) 
Employment       
Employed 1 if currently employed 0.62 (0.48)  0.94 (0.25) 
Full-time 1 if employed full-time 0.21 (0.41)  0.89 (0.31) 
Part-time 1 if employed part-time 0.41 (0.49)  0.04 (0.20) 
Hours worked Hours worked per week if employed 26.90 (12.47)  44.87 (9.99) 
Gross wage Gross wage rate per hour if employed 30.05 (23.11)  35.30 (18.17) 
Work experience Time spent in paid work in years 13.31 (7.03)  19.03 (7.83) 
Non-labour income Non-labour income p.a. (000s) 1.45 (6.50)  2.78 (15.83) 
Parental care       
Provision of care 1 if parental care is provided 0.99 (0.07)  0.99 (0.11) 
Hours provided Hours of care per week if provided 30.57 (23.32)  14.04 (11.39) 
Dissatisfied 
workload 
1 if unsatisfied with the way parental care 
tasks are divided between parents 
0.18 (0.18) 
 
0.10 (0.29) 
Health       
Health improved 1 if reported health better than one year ago 0.18 (0.39)  0.16 (0.37) 
Health worsened 1 if reported health worse than one year ago 0.11 (0.31)  0.10 (0.30) 
Long-term 
disability 
1 if any long-term health conditions that limit 
the type or amount of work 
0.08 (0.28) 
 
0.07 (0.26) 
Other characteristics       
English speaking 1 if born overseas and learned English as the 
first language 
0.10 (0.30) 
 
0.12 (0.33) 
Born in Australia 1 if born in Australia 0.76 (0.43)  0.77 (0.42) 
Observations  1,777     
Households Number of households 975     
Source: HILDA wave 2009 – 2011. 
Note: Cross-sectional analytical weights applied. The non-labour income is defined as the sum of business 
income, investment income, private pensions and private transfers as reported in the financial year preceding 
the interview. 
The descriptive statistics are largely in line with a priori expectations. With 
respect to education, most mothers (37 percent) reported having a university 
degree as their highest educational attainment, compared to fathers (32 
percent), whereas 28 percent of mothers are recorded as having a diploma or 
certificate as their highest attainment, compared to 45 percent of fathers.  
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As the sample is confined to two-parent households, the female employment 
rate is relatively low. Around 62 percent of mothers and 94 percent of their 
partners report being employed. Among those who are employed, the average 
of hours worked is much higher for males than for females. Approximate 89 
percent of males are full-time workers, 4 percent are part-time workers and on 
average males work 45 hours per week. In contrast, 21 percent of mothers are 
employed full-time, 41 percent are employed part-time and the average 
number of hours worked per week is 27 hours. The average reported gross 
wage rate is $35 per hour for fathers - around five dollars higher than the 
reported wage for mothers. The average non-labour income per annum is 
around $1,400 for mothers and $2,800 for fathers and is defined as the sum of 
business income, investment income, private pensions and private transfers as 
reported in the financial year preceding the interview.  
Table 4-3 describes the summary statistics of household demographics and 
childcare usage.  
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TABLE 4-3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS 
HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS DESCRIPTIONS MEAN STD.DEV. 
Marital status    
Married 1 if legally married 0.81 (0.40) 
De facto 1 if de facto 0.19 (0.40) 
Employment    
Both parents working 1 if both parents are working 0.61 (0.49) 
Working father, non-working mother 1 if only father is working 0.32 (0.47) 
Non-working father, working mother 1 if only mother is working 0.03 (0.18) 
Both parents non-working 1 if neither parent is working 0.04 (0.20) 
Number of children by age groups    
0-1 years Number of children aged between 0-1 0.31 (0.49) 
2-5 years Number of children aged between 2-5 0.59 (0.70) 
6-9 years Number of children aged between 6-9 0.49 (0.67) 
10-12 years Number of children aged between 10-12 0.37 (0.56) 
13-17 years Number of children aged between 13-17 0.27 (0.57) 
Use of childcare    
Parental care 1 if parental care is provided 1 (0) 
Informal care 1 if informal childcare is used  0.27 (0.45) 
Formal care 1 if formal childcare is used 0.28 (0.45) 
Usage of childcare (if used)    
Parental care Hours of care per week 44.61 (44.61) 
Informal care Hours of informal childcare per week 16.21 (16.21) 
Formal care Hours of formal childcare per week 22.05 (22.05) 
Other childcare variables    
Difficulty assessing childcare 1 if finding a place at childcare centre is 
difficult 
0.21 (0.21) 
Difficulty coordinating multiple childcare 1 if difficult to juggle multiple childcare 
arrangements 
0.22 (0.22) 
State    
NSW 1 if resides in NSW 0.29 (0.29) 
VIC 1 if resides in VIC 0.23 (0.23) 
QLD 1 if resides in QLD 0.24 (0.24) 
SA 1 if resides in SA 0.06 (0.06) 
WA 1 if resides in WA 0.12 (0.12) 
TAS 1 if resides in TAS 0.03 (0.03) 
NT 1 if resides in NT 0.01 (0.01) 
ACT 1 if resides in ACT 0.03 (0.03) 
Observations  1,777  
Source: HILDA wave 2009 – 2011. 
Note: Cross-sectional analytical weights applied. 
The majority of sample households are married couples, with both parents 
working (61 percent). In terms of childcare, all households report time-spent 
in parental care, with a weekly average of approximately 45 hours. As 
expected, the mother is the dominant caregiver in the household. The average 
parental care undertaken by mothers is 30 hours per week and parental care 
undertaken by fathers is around 14 hours per week. About a quarter of 
households rely upon at least some informal or formal childcare. The average 
time-spent in informal care is 16 hours per week and 22 hours per week in 
formal care. The data shows considerable variation in the availability of 
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childcare services. Approximately 21 percent of households report difficulty in 
finding a place at local childcare centres, and 22 percent of households find 
coordinating multiple childcare arrangements difficult. 
4.5. Results 
Two specifications of the labour supply model are attempted, namely, the male 
chauvinist specification and the dual-agent specification. The estimation 
results of the male chauvinist specification are presented in Section 4.5.1, 
followed by the results for the dual-agent specification in 4.5.2. In Section 
4.5.3, the estimated unconditional elasticities of interest are discussed. 
The Heckman wage model is applied separately for females and males and the 
estimation results are presented in Appendix B. Table 4-4 presents the actual 
and predicted wage rates for mothers and fathers respectively. 
TABLE 4-4 ACTUAL AND PREDICTED WAGE RATES 
  MOTHERS   FATHERS 
Variables Obs. Mean Std.Dev.  Obs. Mean Std.Dev. 
Actual wage rates        
Employed 1040 30.35 (23.83)  1561 35.03 (17.66) 
Predicted wage rates        
Employed 1040 27.60 (9.61)  1561 32.66 (12.10) 
Non-working individuals 699 19.49 (4.52)  144 24.78 (6.21) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
As expected, the unemployed and non-working individuals have lower 
expected wage rates due to the selection effect. On average, the predicted 
wage difference between the employed and the non-working is approximate 
$8 for both females and males.  
To estimate the structural labour supply model, the wage rates for employed 
individuals are from actual wages, whereas wage rates for individuals who are 
non-working or earning gross wages exceeding the 99th percentile or less than 
$7, are imputed using the predicted wage rates. 
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To calculate the tax liability associated with imputed wage earnings for each 
discrete choice, tax deductions applicable to individuals are first imputed 
using the Australia-wide averages with respect to different income classes 
(Australian Tax Office, 2010). The taxable income is calculated by netting the 
imputed tax deduction from the household gross income. As such, the value of 
personal income tax liabilities can be identified after accounting for the 
implications of the Lower Income Tax Offset (LITO).  
4.5.1. Male Chauvinist Specification 
The estimation of the labour supply model does not require the imposition of 
any Slutsky regularity conditions prior to the estimation. After the estimation 
results are obtained, the estimated household utility is found to be quasi-
concave in income for every individual in the sample. This suggests that the 
parameter estimates are suitable for interpretation and policy simulations. 
Table 4-5 presents the parameter estimates of the linear terms of the utility 
function using the male chauvinist specification. The linear terms are 
parameterised with respect to a range of observed characteristics to account 
for heterogeneity of household preferences. The probability contribution of the 
estimated coefficient is highly non-linear and their absolute value is not 
directly interpretable. However, within each preference equation the relative 
size of the estimated coefficient is indicative of importance. Also, the sign of 
the estimated coefficients depict either positive or negative influences. 
- 85 - 
TABLE 4-5 PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE MALE CHAUVINIST SPECIFICATION 
VARIABLES TASTES FOR LEISURE (1) TASTES FOR CARE (2) WORK COSTS (3) 
Constant 52.941*** -23.141*** 1.041*** 
 (8.739) (4.498) (0.125) 
Personal information    
Age/10 -5.172 6.106**  
 (3.222) (2.421)  
Age squared/1000 8.134* -8.151**  
 (4.255) (3.348)  
If aged between 18-34    0.0129 
   (0.102) 
If aged between 35-40   -0.0354 
   (0.0953) 
If aged between 40-45   -0.0972 
   (0.0900) 
If born in Australia   -0.289*** 
   (0.0522) 
Household demographics    
If partner works full-time -2.440***   
 (0.776)   
If partner works part-time -3.272***   
 (1.054)   
Number of children  -0.348*  
  (0.160)  
If youngest child aged 0-1 5.114*** 7.324***  
 (0.847) (0.697)  
If youngest child aged 2-5 3.406*** 5.394***  
 (0.753) (0.649)  
If youngest child aged 0-5   0.0900 
   (0.0949) 
If youngest child aged 6-9 0.900 1.808*** 0.0787 
 (0.716) (0.643) (0.0975) 
If informal care is used  0.202  
  (0.497)  
Health    
Poor Health 8.248***   
 (2.846)   
Health improved -0.013   
 (0.462)   
Health worsened -0.309   
 (0.544)   
Long-term disability  0.611  
  (0.458)  
Other variables    
English as first language  0.704  
  (0.434)  
Difficult to find a place in childcare  -0.698**  
  (0.339)  
Juggling multiple childcare arrangements  -0.499  
  (0.351)  
Unsatisfied division of childcare tasks  -0.518  
  (0.341)  
σa 0.011 0.003  
 (0.175) (0.126)  
Simulated log likelihood -6,621.29   
Observations 1,777   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; sample of couple households with children 0-12 years old; model 
estimated by Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) using inversely scrambled Halton sequences (20 Draws) 
using prime number 7 and 11 respectively; hours worked and hours of care divided by 100; household 
disposable income on weekly basis and divided by 1000. 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
a To ensure positive-definiteness of the covariance matrix, the Cholesky elements are instead estimated. The 
reported σs undoes the transformation where the standard error is calculated using the delta method.
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First, the effects of age, educational attainment and characteristics of children 
of the ‘Tastes for Leisure’ equation are presented in column (1) in Table 4-5, 
and are discussed first. The coefficient of age level is found to be negative, 
whereas the coefficient of the age squared is positive and significant. The 
combination of these two effects indicates that the preference for leisure 
increases at a decreasing rate. Specifically, the preference for leisure peaks at 
around 35 years of age. The results indicate that in general, older mothers and 
younger mothers have a higher preference for labour supply than parents 
around their mid-30s. A set of binary indicators of the age of the youngest 
child is included because mothers are usually the dominant caregivers. As 
expected, younger children tend to have a larger positive impact on the 
preference for leisure. The negative employment effects associated with the 
presence of preschoolers on female preferences for work are consistent with 
earlier studies in Australia (Doiron & Kalb, 2005a; Kalb, 2009; Kalb et al., 
2005; Kalb & Lee, 2008). In terms of health variables, individuals who 
reported poor health status have greater preference for leisure, as expected. 
The economic intuition may follow that healthier individuals are able to work 
for longer hours.  
The effects of the estimated coefficients in the ‘Tastes for Care’ equation are 
presented in column (2). The combined effect of age and its quadratic 
variables suggest that household preference for care peaks at approximately 44 
years of age. In addition, the presence of children significantly increases the 
preference for parental care, as expected. Younger children, for example, aged 
less than one year, significantly increase household preference for care, 
compared to older children. 36  Notably, the tastes for parental care are 
negatively associated with the number of children, suggesting that parents 
                                                 
36 It may be worth noting that it can be more difficult to find formal childcare for younger children, especially below 
the age of one. 
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have a higher tendency towards non-parental care if the number of children 
increases.  
Third, the estimated fixed costs of work can be interpreted as a measurement 
of monetary and non-monetary costs associated with employment (column 
(3)). The constant term is positive and statistically significant, which suggests 
that the inclusion of the fixed costs is necessary to explain the observed large 
proportion of non-working females. Also, the indicator of whether the mother 
is born in Australia is significant. This suggests that mothers who are born in 
Australia generally have lower fixed costs of work and are more likely to 
participate in the labour market, relative to mothers born outside of Australia. 
The other estimated parameters in the utility function and the correlation 
matrix of the error terms are reported in Table 4-6. 
TABLE 4-6 ESTIMATED PARAMETERS IN THE UTILITY FUNCTION 
(A) UTILITY PARAMETER      
Parameters Coef. Std. Err.  Parameters Coef. Std. Err. 
𝛼1 -0.165*** (0.0581)  𝛼4 1.648*** (0.306) 
𝛼2 -16.293*** (2.262)  𝛼5 0.835*** (0.186) 
𝛼3 -3.180*** (0.533)  𝛼6 3.740*** (0.920) 
𝛽1 0.456* (0.449)     
       
(b) CORRELATION MATRIXa 
Errors 𝜀2      
𝜀1 -0.888      
 (18.992)      
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
As shown in Table 4-6, none of the unobserved components appear significant. 
This suggests that the non-systematic stochastic terms have insignificant 
impacts on the estimation results. There is no clear interpretation of these 
parameters but they are essential in computing marginal utilities and 
elasticities.  
The model fitness is discussed in Table 4-7 by comparing the actual and fitted 
mean probabilities across hours of work and hours of parental care. The 
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probability of discrete choices is reported along with the expected hours of 
labour supply and parental care. To incorporate the uncertainty associated with 
the parameter estimates, the expected values are calculated using 100 
independent draws of the parameters from the estimated asymptotic 
distribution of their estimator, following Van Soest (1995). 
TABLE 4-7 ACTUAL AND FITTED LABOUR SUPPLY AND PARENTAL CARE 
(A) HOURS WORKED ACTUAL  FITTED 
 Mean  Mean Std.Dev. 10% Median 90% 
Hours p.w. 17.14  16.74 (0.69) 15.80 16.76 17.56 
Probability (%)        
0 33.88  34.08 (1.69) 32.07 33.97 36.39 
0-5 2.19  2.95 (0.14) 2.79 2.96 3.13 
5-10 4.39  4.43 (0.14) 4.26 4.44 4.61 
10-15 5.91  6.11 (0.10) 5.97 6.12 6.24 
15-20 11.48  7.85 (0.05) 7.80 7.85 7.92 
20-25 9.85  9.26 (0.15) 9.04 9.29 9.44 
25-30 7.03  9.95 (0.31) 9.50 9.97 10.31 
30-35 5.63  9.72 (0.46) 9.11 9.73 10.27 
35-40 13.34  8.64 (0.55) 7.92 8.63 9.31 
40+ 6.30  7.01 (0.56) 6.26 6.99 7.69 
        
(B) PARENTAL CARE        
Hours p.w. 30.39  28.13 (1.02) 26.71 28.18 29.53 
Probability (%)        
0-10 24.59  26.33 (1.25) 24.66 26.26 28.08 
10-20 22.34  20.07 (0.50) 19.38 20.04 20.77 
20-30 16.49  15.41 (0.08) 15.3 15.42 15.52 
30-40 11.14  11.81 (0.16) 11.57 11.82 12.00 
40-50 7.93  8.88 (0.29) 8.47 8.90 9.26 
50-60 6.30  6.51 (0.34) 6.04 6.53 6.98 
60-70 5.06  4.61 (0.34) 4.14 4.63 5.07 
70-80 2.76  3.11 (0.29) 2.70 3.12 3.51 
80-90 1.69  2.01 (0.24) 1.69 2.02 2.34 
90-100 1.69  1.26 (0.17) 1.02 1.26 1.50 
Notes: Sample of couple households with children 0-12 years old. The standard deviation and confidence 
intervals are constructed using 100 independent draws from the estimated parameter distribution.  
In Table 4-7, the second column reports the actual sample means in hours and 
the proportion of sample observations within each discrete choice. The 
expected hours of labour supply and parental care are close to the actual 
sample means, indicating a reasonable goodness of fit. The majority of 
predicted probabilities are close to the sample means except for two notable 
discrepancies, which are found at the choice of working 15-20 hours and 35-
40 hours. These two particular discrete choices correspond to the clustered 
observations of reported hours worked of 20 hours and 40 hours, respectively. 
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Without the incorporation of full-time and part-time dummies, the model tends 
to underpredict the probability associated with these two discrete choices. 
Nonetheless, the effects of underprediction are partially offset by the 
overpredicted probabilities associated with the other labour supply discrete 
choices, which result in the expected hours worked being close to the sample 
average.  
4.5.2. Dual-agent Specification 
Once the estimation results of the dual-agent specification are obtained, the 
satisfaction of the regularity conditions are verified for all individuals in the 
sample.  
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TABLE 4-8 PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE DUAL-AGENT SPECIFICATION  
 MOTHER  FATHER 
Variables 
Tastes for 
Leisure (1) 
Tastes for 
Parental Care 
(2) 
Fixed Costs 
of Work (3) 
 
Tastes for 
Leisure (4) 
Tastes for 
Parental Care 
(5) 
Fixed Costs 
of Work (6) 
Constant 53.260*** -25.820*** 0.715***  105.300*** -28.540*** 3.037*** 
 (6.384) (5.534) (0.119)  (6.785) (7.283) (0.311) 
Personal        
Age/10 -4.490 8.907***   -5.021** 0.949  
 (2.888) (2.859)   (2.270) (3.276)  
Age  7.031* -11.550***   6.880** -1.312  
squared/1000 (3.805) (3.886)   (2.767) (4.106)  
If aged    0.0329    -0.0387 
between 18-34   (0.116)    (0.141) 
If aged    -0.0286    -0.138 
between 35-40   (0.108)    (0.134) 
If aged    -0.103    0.0175 
between 40-45   (0.102)    (0.123) 
If born in    -0.308***    0.0705 
Australia   (0.0629)    (0.103) 
Household         
If partner 
works FT 
-0.569    0.113   
(0.668)    (0.471)   
If partner 
works PT 
-2.562***    -1.449***   
(-0.938)    (-0.430)   
Number of   -0.566***    -1.202***  
children  (0.208)    (0.325)  
If youngest  3.839*** 8.040***    6.744***  
child aged 0-1 (0.742) (0.769)    (1.223)  
If youngest  2.303*** 5.441***    5.649***  
child aged 2-5 (0.647) (0.696)    (1.156)  
If youngest    0.174*    -0.111 
child aged 0-5   (0.105)    (0.137) 
If youngest  0.332 1.271* 0.143   4.176*** -0.167 
child aged 6-9 (0.602) (0.668) (0.105)   (1.153) (0.139) 
If informal   -0.0243    1.448**  
care is used  (0.369)    (0.543)  
Health        
Poor Health 8.021***    3.256***   
 (2.865)    (1.094)   
Health  0.00861    0.144   
improved (0.415)    (0.497)   
Health  -0.224    0.155   
worsened (0.486)    (0.589)   
Long-term  0.286    2.754***  
disability  (0.559)    (0.844)  
Other variables        
If childcare is  1.159**      
available  (0.561)      
If multiple   -0.639      
childcare avail  (0.428)      
If unsatisfied  -0.670    -1.981***  
with childcare  (0.435)    (0.711)  
English as first   -0.0442    1.049  
language  (0.422)    (0.753)  
σa 0.00623 0.0700   0.0142 0.0473  
 (0.157) (0.181)   (0.160) (0.248)  
Log likelihood -8827.31       
Observations 1,777       
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; sample of couple households with children 0-12 years old; model 
estimated by Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) using Halton sequences (20 Draws) using prime 
number 7, 11, 13 and 17 respectively; hours worked and hours of care divided by 100; household disposable 
income on weekly basis and divided by 1000. 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
a To ensure positive-definiteness of the covariance matrix, the Cholesky elements are instead estimated. The 
reported σs undoes the transformation where the standard error is calculated using the delta method.
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Table 4-8 presents the parameter estimates of the linear terms of the utility 
function. These estimated coefficients are largely consistent with the male 
chauvinist specification. First, the parameters of the ‘Tastes for Leisure’ 
equations (column (1) for females and column (4) for males) are discussed). 
By comparing the intercept terms in the preferences for leisure equations, it 
may be seen that mothers generally have a lower preference for work than 
fathers. The coefficient of the age is found to be positive and significant, 
whereas the coefficient of the age squared is negative and significant. The 
combination of these two effects indicates that the preference for leisure peaks 
at around 28 years of age for mothers and around 43 years of age for fathers.  
Next, the inferences of observed characteristics on the estimated ‘Tastes for 
parental care’ equations can be obtained from column (2) for females and 
column (4) for males. The age effects are found to be significant amongst 
females and insignificant for males. This suggests that preferences for parental 
care increases until retirement for females. The effect of younger children also 
significantly increases the preferences for parental care for both parents, where 
the effects are largest among children less than one year of age, as expected.  
The remaining estimated coefficients for the labour supply model are reported 
in Table 4-9. 
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TABLE 4-9 ESTIMATED PARAMETERS IN THE UTILITY FUNCTION 
(A) UTILITY PARAMETER PARAMETERS COEF. STD. ERR.  PARAMETERS COEF. STD. ERR. 
 𝛼1 -0.0696* (0.040)  𝛼9 -0.781** (0.343) 
 𝛼2 -20.77*** (1.469)  𝛼10 -2.114 (1.398) 
 𝛼3 -54.620*** (2.560)  𝛼11 3.895*** (1.045) 
 𝛼4 1.563 (1.100)  𝛼12 -0.778 (1.605) 
 𝛼5 -8.932*** (1.921)  𝛼13 -3.673*** (1.231) 
 𝛼6 1.383*** (0.246)  𝛼14 16.16*** (2.014) 
 𝛼7 2.408*** (0.391)  𝛼15 13.59*** (1.646) 
 𝛼8 0.513** (0.240)  𝛽1 -1.479*** (0.440) 
        
(b) Correlation Matrixa  
  𝜀1 𝜀2  𝜀3 𝜀4  
 𝜀1 1      
  -      
 𝜀2 -0.608 1     
  (0.548) -     
 𝜀3 0.536 0.205  1   
  (0.532) (0.343)  -   
 𝜀4 0.682 0.600  -0.146 1  
  (0.411) (0.603)  (0.736) -  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; sample of couple households with children 0-12 years old; model 
estimated by Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) using Halton sequences (20 Draws) using prime 
number 7, 11, 13 and 17 respectively; hours worked and hours of care divided by 100; household disposable 
income on weekly basis and divided by 1000. 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
a To ensure positive-definiteness of the covariance matrix, the Cholesky elements are instead estimated. The 
reported correlation undoes the transformation where the standard error is calculated using the delta method. 
In Table 4-9, most of the correlations among the unobserved components are 
insignificant. Again, the actual and fitted mean probability values for the hours 
worked and parental care are compared in Table 4-10 to assess the model’s 
fitness. 
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TABLE 4-10 ACTUAL AND FITTED LABOUR SUPPLY AND PARENTAL CARE 
 HOURS WORKED  PARENTAL CARE 
 Actual  Fitted   Actual  Fitted 
(a) Mother Mean  Mean 10% CI 90% CI   Mean  Mean 10% CI 90% CI 
Hours 17.81  17.56 16.87 19.03  Hours 30.39  25.72 23.77 27.12 
Prob. (%)       Prob.      
0 33.88  33.67 30.52 35.15  0-10 24.59  28.18 26.00 30.52 
0-16 16.32  15.26 14.54 15.63  10-20 22.34  18.28 17.65 19.00 
16-32 26.73  29.19 28.72 30.11  20-30 16.49  14.22 14.18 14.28 
32-48 20.26  18.20 17.18 20.36  30-40 11.14  12.76 12.28 13.23 
48+ 2.81  3.68 3.32 4.46  40-50 7.93  12.68 11.72 13.57 
       50+ 17.50  13.86 12.26 15.30 
             
(b) Father             
Hours 42.04  41.33 40.24 42.16  Hours 14.01  11.32 10.27 12.58 
Prob. (%)       Prob.      
0 6.47  6.37 5.36 8.06  0-6 27.52  29.42 28.01 31.42 
0-16 0.79  0.03 0.02 0.04  6-12 30.05  22.84 22.48 23.29 
16-32 3.60  6.02 5.51 6.48  12-18 14.69  21.94 21.35 22.32 
32-48 59.71  57.25 56.65 57.69  18+ 27.74  25.81 23.94 27.17 
48+ 29.43  30.33 28.18 32.43        
Notes: Sample of couple households with children 0-12 years old. The standard deviation and confidence 
intervals are constructed using 100 independent draws from the estimated parameter distribution.  
The results reported in Table 4-10 indicate that the model fitness is reasonably 
well, since the forecasted means of hours worked and probabilities of each 
discrete choice are close to the sample observations. In particular, the fitness 
appears to be better among hours of work than among parental care. The 
labour supply model tends to underpredict the means of parental care hours for 
both spouses. Specifically, it overestimates the probability associated with 
lower discrete points while underestimating the probability of larger hour 
points. The observed discrepancy is likely caused by the large variation in the 
reported hours in parenting activities. Some of the respondents report 
excessive, large hours of care and these values are distant from formulated 
discrete points. In addition, the discrepancy may be the result of poor data 
quality, especially for fathers, since HILDA is not a time-use survey and the 
time-spent in parenting activities are self-reported. 
4.5.3. Elasticity Estimates 
Of central interest is the effect of wage rates and childcare prices on labour 
supply decisions. Table 4-11 reports the estimated elasticities using both the 
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male chauvinist specification and the dual-agent specification. To calculate the 
average elasticity, 100 independent draws of the parameters are taken from the 
estimated asymptotic distribution to incorporate the uncertainty associated 
with the parameter estimates, which are reflected by their standard errors. For 
each draw, the estimated choice probabilities are evaluated before and after a 
one-percent increase in a variable. The expected hours of labour supply and 
parental care for each individual is calculated based on the evaluated 
probabilities of each discrete choice. The estimated elasticities are calculated 
from the proportional change in the expected hours.  
To simulate own wage and cross wage elasticities, household employment 
responses are obtained by predicting the average labour supply before and 
after a one-percent increase in own wage rate and the wage rate of the spouse 
(cross wage). To simulate the childcare price elasticities, the gross childcare 
price is increased by ten percent and the total effects are divided by the 
respective change. The average of elasticities of using 100 independent pseudo 
draws and corresponding standard errors are reported. The reported figures are 
unconditional elasticities obtained at individual level and then averaged across 
all individuals. 
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TABLE 4-11 UNCONDITIONAL ELASTICITIES FROM THE MALE CHAUVINIST SPECIFICATION AND THE DUAL-AGENT SPECIFICATION 
ELASTICITIES OWN WAGE  CROSS WAGE  CHILDCARE PRICE 
(a) Male Chauvinist Female Male  Female Male  Female Male 
LFP 0.194 (0.030) -   -  -   -0.046 (0.005) -  
Lower income 0.175 (0.010) -   -  -   -0.065 (0.008) -  
Middle income 0.195 (0.029) -   -  -   -0.044 (0.005) -  
Higher income 0.212 (0.053) -   -  -   -0.031 (0.004) -  
0-4 years 0.222 (0.019) -   -  -   -0.050 (0.006) -  
5-12 years 0.162 (0.050) -   -  -   -0.042 (0.007) -  
               
Hours worked 0.483 (0.162) -   -  -   -0.122 (0.028) -  
Lower income 0.461 (0.134) -   -  -   -0.201 (0.041) -  
Middle income 0.487 (0.157) -   -  -   -0.122 (0.029) -  
Higher income 0.487 (0.186) -   -  -   -0.080 (0.021) -  
0-4 years 0.601 (0.176) -   -  -   -0.110 (0.028) -  
5-12 years 0.367 (0.152) -   -  -   -0.127 (0.029) -  
               
Parental care -0.030 (0.008) -   -  -   0.158 (0.029) -  
Lower income -0.037 (0.003) -   -  -   0.214 (0.034) -  
Middle income -0.033 (0.008) -   -  -   0.148 (0.026) -  
Higher income -0.016 (0.017) -   -  -   0.116 (0.028) -  
0-4 years -0.037 (0.005) -   -  -   0.217 (0.040) -  
5-12 years -0.022 (0.014) -   -  -   0.093 (0.016) -  
               
(b) Dual-agent               
LFP 0.165 (0.015) 0.089 (0.038)  -0.032 (0.007) -0.005 (0.005)  -0.024 (0.005) -0.013 (0.007) 
Lower income 0.133 (0.015) 0.118 (0.046)  -0.027 (0.008) -0.005 (0.006)  -0.056 (0.008) -0.037 (0.019) 
Middle income 0.155 (0.012) 0.091 (0.039)  -0.031 (0.006) -0.006 (0.007)  -0.022 (0.004) -0.012 (0.007) 
Higher income 0.190 (0.028) 0.077 (0.035)  -0.036 (0.007) -0.003 (0.003)  -0.016 (0.004) -0.006 (0.004) 
0-4 years 0.183 (0.013) 0.087 (0.041)  -0.030 (0.007) -0.004 (0.005)  -0.027 (0.004) -0.011 (0.007) 
5-12 years 0.146 (0.030) 0.089 (0.034)  -0.030 (0.008) -0.005 (0.006)  -0.022 (0.006) -0.016 (0.008) 
               
Hours worked 0.449 (0.097) 0.133 (0.047)  -0.112 (0.031) -0.022 (0.012)  -0.070 (0.018) -0.021 (0.011) 
Lower income 0.405 (0.068) 0.162 (0.071)  -0.090 (0.035) -0.013 (0.011)  -0.260 (0.042) -0.075 (0.035) 
Middle income 0.422 (0.083) 0.129 (0.048)  -0.089 (0.030) -0.019 (0.013)  -0.067 (0.018) -0.021 (0.011) 
Higher income 0.484 (0.116) 0.134 (0.042)  -0.140 (0.031) -0.028 (0.011)  -0.048 (0.016) -0.012 (0.007) 
0-4 years 0.530 (0.094) 0.129 (0.050)  -0.115 (0.027) -0.020 (0.012)  -0.074 (0.016) -0.015 (0.011) 
5-12 years 0.366 (0.102) 0.134 (0.043)  -0.101 (0.034) -0.025 (0.013)  -0.067 (0.021) -0.030 (0.012) 
               
Parental care -0.032 (0.005) -0.103 (0.033)  0.055 (0.009) -0.003 (0.004)  0.193 (0.028) 0.133 (0.016) 
Lower income -0.031 (0.007) -0.107 (0.034)  0.044 (0.006) 0.015 (0.010)  0.291 (0.050) 0.260 (0.040) 
Middle income -0.029 (0.005) -0.091 (0.03)  0.047 (0.008) 0.000 (0.004)  0.191 (0.027) 0.133 (0.016) 
Higher income -0.036 (0.006) -0.115 (0.036)  0.069 (0.010) -0.008 (0.004)  0.164 (0.024) 0.115 (0.013) 
0-4 years -0.029 (0.009) -0.111 (0.030)  0.050 (0.010) -0.003 (0.004)  0.232 (0.048) 0.176 (0.022) 
5-12 years -0.037 (0.003) -0.092 (0.036)  0.064 (0.016) -0.002 (0.003)  0.161 (0.012) 0.097 (0.016) 
Notes: The childcare price elasticities are calculated based on dividing the effects of a ten-percent increase of gross childcare prices by ten percent. The elasticity is calculated for each 
individual and averaged across all individuals. Standard deviations are reported in the parenthesis. Households with earnings less than the first quartile are regarded as the lower income 
group, households with income between the second and the third quartiles are regarded as the middle income group and those remaining are regarded as the higher income families.
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A key research question is how the effect of wage rates and childcare prices 
vary across different demographic groups. Table 4-11 tabulates the simulated 
elasticities by income level and the age of the youngest child. Specifically, the 
first quartile and the third quartile of the pre-tax income distribution are used 
to define different income groups. Households with earnings less than the first 
quartile are regarded as the lower income group, households with income 
between the second and the third quartiles are regarded as the middle income 
group and those remaining are regarded as the higher income families. 
Additionally, all sample households are classified by the presence of preschool 
children, since the required childcare for preschool is significantly higher than 
school-aged children. The simulation results for these demographic groups 
have significant policy implications, especially in the implementation of 
childcare-related policies. 
The estimation results are largely consistent with a priori expectation. An 
increase in own wage rate is found to yield a positive effect on labour force 
participation and hours worked and a negative effect on parental care. An 
increase in the cross wage rate is found to have a negative effect on 
employment decisions. The price elasticity of childcare is found to have a 
positive effect in parenting hours of both spouses, while negative on labour 
supply decisions. In general, female labour supply decisions are more sensitive 
to changes in childcare prices and wage rates, and the effects of wage rates on 
the provision of parental care of males are found to be largely insignificant. 
First, the estimated elasticities of the male chauvinist specification are 
discussed. The results suggest that a one-percent increase in wage rate leads to 
a 0.19 percentage increase in labour force participation and a 0.48-percent 
increase in hours worked by the mother. The effects of wage on hours worked 
are similar across different income groups – the results suggest that the female 
employment responses in different income levels are similar. If one tabulates 
the labour supply elasticity by the age of the youngest child, mothers with 
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preschool aged children show larger elasticities (respectively 0.60 percent on 
hours worked and 0.22 percent on participation) compared to mothers with 
school-aged children (0.37 percent on hours worked and 0.16 percent on 
participation). This is consistent with the sample data where mothers with 
older children on average work longer durations and are more likely to 
participate in market work, especially in part-time employment.  
Parental care elasticities reflect the effect of wage rates on care utilisation 
among families with a working mother. The estimated uncompensated wage 
elasticity of parental care is -0.03, which is significantly less than the 
elasticities of hours worked. The results suggest that higher wages increase 
paid care utilisation among working mothers and the number of working 
mothers, while reducing the amount of parental care. The effect on hours of 
parental care is small, suggesting working females are reluctant to replace 
their time-spent in parenting activities. For example, working mothers may 
increase their parental care hours after work or may only choose to work when 
parental care is not needed, such as during school terms. Nonetheless, the 
direction of parental care utilisation is in line with employment effects and 
these are reinforcing effects in promoting labour supply.  
In relation to the average effects of a one-percent increase in the gross 
childcare price, the model predicts a reduction of 0.05 percentage point in the 
participation rate, a decrease of 0.12 percent in hours worked and an increase 
of 0.16 percent in hours of parental care. These results suggest that rising 
childcare costs would induce working females to work less, increase 
likelihood of parental cover and potentially withdraw from the labour market. 
The loss in the intensive margin of the labour supply is likely replaced by an 
increase in the provision of parental care.  
In contrast to the wage effects, households of different income levels show 
varying labour supply responses to a one-percent increase in the gross 
childcare price. Specifically, the model finds greater effects on hours worked 
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among low-income households (0.20 percent) than high-income households 
(0.08 percent). This is consistent with a priori expectations, since childcare 
expenses may represent a significant proportion of consumption among low-
income households. In addition, such effects may have important implications 
for the design of public childcare assistance policies, especially in shaping 
financial incentives to promote labour force attachment among low-income 
households.  
In the dual-agent specification, the estimated elasticities are more moderate 
than those from the male-chauvinist specification, as expected. The dual-agent 
specification relaxes the male chauvinist assumption and recognises fathers’ 
role in balancing family need for income and parenting activities. As such, the 
role of the mother within the household is less important. Nonetheless, 
elasticity estimates are largely consistent with the male-chauvinist 
specification.  
The effects of wage elasticities are discussed first. Given a one-percent 
increase in own wage rate, the hours worked is increased by 0.45 percent and 
0.13 percent for females and males respectively. The effects on males’ 
working hours are found to be largest among low-income households (0.16 
percent), compared to 0.13 percent for the other income groups. Although the 
effects on fathers’ provision of parental care are largely insignificant, the 
predicted cross-wage elasticities for fathers are somewhat smaller than those 
for mothers. The results show an average cross-wage elasticity of -0.03 among 
fathers, compared to -0.13 among mothers.  
The predicted childcare elasticities are largely consistent with the male-
chauvinist specification. Despite that, the effects of childcare prices on male 
employment are small and close to zero. Overall, the model predicts a fall of 
0.07 percent and 0.02 percent in hours worked and 0.02 and 0.01 percentage 
points on labour force participation for females and males respectively, as a 
result of a one-percent increase in the gross childcare price. The overall effects 
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on parenting hours are larger than those on labour supply, with an average of 
0.19 percent and 0.13 percent for females and males respectively. The results 
suggest that as the result of an increase in the gross childcare price, parents’ 
responses include contracting their supply of labour and substituting their 
provision of parental care for childcare usage for both work and leisure 
purposes.  
4.6. Comparison with Findings in the Literature 
Before discussing the effects of policy simulations, the estimation results are 
compared to previous studies by briefly contrasting elasticity estimates from 
related studies. Although most reported elasticity estimates in the literature are 
obtained by respectively increasing marginally spouses’ wage rates and the 
price of childcare, cross comparison of results shall be interpreted with care. 
First, there exists a large variety of specifications in modelling household 
labour supply and childcare decisions. For example, see Section 2.2 for a 
discussion of different specifications of labour supply models and Section 2.3 
for existing methodologies to estimate employment effects of childcare costs. 
A number of empirical model specifications follow slightly different 
assumptions. 
Second, the method by which reported labour supply elasticities are calculated 
may be different. Two types of elasticities are commonly reported in the 
literature, namely, mean elasticity and elasticity at the means. The former 
refers to the sample average of individual elasticities (Creedy & Kalb, 2005). 
The latter refers to the elasticity of an ‘average individual’, where the 
characteristics of the individual are calculated as the average of sample 
observations (Breunig et al., 2008). There are also other alternative methods to 
measure marginal effects, for example, the aggregate elasticities can be 
calculated based on the aggregate responses of all sample observations.  
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Third, the interpretation of childcare price elasticities depends on how costs 
are defined. Many studies have attempted to estimate childcare expenses by 
employing different methods to calculate hourly childcare prices. For example, 
Doiron and Kalb (2002) define childcare prices as regional average hourly 
expenses and Breunig et al. (2012) allow childcare prices to be age-specific 
and region-specific. 
Fourth, country-specific factors further challenge the interpretation of the 
results. For example, the wage rates of part-time jobs are generally higher than 
for full-time positions in Australia, in contrast to most other developed 
countries (Rammohan & Whelan, 2005). Also, the majority of working 
females are employed part-time during the childrearing phase. Such context is 
especially important when making cross-country comparisons.  
Finally, existing studies vary with respect to sample restrictions and estimation 
methodologies. Important sample selection criteria typically make use of 
household demographics such as age, marital status, full-time study, 
retirement, age of children and geographic locations, and may vary depending 
on the research scope. 
In Table 4-12, the elasticity estimates in this study are compared to a number 
of elasticity estimates found in the literature, both from Australia and selected 
developed countries.  
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TABLE 4-12 COMPARISON OF CHILDCARE PRICE ELASTICITIES (PARTNERED PARENTS) 
(A) MARRIED FEMALES  AGE CRITERIA  ELASTICITY  OWN WAGE  CHILDCARE COSTS 
Country Authors Data  Spouses Child  Type  Hours LFP  Type Hours LFP 
U.S. Blau and Robins (1988) EOPP 1980  0-45 0-13  M     C  -0.38 
 Connelly (1992) SIPP 1984-85  21-55 0-12  M     C  -0.20 
 Ribar (1992) SIPP 1984-85   0-15  M  0.68   P  -0.74 
       A  0.58   P  -0.64 
 Averett et al. (1997) NLSY 1986  21-29 0-5  M  1.63   C  -0.78 
 Michalopoulos and Robins (2000) NCCS 1990   0-12  M   0.32  C  -0.16 
 Connelly and Kimmel (2003b) SIPP 1992-93   0-5  M   0.74  C  -0.45 
Canada Powell (1997) CNCCS, LMAS 1988   0-5  M  0.17 0.85  C -0.32 -0.38 
 Kimmel (1998) SIPP 1987  18-55 0-12  M     C  -0.92 
Germany Bonin, Kempe, and Schneider (2003) GSEP 2000  18-60   A  0.03 0.02     
 Wrohlich (2011) SOEP 2001-03   0-6  A  0.53 0.14  C -0.13 -0.04 
Netherlands Van Soest (1995) SEP 1987  16-65   M  1.03      
 Van Soest and Das (2001) SEP 1995  16-64   G  0.07      
Norway Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) HCAS 1998   1-5  A  0.49 0.35  C -0.17 -0.12 
Australia Doiron and Kalb (2005a) SIHC, CCS 1996   0-12  A     P -0.02 -0.02 
     0-4  A     P -0.05 -0.05 
 Rammohan and Whelan (2005) HILDA 2002   0-14  M     P  -0.06, -0.12 
 Rammohan and Whelan (2007) HILDA 2002   0-14  M     C  -0.06, -0.21 
 Breunig et al. (2008) HILDA 2002  25-59   M  0.50 0.35     
 Kalb and Lee (2008) HILDA, SIHC 2002   0-12  A     C -0.03  
       A     P -0.00  
 Breunig et al. (2012) HILDA 2005-07   0-12  M     P -0.65 -0.29 
 Gong and Breunig (2011)    0-4  M  0.43 0.27  P -0.11 -0.07 
 This study HILDA 2009-11  25-59 0-12  A  0.48,0.45 0.19,0.17  P -0.12, -0.07 -0.05, -0.02 
               
(B) MARRIED MALES              
U.S. Hausman and Ruud (1984) PSID 1976  21-65   M  -0.03      
Netherlands Van Soest (1995) SEP 1987  16-65   M  0.15      
 Van Soest and Das (2001) SEP 1995  16-64   G  0.08      
Germany Wrohlich (2011) GSEP 2000  18-60   A  0.02 0.02     
Australia Creedy and Kalb (2005) SIHC 1994-98       0.02      
 Breunig et al. (2008) HILDA 2002  25-59   M  0.26 0.18     
 This study HILDA 2009-11  25-59 0-12  A  0.13 0.09  P -0.02 -0.01 
Notes: The age criteria are generally applied to both spouses and to the youngest child.  
Data: CNCCS = Canadian National Child Care Survey, EOPP = Household Survey of the Employment Opportunity Pilot Projects, GSOEP = German Socio-Economic Panel, HCAS = Home 
Care Allowance Survey, HILDA = Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia, LMAS = Labour Market Activity Survey, NLSY = National Longitudinal Surveys of Labour 
Market Experience, PSID = US Panel Study of Income Dynamics, SEP = Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, SIHC = Surveys of Income and Housing Costs (Australia), and NCCS = National 
Child-Care Survey. 
Type of elasticities: M = Elasticities evaluated at sample means, A = Elasticities evaluated for each individual and averaged across all individuals, and G = Elasticities evaluated at the 
aggregate level.  
Type of childcare costs: C = average childcare cost and P = hourly childcare price.  
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The reported elasticities with respect to females are discussed first. Own wage 
elasticities in this chapter are similar to previous estimates in Australia, but 
relatively low compared to estimates from other countries. Using the dual-agent 
specification, an increase of one percent in wage rates results in a 0.45 and 0.13-
percent increase in average working hours, and 0.17 and 0.09-percentage point in 
the labour force participation rate for females and males respectively. For 
Australia, Breunig et al. (2008) estimate an increase in average working hours by 
0.50 percent for females and 0.26 percent for males. Their results have been 
estimated on a sample of married households with and without children, while the 
labour supply of married couples is estimated jointly with the wage equations. 
The labour supply model used in Gong and Breunig (2011) is confined to 2005-
2007 waves of HILDA and reports an estimate of wage elasticity of 0.43. Their 
method allows the option of unpaid informal childcare and they report similar 
elasticities to this analysis. In the overseas literature, there is a large degree of 
variation among the estimated wage elasticities. Own wage elasticities reported in 
this chapter are lower than those reported for the United States and the 
Netherlands, for example, Averett et al. (1997) and Van Soest (1995), 
respectively; but higher than those reported for Germany, such as Bonin et al. 
(2003). 
Table 4-12 also shows great variation in childcare price elasticities with respect to 
participation among existing estimates. For the United States, a wide range of 
estimates are reported by different authors, lying between -0.78 found by Averett 
et al. (1997) up to -0.16 reported by Michalopoulos and Robins (2000). Among 
other developed countries, for example, Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) find for 
Norway that mothers’ participation rate would fall by 0.12 percentage points in 
the case of a one-percent increase in childcare costs. Similar results are reported 
for Germany by Wrohlich (2011). 
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The estimated childcare price elasticities in Australia are relatively small 
compared to overseas countries, except in Breunig et al. (2012). Since many of 
these studies have adopted the male chauvinist assumption or its variant, the 
results from the male-chauvinist specification reported in this chapter are 
discussed. For a one-percent increase in gross childcare price, the model in this 
chapter predicts that the labour force participation of the mother reduces by 0.05 
percent and hours worked reduces by 0.12 percent. These estimates remain low 
yet significant and are consistent with a number of previous estimates for 
Australian households. For example, using the HILDA dataset, Rammohan and 
Whelan (2005) report an insignificant elasticity of -0.06 for labour force 
participation, whereas Doiron and Kalb (2005a) report an elasticity of -0.02 with 
respect to both hours worked and participation of married females. At the higher 
end of estimates, significant negative childcare price elasticities with respect to 
hours worked (-0.65) and with respect to participation (-0.29) are reported by 
Breunig et al. (2012), where the Connelly (1992) approach  is applied to estimate 
the price elasticity of childcare. 
Few Australian studies have investigated the labour supply elasticities for married 
males. The hours worked elasticity reported in this chapter are somewhat smaller 
than Breunig et al. (2008), but larger than Creedy and Kalb (2005). Creedy and 
Kalb (2005) reported insignificant employment effects on married males, whereas 
Breunig et al. (2008) report an own wage elasticity of 0.26 using the more recent 
HILDA wave in 2002. None of these studies have incorporated childcare 
decisions, yet in this chapter, the childcare price elasticities are found to be largely 
insignificant for married males. 
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4.7. Evaluation of Alternative CCR Reforms 
Childcare-related financial support has crucial implications for the functioning of 
labour markets. Unlike many developed countries, the public benefits are paid for 
families and institutional childcare in Australia. In most cases, the Child Care 
Rebate (CCR) provides reimbursement in proportion to childcare expenses, 
whereas Child Care Benefit (CCB) provides absolute deduction in per unit 
childcare prices. In principle, the reduction of fees is equivalent to a direct cash 
transfer to the family and drawing a distinction can be difficult. Both policies 
strengthen work incentives by lowering work costs for those returning to work 
after childbirth.37  
The simulation focuses on the effects of alternative reforms of CCR on the female 
labour supply. Specifically, less costly alternative payment schemes of CCR are 
considered in this section, as there is currently public debate about reducing 
budget expenses as the result of the generous childcare assistance programs in 
practice. As of 2011, over $7 billion benefits have been transferred under the CCR 
to approximately 700,000 families in the form of financial assistance to cover out-
of-pocket expenses (Ellis, 2011). While these simulations give some idea about 
the effectiveness of wage and childcare subsidies on promoting employment, they 
also provide insight into the relative cost-effectiveness of these reforms. Several 
                                                 
37 Note that prior to 2009, the Child Care Tax Rebate (CCTR) was provided in the form of a tax offset. The payment from 
CCTR may be lower than CCR for lower-income earners exempt from paying taxes or who pay at low marginal rates. 
High-income families subject to high marginal income tax rates gain more, so that tax deductions tend to reduce overall tax 
progressivity. Additionally, the benefit payout from CCTR is not available at the time parents incur childcare expenses 
only after tax returns have been filed and approved. Such delays may weaken the perceived link between childcare use and 
support payments. Childcare users may see next year’s tax reductions as a windfall rather than a consequence of their 
childcare choices. From July 2009, CCTR has been renamed Childcare Rebate (CCR). The CCR is no longer a tax offset, 
but is paid to eligible households by the Family Assistance Office (FAO). The total benefit entitlement is capped and 
indexed to inflation on a per annum basis. The CCTR cap limit in 2004-05 was $4,000 and was increased to $7,500 in 
2008-09. In 2011-12, the cap limit was no longer indexed but capped at $7,500.  
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insights into implications of the government budget may be gained using 
estimates obtained in this chapter and by making a few simplifying assumptions. 
In particular, if one assumes that the sample data is representative of Australian 
partnered households, the percentage budget savings and predicted employment 
effects may guide future policy design and further understanding of government 
policy implications. 
In designing alternative policy reforms, tensions may exist between the different 
objectives and the extent to which they can be achieved simultaneously. In the 
simulation, two important implications of childcare policies are considered. The 
first is that the childcare financial support programs aim to foster employment of 
partnered parents, especially females. The second objective is to equitably 
distribute benefits and widen the accessibility of eligible families, by supporting 
childcare patterns believed to be most appropriate for the child. The appropriate 
degree of targeting depends on the aims of childcare support policies. 
Nonetheless, a successful overall package ensures that parents are given a real 
choice about their preferred care arrangements without compromising concerns 
for child development or female employment chances. This section examines the 
employment responses of four hypothetical policy reforms in the CCR: 
(i) Reform I: Reimbursement rate of CCR is reduced from 50 percent to 30 
percent. 
(ii) Reform II: Cap limit of CCR per child is reduced from $7,500 to $5,000 
per annum. 
(iii) Reform III: Reimbursement rate is reduced from 50 percent to 30 percent 
if the second earner’s annual income is more than $90,000. The CCR is 
reduced to zero if the second earner’s annual income is more than 
$90,000. 
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(iv) Reform IV: Reimbursement rate is reduced from 50 percent to 30 percent 
only for households with school-aged children and in which the second 
earner’s income is less than $20,000 per annum. The CCR is reduced to 
zero if the second earner’s annual income is more than $90,000. 
During the sample period, the CCR reimburses 50 percent of out-of-pocket 
childcare expenses and is capped to $7,500 per child per annum. In Reform I, all 
current income support benefits are maintained, but the reimbursement rate of 
CCR is reduced to the rate implemented in 2007. The reimbursement rate is set to 
30 percent in the simulation and the employment responses of households are 
simulated. The first reform is universal in the sense that all sample households are 
affected.  
In the second simulation, Reform II, the cap limit of CCR payment is reduced 
from $7,500 to $5,000 for each child per annum, which corresponds with the level 
implemented in 2007. This would mainly affect households with larger childcare 
expenses near the cap limit. The first two reforms roll back the payment of CCR 
to the level of 2007 and examine employment effects.  
The following two reforms introduce income means tests to the CCR with the 
objectives of lowering budget expenses and promoting labour force attachment. In 
Reform III, the benefits of CCR are reduced to zero for high-income earners, 
since high-income families are found to be relatively less responsive to changes in 
childcare costs. In this case, personal income tax thresholds in 2009 are used to 
identify high-income earners. Households in which the annual income of the 
secondary income earner exceeds $90,000 per annum are made ineligible for to 
CCR.  
In Reform IV, the reimbursement rate is lowered to 30 percent for households 
with school-aged children, in recognition of the relatively smaller effects of 
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childcare costs among this group. In addition, similarly to Reform III, households 
are ineligible for CCR if the secondary income earner exceeds $90,000 per 
annum. As such, this reform induces better accessibility and less income 
distortion effects than Reform III. Note that, during the simulation, all other 
income support benefits in the budget constraint, such as FTB (A), FTB (B), CCB 
and LITO, remain unchanged. 
In the simulation, parameter estimates from the male chauvinist specification 
from Section 4.5.1 are used to assess the impact of alternative reforms on married 
mothers’ hours worked and labour force participation. The behavioural simulation 
is conducted at the individual level. The way in which the effects are predicted is 
similar to the method of computing the elasticities as discussed in Section 4.5.3. 
Specifically, the implications of the simulated policy are calculated as the change 
of mean household responses before and after policy reform. To account for the 
uncertainty of parameter estimates, one hundred independent draws are taken 
from the estimated parameter distribution. The same set of draws is kept to 
estimate the effects of policy reform, and the effects are averaged over the number 
of draws to provide robust estimates.  
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TABLE 4-13 SIMULATED EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF POLICY REFORMS 
ELASTICITIES 
REFORM I  REFORM II  REFORM III  REFORM IV 
Mean Std.Dev  Mean Std.Dev  Mean Std.Dev  Mean Std.Dev 
LFP (ppts) -0.854 (0.151)  -0.515 (0.036)  0.881 (0.183)  0.253 (0.111) 
Lower income -1.018 (0.168)  -0.677 (0.08)  1.220 (0.180)  0.301 (0.094) 
Middle income -0.868 (0.160)  -0.509 (0.030)  0.927 (0.206)  0.352 (0.131) 
Higher income -0.621 (0.141)  -0.339 (0.021)  0.403 (0.157)  0.008 (0.092) 
0-4 years -0.930 (0.179)  -0.594 (0.061)  1.168 (0.212)  -0.067 (0.005) 
5-12 years -0.772 (0.191)  -0.440 (0.043)  0.593 (0.187)  0.624 (0.244) 
            
Hours worked  -1.989 (0.668)  -1.487 (0.215)  1.513 (0.667)  0.355 (0.336) 
Lower income -2.364 (0.813)  -2.213 (0.322)  2.612 (0.85)  0.780 (0.358) 
Middle income -2.140 (0.697)  -1.548 (0.212)  1.970 (0.743)  0.773 (0.394) 
Higher income -1.468 (0.523)  -0.956 (0.163)  0.087 (0.432)  -0.625 (0.222) 
0-4 years -2.168 (0.723)  -1.501 (0.205)  2.216 (0.89)  -0.416 (0.026) 
5-12 years -1.789 (0.652)  -1.432 (0.24)  0.938 (0.500)  1.032 (0.637) 
            
Parental care 2.268 (0.374)  1.785 (0.418)  1.065 (0.344)  0.358 (0.142) 
Lower income 2.810 (0.354)  2.341 (0.517)  1.357 (0.402)  0.291 (0.119) 
Middle income 2.253 (0.397)  1.656 (0.382)  0.996 (0.354)  0.350 (0.157) 
Higher income 1.622 (0.358)  1.386 (0.375)  0.863 (0.261)  0.449 (0.147) 
0-4 years 2.939 (0.364)  2.554 (0.639)  1.366 (0.405)  0.062 (0.014) 
5-12 years 1.520 (0.439)  0.960 (0.126)  0.652 (0.280)  0.703 (0.309) 
            
Budget savings 36.41%   19.50%   7.34%   3.73%  
Note: The estimated budget savings are proportion changes in the aggregate CCR benefits of the sample 
households in relation to the existing CCR scheme. Households with earnings less than the first quartile are 
regarded as the lower income group, households with income between the second and the third quartiles are 
regarded as the middle income group and those remaining are the higher income families. 
The simulation results of four hypothetical reforms are summarized in Table 4-13, 
by first reporting the simulated elasticities with respect to the labour force 
participation, hours worked and hours of parental care, followed by the estimated 
aggregate budget savings in the last row.38 All four hypothetical reforms require 
less government budget than the existing CCR payment scheme and introduce 
changes in the economic benefits of employment and childcare usage. 
In the first two reforms, either a lowered CCR rate or a decreased CCR cap 
resulted in a substantial reduction in female labour supply, in accordance with 
                                                 
38 The estimated budget savings are proportion changes in the aggregate CCR benefits of the sample households in relation 
to the existing CCR scheme during the sample period. 
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expectations. Associated with an overall 36.4 percent of aggregate budget savings, 
the model predicts a fall in participation by 0.85 percentage points and average 
hours worked by 1.99 percent in Reform I. The fall in hours worked is likely 
offset by own provision of parent care. In this case, the proportional change in 
hours worked and hours of parental care are similar. Low-income households and 
households with preschool children have greater effect than other subgroups. In 
particular, the model predicts a 2.94-percent increase in hours of parental care and 
a 2.17 reduction in hours worked among mothers with preschool children. The 
effects of Reform II are less dramatic than those of Reform I. Reverting the cap 
limit to the level in 2007, the model predicts a reduction in labour supply and 
increase in parental care, while achieving an overall budget savings of 19.50 
percent. The reform mainly affects households with a hefty amount of childcare 
expenses, as expected. The simulated effect is particularly higher among lower 
income households and households with preschool children. Reform II results in 
an overall reduction of 0.52 percentage points in labour force participation and a 
1.49-percent reduction in hours worked.  
Reform III and Reform IV demonstrate the applications of using means tests to 
preserve economic incentives for female labour supply. In these two reforms, the 
benefits eligible to less responsive subgroups such as high-income families are 
reduced. Reform III is estimated to yield a total of 7.34 percent in budget savings, 
with positive effects on the labour supply among all subgroups. Despite a 
moderate increase in average hours worked and participation among high-income 
families, particularly high responses are found among low and middle-income 
households, corresponding to a respective 2.61-percent and 1.97-percent increase 
in hours worked. In addition, mothers with preschool children are found to be 
more responsive to these economic incentives. Their labour supply is increased by 
2.22 percent in hours worked and 1.17 percentage points in participation. 
- 110 - 
Following a similar policy setting, Reform IV preserves the rebate rate of CCR to 
50 percent for households with preschool children. As such, it yields an overall 
3.73 percent of budget savings and exerts a moderate effect on employment 
responses. The model predicts an increase of 0.25 percentage points in female 
participation and an increase of 0.36 percent in hours worked. As expected, the 
effect is largest among households with only school-aged children. Their 
participation rates are predicted to increase by 0.62 percentage points, associated 
with an increase of 1.03 percent in hours worked.39  
All four hypothetical reforms have reduced childcare benefits available to 
households and, as expected, the time-spent in parenting activities increased. The 
results suggest that in response to lowered childcare benefits, mothers typically 
spend more time looking after their children than using childcare services. The 
effect is largest among households with preschool children, since younger 
children typically require more hours of care. In addition, mothers from lower-
income households show a greater increase in their time-spent in parental care, 
compared to middle and higher-income households. This is in line with a priori 
expectation, since childcare expense typically represents a larger share of family 
disposable income for economically disadvantaged households. 
In short, this section has presented four alternative payment schemes of CCR that 
are less costly to implement compared to the current policy setting. Specifically, 
in the first two schemes, the rebate rate and the cap limit of the CCR are reduced 
                                                 
39 Although Reform III and IV suggest little effects on the lower income groups, however, there exhibits a large and 
significant estimated effects from Reform I and II for two reasons. First, the proposed CCR reforms lowered CCR net 
payments to lower income households in the form of lowered rebate rate (for example, in Reform I, III and IV). The CCR 
payments are means tested and the payment rates decrease if one’s earnings increase. As such, the ratio of CCR benefits 
and disposable income deteriorates faster among the lower income households compared to other income groups. Second, 
Reform III and Reform IV have income tests on the second earners’ income. 
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to the level they were in 2007, and the simulation results show negative impacts 
on female labour supply. The distortionary effects on the labour supply can be 
reduced if the payment scheme targets more responsive subgroups through the use 
of income means testing, as illustrated in the last two schemes. The results show 
that these two reforms may lead to a small negative effect on the labour supply 
among high-income households or households with preschool children, but would 
lead to a larger increase in the supply of labour among other subgroups. Overall, 
the model predicts positive employment effects in the last two reforms. These 
simulations have illustrated the effectiveness of childcare policy in shaping 
employment behaviour of partnered parents. 
4.8. Conclusion 
The main motivation of this study is to present a structural labour supply model 
which jointly takes into account decisions of labour supply and childcare and can 
be used to simulate the employment effect of policy reforms.  
While the discrete choice model is applied for the reason of resolving the issue of 
non-linear and non-piecewise budget set, leisure is disaggregated into time 
allocation in parental care and non-parenting leisure. As such, the model is able to 
impute childcare expenses with respect to different levels of labour supply and to 
consider simultaneously employment decisions and childcare decisions. The 
model incorporates details of tax rules and income support benefits in Australia, 
while appropriately accounting for parental care decisions and their implications 
for the supply of labour. 
The analysis makes use of a cross-sectional dataset of partnered parents, based on 
the HILDA data collected between 2008 and 2011. Own wage elasticity of 
partnered females reported in this chapter is close to previous estimates in 
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Australia, but the wage elasticity of males is relatively low. The model predicts 
that an increase of one percent in wage rates would lead to an increase of 0.45 and 
0.13 percent in average working hours and an increase of 0.17 and 0.09 percent in 
labour force participation rate, for females and males respectively. The estimated 
childcare price elasticity remains low yet significant and consistent with other 
authors’ findings for Australia. For a one-percent increase in gross childcare price, 
mothers’ working hours are reduced by 0.07 percent, while impact on fathers’ 
labour supply is found to be largely insignificant. 
The usefulness of this approach is illustrated by analysing employment effects of 
four hypothetical reforms of the CCR. Although these reforms aim to deliver 
budget savings, they have different implications for the female labour supply. The 
first two reforms show that a universal decrease in childcare benefits has a 
positive effect on parental care hours and a negative impact on the female labour 
supply. The distortionary effect on the labour supply can be minimised if the 
payment scheme targets less responsive subgroups, such as low-income 
households, as illustrated in the last two reforms. The effect shows that childcare 
benefits can be used as important policy instruments to promote the labour force 
attachment of females by exercising an appropriate degree of targeting. The 
simulation results of the last two reforms show that these reforms may result in a 
small negative effect on the labour supply among high-income households and 
households with preschool children, but would lead to a larger increase in the 
supply of labour among other subgroups. These simulations give some idea about 
the effectiveness of childcare subsidies and suggest that public transfers that lower 
the financial burden of childcare services can be an effective means to facilitate 
female employment. 
- 113 - 
Chapter 5. Labour Supply and Childcare Decisions of 
Single Mothers 
Although a number of studies have evaluated the relationship between childcare 
and women’s employment, the majority of these focus on partnered mothers. In 
Australia, a relatively significant portion of households consist of single mothers 
and the employment decisions of this subgroup are investigated by a limited 
number of studies. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011b), there 
were 630 thousand single parent families in 2011, with 84 percent of these 
families being headed by females. The evaluation of the effects of childcare on the 
labour supply of single mothers is of immediate policy relevance: one of the 
initiatives of the recent welfare-to-work reform is to promote the labour force 
attachment of single mothers.  
Following the methodological context developed in Chapter 3, this chapter 
estimates a structural labour supply model that takes into account childcare 
decisions for single mothers. In the absence of a spouse, single mothers face 
diminished care options and income streams, and their employment decisions 
likely differ from partnered mothers in a number of ways. They typically have 
less household income than partnered households and use more informal care, 
while allocating a larger share of family income to childcare. Furthermore, while 
at work, children cannot be looked after by a spouse. Single mothers must 
therefore use childcare that incurs work-related childcare costs. For these reasons, 
the structural model developed in the previous chapter is extended to examine the 
employment behaviours of single mothers. 
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5.1. Introduction 
Over the past few decades, public policy has increasingly focussed on the labour 
market effects of various income-support and transfer programs. A great deal of 
attention has been paid to those single parent households in which income support 
programs were believed to discourage active participation in the labour market. 
Over the long term, such outcomes can lead to entrenched poverty among parents 
and deleterious outcomes for children who reside in low income households. In 
Australia, there have been a number of policy initiatives designed to encourage 
parents, especially females, to return to the labour market following the birth of a 
child. In this context, there is widespread consensus that childcare plays a crucial 
role in facilitating the transition into employment as dependent children age.40 A 
better understanding of the implications of childcare on labour-market activities is 
of high value in the context of formulating policy. The main objective of this 
chapter is to provide an insight into the impact of transfer programs such as 
Family Tax Benefit (FTB) in Australia and subsidies provided to users of 
childcare, on labour market behaviour and outcomes. 
While a range of studies has sought to identify the responsiveness of the labour 
supply to childcare costs among the couple households, there have been very few 
empirical studies of single mothers.41 This is partly a result of the difficulty of 
                                                 
40 Throughout the remainder of the chapter, single parents will be referred to as single mothers, given that the substantial 
majority of individuals in single parent households who are responsible for dependent children are female. According to  
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011b), 84 percent of single parent families with children under the age of 15 years 
were headed by mothers. 
41 In the overseas literature, the effects of childcare costs on hours worked by single females are found to be significant, 
with elasticity estimates ranging from -0.16 (Andrén, 2003) to -0.47 (Anderson & Levine, 1999). In Australia, Doiron and 
Kalb (2005a) and Kalb and Lee (2008) examine the employment effects of single mothers and they report an estimate of 
the childcare price elasticity between -0.05 and -0.16. Among couple households, some earlier Australian studies reported 
insignificant impacts of childcare costs on labour supply, for example, Rammohan and Whelan (2007). In more recent 
estimates, Breunig et al. (2011) and Breunig et al. (2012) employ different estimation methods and report larger 
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collecting information on the time allocation of work and childcare and the 
incorporation of institutional details of income support programs, which makes it 
difficult to measure the employment effect of childcare benefits.  
To address these difficulties, this analysis uses five waves of the Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) dataset collected between 
2006 and 2010. In the data, the time spent in labour-market activities and 
parenting children can be identified. This enables the analysis to incorporate a set 
of time constraints to capture household childcare decisions, into the conventional 
leisure and consumption space of utility framework. The model is based on the 
idea that single mothers must organise childcare to relieve themselves from care 
responsibilities, to participate in market work. Single parents are usually the 
primary carer of their children and the provision of maternal care reduces their 
time available for work. In the absence of care offered by the other parent, single 
mothers face the choice of not returning to the workforce and parenting children 
on their own, or organising formal or informal childcare to cover the times spent 
working. The use of childcare services, whether of a formal or informal nature, 
frees up care responsibilities and time for single mothers to engage in work and 
leisure activities.  
The parenting and work decision-process of single mothers is simultaneously 
considered in the model subject to time and budget constraints that apply to the 
households. While some existing studies adopt a similar approach and model the 
use of childcare as an essential part of household preference, a key contribution of 
                                                                                                                                     
employment effects on childcare prices. Their results indicate the importance of accounting for the measurement 
imprecision stemming from data on the childcare price and childcare usage. 
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this chapter is to incorporate a set of time constraints to capture the behaviours of 
parenting activities and labour supply in a single framework. Further, the 
structural labour supply model incorporates details of taxation and income support 
programs, including the Family Tax Benefit Part A [FTB (A)], Family Tax Benefit 
Part B [FTB (B)], Parenting Payment (PP), Child Care Benefit (CCB) and Child 
Care Rebate (CCR).42  
The relatively small number of single parent households in any given wave of 
HILDA necessitates the pooling of data across waves. As a result, the time 
structure of the panel data imposes further challenges to the conventional 
estimation method. The econometric specification developed in this chapter 
corrects for the standard errors that result from the data being drawn from a panel 
dataset. In addition, the homogeneous assumption of childcare price is relaxed 
following Breunig et al. (2012), where the age-specific prices are obtained at the 
level of Labour Force Survey Region (LFSR). This analysis applies a rolling 
window technique to preserve possible time trend and regional variations in the 
formulation of prices.  
By simulating the employment responses from adjusting a number of budget set 
components, this chapter investigates the sensitivity of single mothers’ labour 
supply to individual income support programs and tax rules. In particular, the 
simulation inspects the employment effects of lowering the payment rate of PP to 
the rate of Newstart Allowance (NSA) for single mothers with children aged eight 
years or older. Such a policy has been in effect since January 2013.  
                                                 
42 Detailed descriptions of these income support programs, including payment rates, eligibility criteria and calculation 
methods, are available in Appendix A. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. A model of childcare and 
labour supply of single mothers is developed in Section 5.2. Following this, the 
econometric specification is presented in Section 5.3. The data source and 
descriptive statistics are described in Section 5.4 and results from the estimation 
are set out in Section 5.5. In section 5.6, the results from a series of policy 
simulations are presented. Section 5.7 compares the elasticity estimates with those 
of other studies from selected countries. Section 5.8 concludes this chapter. 
5.2. Theoretical Model 
This section introduces the static labour supply model, which takes into account 
childcare decisions. It is assumed that single mothers make choices about their 
time allocation in work (denoted by ℎ), parental care (denoted by 𝑐) and leisure 
activity (denoted by 𝑙), subject to a fixed time endowment: 
ℎ + 𝑐 + 𝑙 = ?̅?, (5.1) 
where ?̅? is the time endowment, set to 130 hours per week (seven days).43 
Together with household disposable income (denoted by 𝑦), these arguments form 
the household utility function  
𝑢 = 𝑢[𝑦(𝑤, 𝑞, 𝑝, 𝑇, 𝐵, 𝑋), 𝑙, 𝑐], (5.2) 
where 𝑋 is a vector of household attributes, 𝑦 is the level of household net income 
and is expressed in a function of hourly wage rate, 𝑤, the number of hours of paid 
                                                 
43 As suggested by Van Soest (1995), ?̅? could be incorporated as a parameter to be estimated, however, the results suggest 
that the estimate of this parameter is imprecise. Different values of ?̅? have been attempted and the results suggest that the 
choice of any reasonable ?̅? values has little impact on the model estimates. The time-spent in leisure activity is assumed to 
equal the slack of time during which an individual is neither working nor parenting, 𝑙 = ?̅? − ℎ − 𝑐. 
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childcare, 𝑞 , the hourly childcare price, 𝑝 , the tax liability, 𝑇 , and transfer 
receipts, 𝐵. The household characteristics, 𝑋, are assumed exogenous and include 
features such as characteristics of the children, family members and education 
levels. We will assume that the function 𝑢(𝑦, 𝑙, 𝑐)  is twice continuously 
differentiable, and strictly increasing and concave in income, 𝑦 . 44  Following 
standard practice in the literature (Breunig et al., 2008; Creedy & Duncan, 2002; 
Creedy & Kalb, 2005), gross wage rates are assumed to be independent of 
working hours.  
We make a distinction among time invested in three types of childcare: parenting 
children, 𝑐 , informal childcare (denoted by 𝑟 ) and formal childcare, 𝑞 .45  The 
provision of parental care typically requires the input of effort and time, and 
rarely takes place at work. When the mother engages in work or other activities, 
her care responsibilities can only be freed up by arranging for a similar number of 
hours of formal or informal childcare. To capture the employment and childcare 
decisions, two sets of time constraints are introduced into the model. Subscript 𝑘 
is used to index each child in the household. The first set of constraints 
characterises the amount of childcare required by each child in the household: 
𝑐 + 𝑞𝑘 + 𝑟𝑘 ≥ 𝐶?̅?. (5.3) 
                                                 
44 The satisfaction of the monotonicity and concavity condition of the utility function is verified ex post. See, amongst 
others, Callan and Van Soest (1996) and Van Soest and Das (2001) for similar applications.  
45  The informal childcare includes mainly custodial childcare arrangements, such as care delivered by siblings, 
grandparents, close relatives and friends in-home or out-of-home. The types of childcare are termed ‘formal care’ and 
include family day care, long day care, out of hours care, kindergarten, preschool and vocational care. 
- 119 - 
In equation (5.3), for the child 𝑘, 𝑞𝑘 represents the amount of formal childcare 
purchased by the mother, and 𝑟𝑘 represents the amount of informal childcare.
46 
The childcare requirement, 𝐶?̅?,  is exogenous and quantifies the number of 
childcare hours required by each child. The numerical value of 𝐶?̅? is dependent 
upon the characteristics of the child, and is approximated by the age-specific 
empirical means of time spent looking after children (discussed in Section 3.3.1). 
The basic idea is to capture the notion that children of different ages require 
different levels of supervision or care, and such care may be provided by the 
parent, an informal carer or through the purchase of formal care services. The 
constraint captured by equation (5.3) simply states that the sum of care or 
supervision for each child provided must exceed the required level of care, 𝐶?̅?.  
The second set of time constraints ensures a minimum level of childcare to be 
attached to the hours worked, ℎ. To rephrase, mothers may only engage in market 
work if appropriate levels of formal and or informal care are arranged to cover the 
period during which they work: 
𝑟𝑘 + 𝑞𝑘 ≥ ℎ. (5.4) 
Equation (5.4) indicates that the participation in the labour market requires an 
equivalent number of hours of non-parental childcare to be arranged. Using 
equation (5.3) and (5.4), the minimum number of the formal childcare hours, ?̃?𝑘, 
for the child, 𝑘, associated with hours worked, ℎ, is given as: 
                                                 
46 The setup of the time constraint rules out the possibility that children look after themselves. However, in the dataset a 
small fraction of school-aged children were reported to be alone. The amount of time spent alone is included in informal 
childcare. 
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?̃?𝑘|ℎ = max {
𝐶?̅? − 𝑐 − 𝑟𝑘
min(ℎ − 𝑟𝑘, 𝐶?̅?)
}. (5.5) 
The constraint in equation (5.5) states that the amount of childcare to support 
working ℎ hours must simultaneously satisfy the required childcare constraint, 
equation (5.3), and the work substitution constraint, equation (5.4).47 Equation 
(5.5) describes how parental care reduces the need for childcare and is important 
in characterising the trade-offs between parental care and market work faced by 
many single parents. 
Finally, it is necessary to incorporate costs of engaging in the labour market along 
the lines suggested in Callan and Van Soest (1996) and Creedy and Duncan 
(2002). In particular, fixed costs of work are incorporated additively in the budget 
constraint. In the absence of fixed costs of work, discrete labour supply models 
tend to underpredict the large proportion of individuals who identify themselves 
as part-time employed and the imputation of fixed costs of work at least partially 
ameliorates this problem (Callan & Van Soest, 1996). Effectively, household 
disposable income is lowered by the amount of fixed costs if an individual works 
positive hours. Denoting the gross childcare hourly price as 𝑝𝑘 for the child, 𝑘, the 
household disposable income, 𝑦, is given by: 
𝑦 = 𝜇 + 𝑤ℎ −∑ 𝑝𝑘?̃?𝑘
𝑘
− 𝑇(𝜇,𝑤, ℎ, 𝑋) + 𝐵(𝜇,𝑤, ℎ, 𝑋) − 𝐹 ∙ 𝐼(ℎ > 0), (5.6) 
                                                 
47 Consider a simple numerical example of a single mother household with a four-year old child. Given that the child 
requires 60 hours of childcare per week and the mother provides 40 hours of parental care, the required amount of childcare 
implied in equation (5.3) is 60-40=20 hours per week. Suppose that the mother engages in 25 hours of market work, 
equation (5.4) suggests that an additional 5 hours of childcare must be arranged. Conditional on the provision of parental 
care, equation (5.5) suggests that the minimum required level of childcare to support this level of labour supply, is 
max(20,5) = 20 hours per week.  
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where 𝜇 is non-labour income and is assumed to be exogenous, for child 𝑘, and 
𝑝𝑘  is the child-specific price of formal childcare. 𝐼(∙)  is a binary indicator 
function equal to one if the argument in the parenthesis is true, and zero 
otherwise.48  
Costs associated with the purchase of formal childcare services are accounted for 
in the budget constraint, since they can be significant and represent a substantial 
fraction of the work-related costs for low income households notwithstanding the 
availability of subsidies associated with the use of this form of care. In relation to 
informal care, most households report little or no direct monetary costs. The costs 
associated with informal care are more likely to be associated with the ‘psychic’ 
costs incurred by the mother if she feels indebted to the provider. As a result of 
the empirical difficulty in identifying these indirect costs, the usage decisions of 
informal care is not modelled and is assumed to remain fixed at the observed 
level.49  
To calculate the tax liability, 𝑇(. ), the tax deductions applicable to individuals are 
first imputed using Australia-wide averages by income groups as reported by the 
Australian Tax Office (2013). The taxable income is calculated by netting the 
imputed tax deduction from the household gross income. As such, the value of the 
Lower Income Tax Offset (LITO) and personal income tax liabilities can be 
identified.50 Household disposable income is calculated as the gross income less 
                                                 
48 The non-labour income consists of income from investment, property rentals and other sources. 
49 See Parera-Nicolau and Mumford (2005) for a similar approach. If informal care is associated with zero or low direct 
money cost to the user, it is likely that the use of this type of care will depend largely on its availability. 
50 Lower Income Tax Offset (LITO) is a tax rebate for low-income individuals. From July 2010, LITO provides individuals 
earning less than $30,000 with a tax rebate of $1,500 (Department of Social Services, 2013). The full offset is reduced by 
1.5 cents in the dollar if taxable income exceeds $37,000, meaning incomes greater than $66,667 do not attract any benefit. 
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income tax and childcare expenses, plus the income transfer benefits, 𝐵(. ) in 
equation (5.6), which consists of transfers from FTB (A), FTB (B), PP, CCB, and 
CCR. 
Each household maximises utility, equation (5.2), subject to its childcare time 
constraint, equation (5.5) and the budget constraint, equation (5.6). By 
formulating appropriate discrete hour points, the decisional variables, ℎ and 𝑐, are 
constrained to be non-negative. The model specification is static in nature so that 
saving or investment associated with inter-temporal consumption decisions is 
ignored.  
5.3. Empirical Specification 
The recent literature on labour supply and policy analysis relies heavily on the 
discrete choice framework for modelling behaviour. Such an approach reduces the 
computational burden and analytical difficulties linked to utility maximisation, 
such as the approach adopted in Hausman (1979). The discrete approach 
simplifies the utility maximisation problem to choosing the optimal discrete 
choice among a finite set of possibilities. Significantly, the approach allows the 
incorporation of institutional details of the actual tax and income support 
programs faced by individuals. The empirical specification of the model in this 
chapter builds on the discrete choice model developed in Van Soest (1995), Eissa 
and Hoynes (2004), and Keane and Moffitt (1998), where the preferences of the 
utility arguments are explicitly parameterised with respect to observed household 
characteristics.  
Let 𝑗  index alternatives in the choice set 𝐻𝑗 . Each family can choose the 
alternative 𝑗 among the set of work and parental care combinations 𝐻𝑗 = (ℎ𝑗 , 𝑐𝑗), 
𝑗 ∈ 1,2, … , 𝐽, to maximise household utility. In particular, assume the following: 
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Choose alternative 𝑗 iff 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑠 ∀ 𝑗, 𝑠 = 1,… , 𝐽, 𝑠 ≠ 𝑗, (5.7) 
where 𝑈𝑗 denotes the assessment of equation (5.2) for the combination, 𝑗, obtained 
by evaluating time and budget constraints at that combination. 
Defining the utility function by the second order polynomial in its arguments 
provides a reasonable approximation of different utility functional forms (Breunig 
et al., 2008; Van Soest et al., 2002). It also provides the benefit of a flexible 
relationship of the utility arguments, as each pair of the arguments may be 
complementary or substitutes. The household utility function consists of nine 
terms and is given as follows: 
𝑈(𝑦𝑗 , 𝑙𝑗, 𝑐𝑗|𝑋) = 𝛼1𝑙𝑗
2 + 𝛼2𝑐𝑗
2 + 𝛼3𝑦𝑗
2 + 𝛼4𝑦𝑗𝑙𝑗 + 𝛼5𝑦𝑗𝑐𝑗 + 𝛼6𝑙𝑗𝑐𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑗
+ 𝛽2𝑐𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑦𝑗 . 
(5.8) 
Some of the factors that relate to the preferences for work and parental care may 
be observable to the researcher and are incorporated additively in the linear 
parameters of the utility function. The unobserved factors allow households with 
identical observed characteristics to make different choices about the labour 
supply and parental care. Furthermore, in order to relax the assumption of 
independence from irrelevant alternatives, the unobserved portion of the utility 
function is allowed to be correlated over alternatives through the common 
influence of the random terms (Train, 2009). 
𝛽𝑞 = 𝑥𝑞
′𝛽𝑞 + 𝜀𝑞 , 𝑞 = 1,2, (5.9) 
where 𝜀 = (𝜀1, 𝜀2) captures unobserved heterogeneity and is assumed to follow a 
multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and covariance 𝛩𝜀. None of the 
elements in the covariance matrix is restricted in the estimation. 
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The fixed costs of work are further parameterised to control for heterogeneity at 
the level of the individual using observed personal and household characteristics: 
𝐹 = 𝑋𝐹
′𝛽𝐹, (5.10) 
where 𝐹 represents the fixed costs of work. In equation (5.10), 𝛽 represents the 
vector of the estimated coefficients and 𝑋𝐹 represents observable taste shifters of 
the fixed costs of work. 
The subscript 𝑖  is used to index households. The relationship between 
𝑈𝑖(𝑦𝑗 , ℎ𝑗 , 𝑐𝑗|𝑋) and the true utility, 𝑉𝑖𝑗, is given by the following: 
𝑈𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑉𝑖(𝑦𝑗 , 𝑙𝑗, 𝑐𝑗|𝑋) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽. (5.11) 
The stochastic terms, 𝜖𝑗, capture the factors that affect utility but are unobserved 
to the researcher and represent idiosyncratic tastes of the household. The random 
disturbances 𝜖𝑖  are assumed to follow Type-I extreme value distribution. The 
probability of choosing the alternative 𝑗 is thus given by a closed form expression: 
Pr[𝑈𝑖,𝑗 > 𝑈𝑖,𝑠 for all 𝑠 ≠ 𝑗] =
∂ ln(∑ 𝑒𝑉𝑖,𝑗𝐽𝑗=1 )
𝜕 ln𝑉𝑖,𝑗
=
𝑒𝑈𝑖(𝑦𝑗,𝑙𝑗,𝑐𝑗|𝑋)
∑ 𝑒𝑈𝑖(𝑦𝑗,𝑙𝑗,𝑐𝑗|𝑋)𝐽𝑘=1
. (5.12) 
The final specification of the model consists of the random preferences equation 
(5.9) and the fixed costs of work equation (5.10), the elements in the covariance 
matrix, 𝛩𝜀, and the parameters in the utility equation (5.8). The data used in the 
estimation consists of five consecutive waves of the HILDA dataset. Although 
discussed in more detail in Section 5.4, it is essential to note that the HILDA 
dataset is a longitudinal panel dataset and the sample used for the estimation is a 
pooled cross-section of consecutive unbalanced waves of data. As a result, some 
households are observed more than once. The subscript 𝑡 is used to index the time 
periods for which household 𝑖  have responded. Taking into account the 
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probability of repetitive sampling, the likelihood contribution of an individual, 𝑖, 
is given as: 
ℒ𝑖 = ∫ ∏∏(
𝑒𝑈(𝑦𝑗,𝑡,𝑙𝑗,𝑡,𝑐𝑗,𝑡|𝑋𝑡)
∑ 𝑒𝑈(𝑦𝑘,𝑡,𝑙𝑘,𝑡,𝑐𝑘,𝑡|𝑋𝑡)𝐽𝑘=1
)
𝐼(𝐻𝑖,𝑡=𝑗)𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑇𝑖
𝑡=1𝜀
𝜙(𝜀)𝑑(𝜀), (5.13) 
where 𝑇𝑖  is the number of surveys that a household, 𝑖, has participated in; and 
function 𝜙(∙) is the normal density function.  
Following Van Soest (1995), the maximum simulated likelihood is used to replace 
the expectation of the log likelihood by simulated means in which residual terms, 
𝜀s , are drawn from the corresponding distribution for each individual in the 
sample.  
5.3.1. Unobserved Wages 
The problem of missing wage information for individuals not currently working is 
common to many studies on labour supply. Nonetheless, the empirical 
implementation of the estimation requires the information on wage rates for all 
individuals. A number of approaches have been proposed to overcome this 
challenge. One approach is to integrate the wage estimation in the labour supply 
model (Breunig et al., 2008; Van Soest et al., 2002). In this approach, the 
evaluation of tax and benefits is typically required during the estimation of wage 
for non-working individuals. 
This chapter follows an alternative approach in which wage rates for non-workers 
are imputed using a selectivity-corrected wage model prior to the labour supply 
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model.51 Wage rates for females and males are estimated separately. A selection 
criterion is used to improve the quality of income information. The criterion 
affects individuals earning less than half of the minimum wage rate or more than 
the 99th percentile of the wage distribution, since these reported wage rates are 
likely associated with measurement errors. 52  The wage rates of non-working 
individuals and those who meet the selection criterion are replaced by predicted 
values. Since the labour supply model is highly non-linear in nature, the 
prediction errors can be accounted for by integrating out the wage errors in the 
likelihood (Van Soest & Das, 2001). To calculate the conditional likelihood, a 
total of 20 pseudo draws are taken from the distribution of the error terms in the 
wage equations to calculate the average of the likelihood values conditional upon 
the error draws. 
5.3.2. Price of Childcare 
The limited numbers of studies that have examined the behaviour of single 
mothers indicate that higher childcare costs are associated with lower levels of 
labour market activity (Connelly, 1992; Doiron & Kalb, 2005a; Kimmel, 1998). 
Among studies that directly compare the employment effect for single mothers 
with that for partnered females, except for Kimmel (1998), the effect of childcare 
costs is found to be greater for single mothers or single parent households (Doiron 
& Kalb, 2005a; Han & Waldfogel, 2001; Michalopoulos & Robins, 2002). One 
challenge in any analysis of childcare is to identify the appropriate price faced by 
users. Clearly, there is a great deal of heterogeneity among the price faced by 
                                                 
51 For recent policy analyses, amongst others, see Van Soest and Das (2001) for the Netherlands and Creedy and Kalb 
(2005) for Australia. 
52 The minimum wage is set to $14 per hour, reflecting the level of standard Federal Minimum Wage (FMW) implemented 
in 2009 (Sloane, 2010). The 99th percentile of the wage distribution is $55.56 per hour. 
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users of childcare, with the actual cost being endogenously determined. Following 
Breunig et al. (2012), for this chapter the net childcare hourly price is constructed 
as the ratio of the type-specific childcare expenses and the respective number of 
hours of childcare usage for each child. The benefit from CCB is recovered using 
information on household income to form gross childcare prices. Three age 
groups for sample children are formulated, respectively, 0 to 2 years, 3 to 4 years 
and 5 to 12 years. The gross hourly price for each age group is approximated by 
regional means according to the definition of LFSR.53  
At the level of LFSR, Breunig et al. (2012) find that pooling three waves of 
HILDA provides sufficient sample coverage to yield robust estimates. In order to 
preserve the possible time trend and the regional differences, childcare prices are 
calculated on the basis of a rolling window for three years during the sampling 
period. That is, between 2005 and 2011 every three consecutive waves of HILDA 
are pooled to form a cross-sectional dataset. The three-wave dataset is composed 
of sufficient sample observations to estimate prices at the level of LFSR. As such, 
the prices can be identified for the middle waves in each of the three-wave 
dataset. The process is repeated until the childcare prices for each year of the 
sample period are obtained. To evaluate the expected childcare expenses, the 
imputed prices are then inserted into the budget constraint, equation (5.6). 
                                                 
53 The labour force survey regions are established by the Australian Bureau of Statistics to provide information on the 
quality of estimates in small area data from the Labour Force Survey. In 2011, there were 77 labour force survey regions 
across Australia. A list of regions is provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013). 
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5.4. Data Formulation and Statistics 
The data used in the empirical analysis is derived from the Household, Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) dataset. The HILDA dataset is 
sourced from an Australia-wide longitudinal survey that collects information 
about household members on an annual basis. Data collection began in 2001 and 
the analysis in this chapter uses data from waves 6 to 10, collected between 2006 
and 2010 respectively.  
The HILDA data contains information derived from surveys administered to 
households and individuals residing in those households, along with data reported 
in the self-completed questionnaires. In particular, households report their weekly 
time-spent in parenting activities in the self-completed questionnaires and report 
hours of childcare for each child and the costs of each childcare type in the 
household survey questionnaires. Information from the self-completed 
questionnaires and the household survey questionnaires is matched at the level of 
the household. The analysis utilises information on time-use in parenting 
activities, childcare usage and costs, income, employment status and 
demographics of single mothers.54 Geographic information at the level of LFSR is 
essential to the calculation of childcare prices and is recovered using the in-
confidence-release of HILDA.  
The sample used in the empirical analysis is derived through a series of steps as 
follows. The unbalanced panel data consists of single females aged between 25 
and 59 years with at least one child aged less than 12 years old in waves 6 through 
to 10. Households with more than six children are excluded because of the 
                                                 
54 The real household disposable income for each discrete choice is imputed by discounting the disposable income by the 
respective Consumer Price Index (CPI). Year 2011 is normalised as the base year.  
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difficulties associated with the imputation of the tax and benefits. The self-
employed, individuals who report negative non-labour income, full-time students 
and individuals who report more than 100 hours per week in either work or 
parental care are excluded. Observations with missing information in the key 
variables are also excluded from the analysis, leaving a final sample of 738 
single-mother households. 
In the self-completed questionnaire, HILDA respondents are required to report 
their weekly time-spent in a variety of activities, including parental care activities. 
In particular, individuals are asked to identify the time spent playing with their 
own children, helping with personal care, teaching, coaching, supervising children 
or transporting children to childcare or school. Further, respondents report 
childcare usage and costs corresponding to ten different childcare types, namely: 
the family day care, long day care at the workplace or elsewhere, outside-school-
hours care, kindergarten/preschool, out-of-hours care at the child’s school or 
elsewhere, vocational care at the child’s school or elsewhere, and other 
arrangements. The construction of measures of informal and formal care use is 
based on the aggregation of child-specific usage of corresponding childcare types. 
Other types of care, in particular, family day care, long day care, out of hours care 
and vocational care are eligible for CCB payments. 
One difficulty that arises relates to households with multiple children and how 
time is allocated among different children. It is assumed that the mean values of 
the total childcare hours presented in Table 3-1 are indicative of the level of 
supervision or care that children of different ages require. They are first rounded 
to the nearest multiple of five hours and are used to define the expected level of 
childcare, 𝐶?̅?, in equation (5.3). 
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5.4.1. Discrete Hours Points 
Histograms of hours worked and hours of parental care for individuals in the 
sample are shown in Figure 5-1. Note that the frequency of zero working hours is 
hidden. In the hours worked histogram there are several spikes clustering around 
the 20-hours and 40-hours per week, corresponding to part-time and full-time 
employment respectively. To discretise the distribution of working hours, ten 
equally spaced discrete points are formulated at multiples of six hours to capture 
choices ranging from non-working to a maximum of 54 hours worked per week. 
The reported hours are then rounded to the nearest discrete points. Individuals 
who report hours worked between 54 and 100 hours are rounded to 54 hours.55  
 
FIGURE 5-1 HISTOGRAMS OF HOURS WORKED AND PARENTAL CARE (SINGLE MOTHERS) 
In relation to the hours of parental care, the histogram shows significant spikes at 
multiples of ten hours. One possible explanation relates to poor data quality, with 
survey respondents rounding their time-spent in parental care in multiples of ten 
hours. For the parental care behaviour, ten discrete points are formulated in 
multiples of ten hours, with a lower limit of five hours and the upper limit of 95 
hours per week. In the formulation, the possibility of non-parenting is not 
                                                 
55 This rounding affects a total of 8 observations (1 percent). 
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considered since the number of sample households that reported not using 
parental care is approximately one percent of all observations.  
5.4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5-1 sets out the sample means of key variables in the dataset alongside their 
definitions. The mean age of the sample individuals is 37 years. Education levels 
overall are relatively low, with around one-third of mothers reporting their highest 
attained educational level being a vocational degree, followed by 18 percent 
holding a university degree and 20 percent as high-school graduates. In relation to 
employment status, 64 percent of single mothers are employed, with the majority 
undertaking part-time jobs. The provision of parental care is reported for 98 
percent of households, with an average length of 25 hours per week. 
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TABLE 5-1 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND SAMPLE STATISTICS 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION MEAN STD.DEV. 
Age indicators    
Age Age in years 37.377 (7.011) 
25-30 1 if aged between 25-30 0.150 (0.358) 
30-35 1 if aged between 30-35 0.220 (0.414) 
35-40 1 if aged between 35-40 0.251 (0.434) 
40-45 1 if aged between 40-45 0.194 (0.396) 
45-50 1 if aged between 45-50 0.145 (0.352) 
50-55 1 if aged between 50-55 0.037 (0.188) 
55+ 1 if aged 55 or more 0.004 (0.064) 
Education    
University 1 if postgraduate, graduate, bachelor or honour s 0.180 (0.385) 
Vocational 1 if diploma or certificates I/II/III/IV 0.336 (0.473) 
Year 12 1 if year 12 0.195 (0.397) 
Year 11 1 if year 11 or less 0.289 (0.453) 
Employment    
Employed 1 if currently employed 0.638 (0.481) 
Full-time 1 if employed full-time 0.255 (0.436) 
Part-time 1 if employed part-time 0.383 (0.487) 
Hours worked Hours worked per week if employed 28.672 (12.421) 
Gross wage Gross wage rate per hour if employed 22.719 (10.294) 
Work experience Time spent in paid work in years 12.854 (8.326) 
Parental care    
Provision of care 1 if parental care is provided 0.982 (0.132) 
Hours provided Hours of care per week if provided 24.840 (21.766) 
Health    
Health improved 1 if reported health better than one year ago 0.133 (0.340) 
Health worsened 1 if reported health worse than one year ago 0.215 (0.410) 
Long-term disability 
1 if any long-term health conditions which limit the type or 
amount of work 
0.134 (0.341) 
Other characteristics    
Born in Australia 1 if born in Australia 0.873 (0.334) 
Observations  738  
Number of Households  317  
Source: HILDA wave 2006 – 2010. 
Note: The non-labour income is defined as the sum of the business income, investment income, private pensions 
and private transfers as reported in the financial year preceding the interview. 
In the labour supply model, demand side factors in the labour market are assumed 
to be exogenous. It important to note that the observed labour supply may not be 
the optimal choice if there is a limitation from the demand side (Euwals & Van 
Soest, 1999). It would be appropriate to formulate discrete points based on the 
desired hours of work instead of actual hours to remove the restrictions in actual 
hours caused by labour demand. Although HILDA provides information on the 
desired hours worked, it does not collect information on the desired hours of 
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parental care activities. For working individuals, it is thus assumed that preferred 
working hours equal their actual hours. 
5.5. Estimation Results 
The first step in the empirical estimation involves obtaining the parameter 
estimates of the log-linear wage model. The estimation results are reported in 
Appendix B. The estimated coefficients of the wage model are largely in line with 
a priori expectations.  
The majority of the data used as explanatory variables are recoded as binary 
indicators. To keep variables to scale, the variables of hours worked and hours of 
parental care are divided by 100 respectively and the variable of household 
disposable income is divided by 1000. Following Van Soest et al. (2002) the 
labour supply model is estimated using the maximum simulated likelihood, with 
20 Halton draws per individual56. Arguably, this number of draws is sufficient to 
provide robust and stable model estimates.  
Table 5-2 and Table 5-3 set out the parameter estimates of the labour supply 
model. A range of specifications and starting values are used, and the estimated 
coefficients of the significant parameters are found to be stable. The choice of 
different but reasonable starting values mainly affects the convergence time. 
Further, a check of the Slustky regularity conditions is conducted using the ex post 
estimated parameters and 99 percent of individuals in the sample satisfy these 
regularity conditions.  
                                                 
56 The prime numbers of the Halton Sequence are 7 and 11. 
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TABLE 5-2 PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR SINGLE WOMEN WITH YOUNG CHILDREN 
VARIABLES 
TASTES FOR LEISURE 
(1) 
TASTES FOR PARENTAL 
CARE (2) 
FIXED COSTS OF WORK 
(3) 
Constant 65.20*** 52.33*** 0.975*** 
 (7.999) (6.710) (0.232) 
Personal information    
Age -5.599**   
 (2.508)   
Age squared 7.989**   
 (3.331)   
If aged between 18-34    0.514*** 
   (0.164) 
If aged between 35-40   0.374*** 
   (0.145) 
If aged between 40-45   0.223* 
   (0.131) 
If born in Australia   -0.306** 
   (0.131) 
Educational attainment    
University    
    
Vocational or year 12    
    
Household demographics    
Number of children  -1.233***  
  (0.284)  
If youngest child aged 0-1 6.287*** 11.37***  
 (1.393) (1.620)  
If youngest child aged 2-5 2.255*** 5.557***  
 (0.736) (0.949)  
If youngest child aged 6-9 -0.511 1.243  
 (0.641) (0.853)  
If informal care is used  0.483  
  (0.477)  
Health    
Poor Health 2.817**   
 (1.225)   
Health improved -0.486   
 (0.520)   
Health worsened 0.0785   
 (0.414)   
Other variables    
English as first language  1.669**  
  (0.807)  
Difficulty finding a place in 
childcare 
 -0.501  
 (0.577)  
Juggling multiple childcare 
arrangements 
 -0.371  
 (0.575)  
    
Unsatisfied division of childcare 
tasks 
 -0.689  
 (0.550)  
    
σa 0.036 0.093  
 (0.250) (0.295)  
Simulated log likelihood -2,778.27   
Observations 738   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; sample of single mothers with children 0-12 years old; model estimated by 
Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) using Halton sequences (20 Draws); hours worked and hours of care 
divided by 100; household disposable income on weekly basis and divided by 1000. 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
a To ensure positive-definiteness of the covariance matrix, the Cholesky elements are instead estimated. The 
reported σs undoes the transformation where the standard error is calculated using the delta method.                                                
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The estimated coefficients presented in Table 5-2 are not directly interpretable due 
to the highly non-linear nature of the model. Nonetheless, the signs of the 
estimated coefficients do indicate the manner in which household characteristics 
influence the utility function.  
The results reported in column (1), ‘Tastes for Leisure’, are discussed first. This 
equation captures the effects of age, household demographics and health status on 
household idiosyncratic tastes for leisure. The coefficients of the age variables 
indicate that the preference for leisure is quadratic in age, peaking at 
approximately 40 years of age. Further, the estimated coefficients of children age 
groups indicate that the presence of preschool children significantly reduces 
household preference for leisure, and such effects are larger if a child less than 
one year of age is present in the household. This is consistent with a priori 
expectations since infants typically require significant hours of parenting. The 
effects of health variables suggest that individuals with poor health have a lower 
preference for leisure. 
The ‘Tastes for Parental Care’ equation (column (2)) indicates that both the 
number and age of children have a significant effect on parental care utilization. 
Households with multiple children are found to have a lower preference for 
parental care compared to those with a single child. This may be related to 
parenting specialisation in the presence of multiple children, where mothers can 
often provide supervision on a one-to-many basis. As such, hours of parental care 
do not necessarily increase linearly with the number of children. Nonetheless, the 
presence of a child aged less than one year is found to have large positive effect 
on preference for parental care, as does the presence of a two to five-year old 
child, and a six to nine-year old child. Part of the explanation most likely relates 
to the lower childcare needs as children age and the possibility that older siblings 
may provide care for younger dependents. Finally, the results indicate that where 
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the parent speaks English as the first language, her preference for own parenting 
activities is higher, compared to individuals from non-English speaking 
backgrounds. 
Most of the coefficients in the fixed costs of work equation (column (4) of Table 
5-2) are significant, suggesting that the inclusion of the fixed costs of work is 
appropriate. The coefficient on Australian-born is negative and significant, 
suggesting that for Australian-born mothers the fixed costs to participate in the 
labour market are lower compared to those born outside of Australia. 
Table 5-3 presents the remainder of the utility parameters and the elements of the 
correlation matrix. The utility parameters have no clear interpretation but they are 
indispensable components in the expression for marginal effects. Note that none 
of the elements in the correlation matrix is significant. 
TABLE 5-3 ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE UTILITY FUNCTION 
(a) UTILITY PARAMETER     
Parameters Coef. Std. Err. Parameters Coef. Std. Err. 
𝛼1 0.275 (0.229) 𝛼4 2.427** (1.186) 
𝛼2 -26.55*** (3.078) 𝛼5 2.370* (1.291) 
𝛼3 -27.43*** (3.501) 𝛼6 -51.890*** (6.233) 
𝛽1 -0.0812 (1.175)    
      
(b) CORRELATION MATRIXa 
Errors 𝜀1     
𝜀2 0.092     
 (7.640)     
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
Table 5-4 reports the actual and the fitted means of hours of working and parental 
care alongside the probabilities associated with each discrete choice. Overall, the 
estimated model provides a reasonable fit to the sample data as indicated by the 
consistent sample and fitted means. 
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TABLE 5-4 ACTUAL AND FITTED MEANS AND PROBABILITIES 
HOURS WORKED 
ACTUAL  FITTED  
PARENTAL CARE 
ACTUAL  FITTED 
Mean  Mean Std.Err.  Mean  Mean Std.Err. 
Hours per week 18.260  17.538 (1.550)  Hours per week 24.402  26.233 (2.192) 
Probability (in percent)     Probability (in percent)    
0 36.314  36.554 (3.967)  0-10 24.551  26.348 (3.898) 
0-6 1.626  2.242 (0.929)  10-20 22.069  21.006 (1.585) 
6-12 5.013  4.598 (0.870)  20-30 25.655  16.432 (1.947) 
12-18 8.672  7.628 (0.648)  30-40 11.586  12.393 (1.714) 
18-24 10.569  10.312 (1.573)  40-50 7.310  9.145 (1.179) 
24-30 9.621  11.416 (2.264)  50-60 4.414  6.643 (1.061) 
30-36 6.504  10.611 (1.837)  60-70 3.586  4.750 (1.433) 
36-42 13.415  8.314 (1.113)  70+ 5.655  3.283 (1.742) 
42-48 5.149  5.413 (1.517)       
48+ 3.117  2.910 (1.650)       
Notes: The standard errors are constructed by averaging over the corresponding demographic group for each of the 
100 independent draws from the asymptotic distribution of the estimated parameters. 
In the actual hours worked, bunching is observed at two discrete-hour points, zero 
and 36-42 hours, which correspond to non-working and full-time employment 
respectively. The model has identified the large proportion of non-working 
individuals (36.6 percent), where the actual rate is 36.3 percent. However, the 
probability of the observed bunching around full-time employment is 
underpredicted. The effects of underprediction are partially offset by 
overpredicted probabilities associated with discrete choices of lower hours, which 
results in the expected hours worked being close to the sample average. In relation 
to parental care, the predicted choice probabilities of most alternatives are well in 
line with actual figures. The largest discrepancy occurred in the smallest two 
discrete choices where the weekly time-spent in parental activities is less than 20 
hours per week. The model has provided a reasonable fit over the sample data for 
the remaining discrete choices. 
5.6. Simulations 
In the labour supply model, the parameters faced by individuals can be used to 
simulate the impact of a change in the gross wage, tax rules or benefit payments 
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on participation, hours worked and hours of parental care. Within the time span 
considered in the analysis, payments from the income support programs 
considered in the model have been indexed to inflation, with the exception of 
CCR. The reimbursement rate of out-of-pocket childcare expenses of CCR 
increased from 30 percent to 50 percent in 2009, with the maximum payable 
benefit per child lifted from $4,354 to $7,500 per annum. In the simulation, it is 
necessary to unify the policy setting of the CCR over the sample period by 
adjusting the CCR payment rate of the pre-reform period to that of the post-
reform period.57 In particular, the reimbursement rate of CCR from 2006 to 2008 
is changed to 50 percent in the dollar, and the value of the cap limit per child of 
the CCR is adjusted similarly.58  
The simulation is carried out in a different hypothetical scenario by considering a 
series of hypothetical shocks to the budget constraint and assessing how predicted 
behaviour changes in response to these ‘shocks’. For example, the wage 
elasticities are obtained by evaluating employment responses before and after a 
one-percent increase in the wage rate. The impacts of these shocks are considered 
by reporting the elasticities of the responses, where average elasticities are 
reported by evaluating the change in employment responses over the number of 
individuals in the sample. To account for the uncertainty associated with the 
parameter estimates, a total of 100 independent draws of the parameters are taken 
                                                 
57 One of the purposes of the analyses is to provide benchmark estimates of labour supply responses to the costs of 
childcare. The econometrics of the model requires the pooling across different waves of HILDA data, whereas the policy 
context may change significantly during the sample period. As discussed earlier, CCR evolved significantly during the 
2009 fiscal year. To isolate the impact of policy changes from the estimates of households’ labour responses to childcare 
costs, it was necessary to unify the CCR payments during the sample period. To accomplish this goal, we first obtained 
model estimates using the historical data and rates. Then, we applied the CCR payment rates and cap rates effective in 
2009 to all other periods and imputed CCR benefits prior to 2009. As such, the simulation responses such as the wage 
elasticities and childcare price elasticities correspond to the policy context in 2009. 
58 The nominal values of the cap limits of the Child Care Rebate for 2006 to 2008 are deflated using the Consumer Price 
Index. 
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from the estimated asymptotic distribution while calculating the average 
elasticities. Before and after a shock, the choice probabilities are calculated for 
each parameter draw using the model estimates. The expected hours of the labour 
supply and parental care for each individual are calculated based on weighting the 
discrete hour points by corresponding choice probabilities. The estimated 
elasticities are calculated from the proportional change in the expected hours. The 
elasticities from the independent pseudo draws are then averaged across sample 
households and the associated standard errors are reported. Table 5-5 reports the 
simulated wage elasticity and gross childcare price elasticity. 
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TABLE 5-5 ELASTICITIES OF WAGE AND CHILDCARE PRICE FOR SINGLE MOTHERS 
ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES PARTICIPATION (PPTS)  LABOUR SUPPLY  PARENTAL CARE 
(a) Gross wage Mean Std.Err.  Mean Std.Err.  Mean Std.Err. 
All 0.127 (0.024)  0.345 (0.060)  -0.036 (0.018) 
Education         
University 0.171 (0.029)  0.436 (0.071)  -0.036 (0.017) 
Vocational or year 12 0.126 (0.025)  0.338 (0.061)  -0.027 (0.012) 
Year 11 0.102 (0.021)  0.274 (0.052)  -0.026 (0.011) 
Income level         
Low income 0.104 (0.024)  0.250 (0.063)  -0.026 (0.011) 
Middle income 0.115 (0.023)  0.293 (0.058)  -0.031 (0.014) 
High income 0.175 (0.028)  0.449 (0.072)  -0.058 (0.033) 
Age of youngest child         
0-4 0.122 (0.028)  0.408 (0.081)  -0.028 (0.011) 
5-12 0.131 (0.023)  0.330 (0.056)  -0.040 (0.021) 
         
(b) Gross childcare price          
All -0.025 (0.013)  -0.074 (0.024)  0.079 (0.014) 
Education         
University -0.025 (0.008)  -0.065 (0.014)  0.087 (0.016) 
Vocational or year 12 -0.026 (0.014)  -0.080 (0.029)  0.080 (0.015) 
Year 11 -0.024 (0.013)  -0.070 (0.026)  0.118 (0.022) 
Income level         
Low income -0.027 (0.020)  -0.153 (0.080)  0.118 (0.022) 
Middle income -0.025 (0.012)  -0.068 (0.023)  0.075 (0.013) 
High income -0.023 (0.006)  -0.058 (0.012)  0.042 (0.009) 
Age of youngest child         
0-4 -0.016 (0.021)  -0.073 (0.048)  0.155 (0.028) 
5-12 -0.029 (0.009)  -0.074 (0.019)  0.046 (0.009) 
Notes: Sample of single mothers with children 0-12 years using HILDA waves 2006-2010. The individual 
elasticity is averaged across all observations. The standard errors are constructed by averaging over the 
corresponding demographic group for each of the 100 independent draws from the asymptotic distribution of the 
estimated parameters. 
A key research question is the response of different subgroups of single mothers 
to exogenous changes in wage rates and childcare prices. Table 5-5 tabulates the 
simulated elasticities by education, income and the age of their youngest child. 
Note that households whose disposable income falls below the first quartile of the 
income distribution are classified as the low-income group. Households with 
disposable income exceeding the third quartile of income distribution are 
classified as the high-income group. Those remaining are termed as the middle-
income group.  
In relation to the wage elasticities, the results suggest that a one-percent increase 
in the wage leads to 0.13-percent increase in overall participation, 0.35-percent 
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increase in their hours worked and 0.04-percent decrease in their hours of parental 
care. The wage elasticities are highest among university graduates (0.44 percent), 
followed by vocational degree holders (0.34 percent) and individuals without a 
high-school degree (0.27 percent). When assessed by income group, the effects 
are found to be greatest among high-income families (0.45 percent). Wage 
earnings are likely the dominant source of income, since most single mothers 
report little or no non-labour income. Nonetheless, mothers with preschool 
children have a larger employment response (0.41 percent) compared to mothers 
with only school-aged children (0.33 percent). In general, the wage elasticity on 
parental care hours is smaller than the elasticity on hours worked. The results 
suggest that single mothers have a relatively high preference for parental care and 
are reluctant to limit their time-spent in parental care, following a marginal 
increase in the offered wage.  
The childcare elasticities reported in Table 5-5 are computed on the basis of a 
one-percent increase in the gross price of childcare. The results suggest that the 
labour supply will decrease by 0.03 percent at the extensive margin and 0.07 
percent in hours worked. The effects of childcare costs on employment are largest 
among individuals with vocational degrees, for whom the childcare price 
elasticity is -0.08. By income groups, childcare price elasticity on hours worked is 
found to be most significant amongst low-income families (0.15 percent), in 
contrast to the small effect among middle and high-income families (0.7 percent 
and 0.06 percent respectively). This finding is in line with a priori expectations. 
The results indicate that childcare assistance policies can be a valuable means to 
promote the labour supply behaviours of low-income families. 
Finally, a comparison of the price elasticity on hours worked and on parental care 
suggests that an increase in the gross childcare price largely induces mothers with 
preschool children to replace their working hours for their own provision of care. 
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However, the substitution effect is smaller among mothers of school-aged 
children.  
To examine the policy implications of the empirical results further, several 
additional simulations are generated. The employment effect of the PP reform 
enacted in 2013 is considered first, along with other hypothetical adjustments in 
the components of the budget set. While some of these simulations do not refer to 
any policy proposal, they help illustrate the effectiveness of different policy 
options in promoting employment.  
The first simulation aims to depict the employment effect of the recent abolition 
of Parenting Payment transitional arrangements, which is estimated to realise 
budget savings of $686 million between 2013 and 2017 (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2012).59 Since January 2013, single parents are no longer eligible for 
PP benefits once their youngest child turns eight. They may instead receive NSA 
benefits which are paid at a lower rate of benefits compared to the PP, and are 
subject to participation requirements. 60  For the simulation purpose, all single 
mothers are assumed to move from PP to NSA once their youngest child turns 
eight years of age, and mothers are assumed to fulfil the participation 
requirements specified by the NSA. Employment responses in this policy context 
                                                 
59 The Parenting Payment transitional arrangements allow single parents who have been receiving Parenting Payment 
before 2006 to remain on this payment until their youngest child turns 16, subject to continued eligibility and participation 
requirements since when their youngest child turns seven. Parents who claimed Parenting Payment after 2006 are eligible 
to receive PP only until their youngest child turns eight. 
60 Single principal carers with large families of four or more, foster carers, relative caring under a court order and those 
who provide home schooling or distance education are eligible for a higher rate of NSA, which is the same amount as 
Parenting Payment. Eligible NSA recipients must be actively searching for work and meet the requirements included in 
their Employment Pathway Plan, which outlines activities to undertake while looking for work, such as attending 
interviews and workshops. 
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are compared with the baseline estimates and changes in the labour supply are 
summarised at the level of the household.61 
Some additional alternative reforms are simulated to evaluate the sensitivity of 
single mothers’ labour supply to individual income support programs and tax 
rules. A number of components of the budget set are adjusted and the employment 
effects of such adjustments are simulated. These changes include a reduction in 
the personal income tax rate and increases in total benefit payments in CCB, 
CCR, FTB and PP. The evaluation of the employment effects can inform the 
design of proactive family assistance policies. 
Table 5-6 reports the mean employment responses of different simulation 
scenarios. First, the effects of abolishing the Parenting Payment transition 
arrangements are discussed. For households without children aged less than eight 
years, the model predicts an increase in the labour supply – an increase of 2.14 
percent in hours worked and 0.46 percentage points at the extensive margin; and a 
decrease of 0.07 percent in the hours of parental care. The abolition significantly 
increases the labour supply of single mothers, which is consistent with a priori 
expectations. Removal of the Parenting Payment transition arrangements likely 
increases the gain from a unit of market work associated with the discrete hour 
points in which PPs are eligible, and decreases the payoffs of the choice of non-
working. 
                                                 
61 For an example, consider a single mother of an eight year-old child, who is eligible for both PP and NSA, and assume 
that the Parenting Payment transitional arrangements were not abolished. The 2013 figures are reported for an illustration. 
The maximum payment rate of PP and NSA is $683.50 and $537.80 respectively. The payment of PP is reduced by 40 
cents in the dollar for income over $176.60 per fortnight, whereas the payment of NSA is reduced by 50 cents in the dollar 
for fortnightly income between $62 and $250, and by 60 cents in the dollar for income over $250. Moreover, PP provides 
an additional $24.60 per fortnight for each additional child. 
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TABLE 5-6 SIMULATED RESPONSES TO CHANGES IN THE BUDGET SET 
ESTIMATED EFFECTS (IN PERCENT) PARTICIPATION (PPTS)  LABOUR SUPPLY  PARENTAL CARE 
(a) PP lowered to NSA Mean Std.Err.  Mean Std.Err.  Mean Std.Err. 
All households 0.460 (0.208)  2.137 (0.483)  -0.074 (0.114) 
If youngest child aged 8-12 0.658 (0.299)  2.685 (0.607)  -0.106 (0.157) 
         
(b) Change in the budget component         
Non-labour income + 10% -0.096 (0.038)  -0.154 (0.085)  -0.001 (0.029) 
Personal income tax rate – 1% 0.191 (0.042)  0.524 (0.100)  -0.059 (0.032) 
Net childcare price + 10% -0.215 (0.093)  -0.623 (0.189)  0.549 (0.099) 
Net childcare cost + 10% -0.738 (0.160)  -1.944 (0.553)  2.104 (0.212) 
         
(c) Change in the social assistance         
Total benefit + 1% -0.163 (0.056)  -0.290 (0.093)  -0.053 (0.032) 
CCR + 10%a 0.164 (0.078)  0.459 (0.141)  -0.451 (0.083) 
CCB + 10% 0.060 (0.049)  0.170 (0.08)  -0.265 (0.050) 
FTB (A) + 10% -0.460 (0.188)  -0.837 (0.301)  0.027 (0.116) 
FTB (B) + 10% -0.116 (0.057)  -0.179 (0.095)  -0.002 (0.038) 
PP + 10% -1.199 (0.251)  -2.341 (0.463)  0.156 (0.134) 
Notes: Sample of single mothers with children 0-12 years using HILDA waves 2006-2010. The standard errors are 
constructed by averaging over the corresponding demographic group for each of the 100 independent draws from 
the asymptotic distribution of the estimated parameters. 
a Ten percent increase in the total benefits received from CCR. 
Next, reducing the personal income tax by one percentage point was found to 
have a positive effect on the labour supply – an increase of 0.52 percent in hours 
worked and 0.19 percent in participation. These effects are most likely the result 
of utilising childcare to facilitate employment and improved work incentives. The 
effects of increasing one percent in the net childcare price are found to be 
somewhat smaller than a corresponding change in the gross price – a decrease of 
0.06 percent in hours worked and 0.02 percent in participation. The moderate 
impacts of change in the net price are likely the result of the joint effects of two 
childcare subsidies in Australia: the CCB provides an absolute reduction in the 
gross childcare price, and the CCR provides a further proportional reimbursement 
of costs.   
Finally, the employment effects of adjusting the total transfers of a number of 
income support programs are discussed. Income support programs that reimburse 
childcare expenses, such as CCR and CCB, are found to result in positive impacts 
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on labour-market activities and negative impacts on the hours of parental care, 
whereas the effects of FTB and PP are found to be opposite. In particular, an 
increase of ten percent in the receipt of CCR and CCB leads to a respective 
increase of 0.46 percent and 0.17 percent in hours worked. The results show that 
for single mothers to engage in market work, childcare subsidies played an 
important role to in relieving care responsibilities and facilitating employment.  
5.7. Comparison with Findings in the Literature 
There is little literature that evaluates the employment responses with respect to 
changes in wages and childcare prices for single mothers in Australia. Table 5-7 
presents the elasticity estimates of wage and childcare price from selected 
countries. 
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TABLE 5-7 COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED CHILDCARE PRICE ELASTICITIES (SINGLE MOTHERS) 
COUNTRY AUTHORS 
DATA  AGE CRITERIA  ELASTICITY  OWN WAGE   CHILDCARE COSTS 
Source Type  Mothers Child  Type  Hours LFP  Type Hours LFP 
New Zealand Kalb and Scutella (2003) NZSTATS 2001-2000 L  64 0-18  A  0.34      
Sweden Andrén (2003) SHINK 1997, 1998 S  17+ 1-12  A  0.77   C -0.163  
U.K. Blundell and Shephard (2012) FRS 1997-2002 S  18-45 0-18  M  0.42 0.77     
US Michalopoulos et al. (1992) SIPP 1984 S   0-14  A  -0.00     -0.26 
 Kimmel (1995) SIPP 1987,1988 P     M      -0.35  
 Kimmel (1998) SIPP 1988 S  18-55 0-12  M     P -0.22  
 Anderson and Levine (1999) SIPP 1990-1993 S   0-12  M      -0.47  
 Han and Waldfogel (2001) CPS 1991-1994 S  15-55 0-5       C  -0.73 to -0.50 
 Connelly and Kimmel (2003a) SIPP 1992,1993 S   0-5     0.81, 0.92    -0.42, -0.32 
 Tekin (2007) NSAF 1997 S   0-5  M     P -0.12  
US/Canada Michalopoulos and Robins (2002) NCCS 1990, CNCCS 1988 L   0-4  M  0.40   P -0.26  
Australia Murray (1997) IDS 1986 L       -1.38 to -0.14 -0.52 to 0.39     
 Creedy and Kalb (2005) SIHC, HES 1994-1998 S  0-65   A  1.58, 1.38 0.42, 0.47     
 Doiron and Kalb (2005a) SIHC, CCS L          P -0.05 -0.05 
 Kalb and Lee (2008) SIHC, HILDA 2002 S          P -0.16 -0.19 
 Kalb (2010) SIHC 1994-1998 L     A  1.49 0.41     
   L     A  0.78 0.24     
  SIHC 1999-2004 L     A  0.85 0.29     
   L     A  0.41 0.26     
 Breunig et al. (2011) HILDA 2000-2007 L   0-14  M  1.85a      
 This study HILDA 2006-2010 S  25-59 0-12  A  0.35 0.13  P -0.07 -0.03 
Note: The age criteria are generally applied to both spouses and to the youngest child.  
Data: CNCCS = Canadian National Child-Care Survey, FRS = Family Resources Survey, HES = Household Expenditure Survey, HILDA = Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia, IDS 
= Income Distribution Survey, PSID = US Panel Study of Income Dynamics, SIHC = Surveys of Income and Housing Costs (Australia), SHINK = Swedish Household Income Survey, NCCS = United 
States National Child-Care Survey, NZSTATS = Statistics New Zealand, and NSAF = National Survey of America’s Families. 
Type of data: P = Poor families, L = Lone (single) parent families, and S = Single mothers. 
Type of elasticities: M = Elasticities evaluated at sample means, and A = Elasticities evaluated for each individual and averaged across all individuals.  
Type of childcare costs: C = average childcare cost and P = hourly childcare price.  
a Based on the calculation of a predicted increase of 0.61 hours worked per week as the result of increasing the wage rate by one percent, and that the average weekly working hours is 33 hours for 
single parents families. 
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The effect of changes in the wage rate identified in this study appears to be 
consistent with estimates from other studies reported in Table 8. The estimates 
in this study point to a one-percent increase in the mother’s hourly wage, 
leading to an increase in hours worked by 0.35 percent and participation by 
0.13 percent. These figures fall in the lower end of the range of estimates 
reported in the Australian literature. However, it is close to those from Kalb 
(2010), who estimates a discrete choice labour supply model using a recent 
household dataset. The wage elasticities for single parents reported in that 
paper are 0.41 or 0.85 in hours worked, depending on whether calibration is 
used in the simulations.  
In a more recent study, Breunig et al. (2011) used the Heckman (1974) model 
to estimate the labour supply responses of single parents and presented the 
partial effects of the intensive margin in absolute terms. Based on the sample 
statistics, such effects implied a wage elasticity at the means of 1.85.62 Higher 
wage elasticities are reported in estimates based on earlier data. Using the 
sample of single parents between 1994 and 1998, Kalb (2010) reported wage 
elasticities of 0.79 and 1.49, and Creedy and Kalb (2005) reported elasticities 
of 1.38 and 1.58, depending on the model specifications. The reported 
elasticity estimates of earlier data are also at the higher end of those found 
overseas. The reported employment effects in Murray (1997) are ambiguous in 
size, mixed across different subgroups, and sensitive with respect to non-
workers, part-time and full-time workers.  
In overseas studies, the range of wage elasticity estimates for single mothers is 
wide, but generally narrower than that found for single parents in Australia. 
Own wage elasticities reported in this chapter are higher than those reported 
for New Zealand and the United States, for example, Kalb and Scutella (2003) 
                                                 
62 Based on the calculation of a predicted increase of 0.61 hours worked per week as the result of a one-percent 
increase in the wage rate, and an average working week of 33 hours for single parent families. 
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and Michalopoulos et al. (1992) respectively, but lower than those reported for 
Sweden, such as Andrén (2003). 
Until now, only a few studies have addressed the employment implications of 
childcare of single mothers or single parents in Australia. A comparison of the 
childcare price elasticity found in this chapter to those from other studies 
suggests that the elasticity found in this chapter is similar to those reported in 
Australian studies, but smaller than estimates reported in overseas studies. The 
overall gross childcare price elasticity is -0.07 and is comparable to estimates 
in several other studies. For example, based on earlier data in the 1990s, the 
price elasticity reported by Doiron and Kalb (2005a) and Kalb and Lee (2008) 
are respectively -0.05 and -0.16. From an international perspective, the 
elasticities of Australian households are found to fall in the lower end of the 
estimates documented in the literature. Studies in the United States find 
elasticities of zero (Michalopoulos et al., 1992), -0.35 (Kimmel, 1995), -0.22 
(Kimmel, 1998), -0.47 (Anderson & Levine, 1999), -0.32 (Connelly & 
Kimmel, 2003a) and between -0.73 to -0.50 for different specifications (Han 
& Waldfogel, 2001). These results suggest that Australian single parents are 
less sensitive to changes in childcare costs. 
5.8. Conclusion 
Recent policy changes in Australia have heightened the importance of 
childcare subsidies as a policy tool to increase the employment of single 
mothers and the low-income population in general. However, despite this 
increased attention, there is limited evidence on the size of the effects of 
childcare on single mothers’ labour supply. This chapter specifically evaluates 
the employment behaviour of single mothers.  
This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, the behavioural 
labour supply model appropriately takes into account childcare decisions, and 
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captures the real-life childcare and work trade-offs faced by single mothers. 
Second, it fully incorporates the details of the important income support and 
childcare subsidy programs in Australia and evaluates the policy implications 
on single mothers. The estimated results are used to simulate the impact of 
changes in income support programs on the hours worked, labour force 
participation and hours of parental care of single mothers.  
The results confirm that childcare costs have a negative effect on employment 
of single mothers. The model was used to perform simulations of the 
household responses to changes in the budget constraints. Simulations of the 
labour supply elasticities indicate an inelastic response, with an 
uncompensated wage elasticity of 0.35 and childcare price elasticity of -0.07. 
The reported childcare price elasticity is comparable to other estimates found 
in Australia but smaller than those in the overseas literature. 
The simulations conducted suggest that an increase in income support has a 
relatively large labour supply effect, but the degrees to which existing income 
support programs influence employment vary. The simulations show the value 
of childcare subsidies in encouraging single parents to participate in market 
work. When CCR and CCB are increased by 10 percent, employment is 
increased by 0.46 and 0.17 percent respectively. The simulations also show 
that the abolishment of the PP transition program results in an increase of 2.14 
percent in hours worked among employed single mothers whose youngest 
child is at least eight years of age.  
Finally, for future work it would be fruitful to develop a collective model of 
labour supply that takes into account bargaining of parenting activities 
between spouses. 
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Chapter 6. The Impact of Controlling for 
Unemployment Risk on Labour Supply Decisions: 
A New Approach 
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, the discrete choice labour supply model is 
extended to take into account the childcare decisions of partnered and single 
households. This chapter has a different research focus, which is to investigate 
the modelling issues related to unemployed individuals and to integrate their 
employment choices and outcomes into the discrete choice labour supply 
model.  
In particular, this chapter examines the effects on model estimates when 
controlling for the risk of being unemployed, and evaluates household 
employment responses in the presence of the Newstart Allowance and other 
income support programs in Australia. This study investigates the sensitivity 
of household labour supply to program parameters, in particular, the benefits 
available to unemployed individuals, by simulating employment responses of 
hypothetical adjustments to the unemployment benefits available in Australia. 
A key contribution of the model developed in this chapter is that it 
differentiates between employment effects of individuals who are unable to 
obtain work and those who remain outside the labour force by choice. 
The analysis also compares the estimated employment effects of partnered 
households in Australia using the standard discrete choice model and an 
extended model, which takes into account the risk of being unemployed. The 
results indicate that the standard model overpredicts the employment 
responses of unemployed individuals and leads to an upward bias in the 
estimated employment effects.  
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6.1. Introduction 
The majority of the neo-classical labour supply models explicitly or implicitly 
assume that the labour market clears at the prevailing market wage in 
equilibrium. For some individuals, not working or remaining outside of the 
labour market remains the preferred option. In the search for employment, the 
unemployed strictly prefer to work at the prevailing market wage, but for 
frictional, structural or some other reason they are unable to find employment 
at the prevailing wage rate. In this chapter, the assumption of market clearing 
is relaxed and an extended labour supply model of the non-Walrasian market 
equilibrium is developed. 63  Specifically, the extended model provides an 
opportunity to undertake policy analysis by considering how optimal choices 
vary in response to changes in the policy parameters that impact on budget 
constraints. 
Following the discrete choice framework pioneered by Van Soest (1995), 
Keane and Moffitt (1998) and Van Soest et al. (2002), a considerable body of 
literature has explored the employment effects in the presence of kinked and 
non-convex budget set (Aaberge, Colombino, & Strøm, 1999; Kalb & 
Scutella, 2003). There has, however, been little analysis of the unemployed 
(Blundell et al., 1987). Furthermore, the choice of non-working has 
traditionally been regarded as a voluntary decision from the supply side. As a 
result, literature that models the fixed costs associated with market 
                                                 
63 The causes of non-Walrasian equilibrium have been addressed in a number of economics theories, namely, the 
minimum wage model, the search model, the turnover model, the shirking model, and the adverse selection model. 
The minimum wage model suggests that any binding minimum wage law increases the costs of hiring labour and 
reduces the quantity demanded either through a reduction in the number of hours worked, or through a reduction in 
the number of jobs (Harris & Todaro, 1970). The search model predicts that employers are inclined to offer wage 
premiums in excess of the market prevailing wage to reduce turnovers, as the effort of finding the ideal job candidate 
is costly (Salop, 1979). Under the assumption that work performance cannot be fully monitored, the shirking model 
suggests that excess wage compensations are likely offered to provide better incentive for employees to work rather 
than shirk (Bowles, 1985). In the adverse selection model, the employer is motivated to signal the market by offering 
higher wages to attract candidates with better abilities, if the ability is unobserved and positively correlated with the 
reservation wage (MacLeod & Malcomson, 1989). All these theories suggest the existence of the non-Walrasian 
equilibrium associated with jobless individuals. The focus of this chapter is not the underlying causes of 
unemployment, but the incorporation of unemployment risk in the discrete choice labour supply model.  
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participation is extensive (Blundell & Macurdy, 1999; Callan & Van Soest, 
1996; Kalb, 2002), but this literature does not capture the constraints from the 
demand side of the labour market (Euwals & Van Soest, 1999; Sousa-Poza & 
Henneberger, 2002). These studies have acknowledged the need for a greater 
understanding of how the identification of the unemployed influences the 
model estimates, and how to address employment responses in the presence of 
unemployment benefits and a range of income support programs. 
It is likely that the treatment of unemployed individuals in any empirical 
analysis will have important implications for evaluating household responses, 
following changes in policy settings. Blundell et al. (2000) suggest without 
considering the behaviour of unemployed individuals, estimates of structural 
labour supply models and simulated employment responses in policy 
evaluations may be biased. Although many academic researchers have 
acknowledged a need for greater understanding in this area, little is known 
about how the identification of the unemployed influences the model estimates 
and simulated employment behaviour (Bingley & Walker, 2001; Blundell et 
al., 1987; Ham, 1982). 
This chapter investigates the change in model estimates and simulated 
employment responses of partnered households in Australia before and after 
the behaviour of unemployed individuals is accounted for. The results indicate 
that the standard model overpredicts the employment responses of 
unemployed individuals, resulting an upward bias in the overall simulated 
employment effects. More importantly, this study examines employment 
responses by jointly considering a range of income support programs in 
Australia, including the benefits from the Newstart Allowance (NSA).64 NSA 
benefits are payable to eligible non-working individuals who are actively 
                                                 
64 In Australia, the Newstart Allowance (NSA) is the major unemployment benefit program. It targets unemployed 
individuals and low-income workers and provides a range of payment schemes for various types of households. 
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seeking work, and working individuals whose disposable income is 
sufficiently low. In the presence of NSA, it is likely that the budget constraints 
of unemployed individuals or low-income individuals are different from those 
of non-participants. The differences are especially significant for low-wage 
individuals where income from unemployment is close to their earnings if they 
were to participate in market work. Furthermore, this study investigates the 
sensitivity of household labour supply to program parameters, in particular, 
the benefits available to unemployed individuals, by simulating employment 
responses of hypothetical adjustments to the unemployment benefits in 
Australia.  
The model considered in this chapter disaggregates the non-working 
population into two groups, namely, unemployed individuals who are seeking 
work and non-participants who are inactive in the labour market. The 
formulation of the extended model follows the double-hurdle model originally 
proposed by Cragg (1971), and more recently by Bargain et al. (2010), 
Blundell et al. (1987), Bingley and Walker (2001) and Duncan and MacCrae 
(1999). In the extended model, the decision to participate in the market 
depends upon the weighted payoff from employment against the probability of 
getting a job offer. The analysis in this chapter exploits geographic 
information and individual characteristics available in the Household, Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) data to identify the risk of being 
unemployed.  
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, an extended model 
that takes into account the effect of being unemployed is presented in Section 
6.2. The formation of the sample data and descriptive statistics are discussed 
in Section 6.3. Parameter estimates and simulated marginal effects of the 
extended model are set out in Section 6.4 and are compared to the standard 
model in Section 6.5. Next, in Section 6.6, the empirical results are used to 
simulate the employment responses of two alternative payment schemes of the 
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NSA program. The chapter concludes in Section 6.7 with a summary of the 
research contributions and directions for future research.  
6.2. Theoretical Model 
This chapter considers a structural static labour supply model for partnered 
households, where a unitary household utility function is formulated in the 
conventional leisure and consumption space. Assume each household 
maximises over a predefined utility function, 𝑈, by choosing from a finite 
choice set, 𝐻 . The utility, 𝑈 , is formulated in the arguments of the hours 
worked of the female, ℎ𝑓, of the male, ℎ𝑚, and household disposable income, 
𝑦, which is composed of wage earnings, non-labour income and taxes and 
transfers received or paid by the household.65 Within the household, 𝐽𝑓 and 𝐽𝑚 
discrete hour points are formulated for the female and the male respectively. 
Hence, the choice set, 𝐻, consists of 𝐽𝑓 × 𝐽𝑚  combinations of discrete hour 
points. The first discrete point of each spouse has the value of zero hours and 
corresponds to non-working. The construction of the choice set is based on 
rounding reported working hours in the data to the nearest discrete points.  
Following common practice (Breunig et al., 2008; Van Soest et al., 2002), a 
stochastic term 𝜖, which follows the identical and independent Extreme-Value 
Type I (EV-I) distribution, is incorporated additively in the household utility 
function, 𝑈:  
𝑉𝑗 = 𝑈(ℎ𝑓𝑗, ℎ𝑚𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗|𝑋) + 𝜖𝑗 . (6.1) 
The residual terms, 𝜖𝑗 , capture the unexplained process in evaluating 
alternative 𝑗.  
                                                 
65 Assume that the household has a fixed time endowment and leisure can therefore be expressed as non-working time.  
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By defining the household utility function using the second polynomial 
expansion in the arguments of hours worked and household disposable 
income, a sensible approximation of different utility functional forms (Breunig 
et al., 2008; Van Soest et al., 2002) is provided.  
𝑈(ℎ𝑓𝑖,𝑗, ℎ𝑚𝑖,𝑗 , 𝑦𝑖,𝑗|𝑋𝑖) = 𝑣
′𝐴𝑣′ + 𝑏′𝑣, (6.2) 
where 𝐴 is a symmetric matrix and 𝑏 is an coefficient vector with element 𝑏𝑘. 
For couple households 𝑣 = (𝑦, ℎ𝑓 , ℎ𝑚)
′
, matrix 𝐴 has elements 𝐴𝑝𝑞 , (𝑝, 𝑞 =
1,2,3) and vector 𝑏 has elements (𝑏𝑦, 𝑏𝑓 , 𝑏𝑚).  
The linear coefficients, 𝑏𝑓 and 𝑏𝑚, are further parameterised with respect to 
observed and unobserved individual chracteristics. The incorporation of the 
unobserved factors, 𝜀s, allows individuals with identical characteristics to be 
observed making different employment decisions. The preference for work 
equations are given as: 
𝑏𝑓 = 𝑋𝑓𝛽𝑓 + 𝜀1,  and 
𝑏𝑚 = 𝑋𝑚𝛽𝑚 + 𝜀2, 
(6.3) 
where 𝑋𝑓 and 𝑋𝑚 are vectors of exogenous characteristics. The error terms, 𝜀1 
and 𝜀2, capture the unobserved heterogeneity in individual preferences.  
The fixed costs of work are modelled separately for females and males. The 
incorporation of the fixed costs of work parameters (𝐹𝑓 for the female and 𝐹𝑚 
for the male) lowers the household income, 𝑦, by the size of the fixed cost for 
non-zero discrete hour points and facilitates the prediction of the large 
population of non-participants (Breunig et al., 2008; Van Soest et al., 2002). 
Specifically, the fixed costs of work are parameterised with respect to 
individual characteristics: 
𝐹𝑞 = 𝑋𝑞
′ ?̃?𝑞, 𝑞 = 𝑓 or 𝑚. (6.4) 
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In equation (6.4), 𝛽𝑞  represents the vector of the estimated coefficients, 𝑋𝑞 
represents a vector of observable taste shifters of fixed costs of work, and 𝑞 
equals 𝑓  and 𝑚  to denote female and male respectively. The household 
disposable income, 𝑦, is given as: 
𝑦 = 𝜇 + 𝑤𝑓ℎ𝑓 + 𝑤𝑚ℎ𝑚 − 𝑇(𝜇,𝑤𝑓 , ℎ𝑓 , 𝑤𝑚, ℎ𝑚, 𝑋)
+ 𝐵(𝜇,𝑤𝑓 , ℎ𝑓 , 𝑤𝑚, ℎ𝑚, 𝑋) − 𝐹𝑓 ∙ 𝐼(ℎ𝑓 > 0) − 𝐹𝑚
∙ 𝐼(ℎ𝑚 > 0), 
(6.5) 
where 𝜇 is the household non-labour income and is assumed to be exogenous, 
𝑤𝑓 and 𝑤𝑚 are the respective gross wage rates for females and males, and 𝐼(∙) 
is an indicator function.  
Due to the static nature of the model, inter-temporal investment and saving 
decisions are not considered. Business and investment returns are realised in 
the non-labour income. The benefit function, 𝐵(𝑦, 𝑋), consists of the imputed 
benefits from three important income support programs in Australia, namely, 
the Family Tax Benefits Part A [FTB (A)], Family Tax Benefits Part B [FTB 
(B)] and the NSA. It is important to consider household employment decisions 
in the context of multiple income support programs, since work incentives 
delivered from NSA may be partially offset by other payments.66  
Next, to account for the heterogeneity in the risk of being unemployed, a latent 
equation of unemployment risk is specified separately for females and males, 
following Duncan and MacCrae (1999) and Bargain et al. (2010). Note that 
the model specification differs from previous studies in two ways. First, the 
unemployment risk and household labour supply decisions are addressed 
                                                 
66 Some non-working individuals may undertake opportunistic behaviours to claim NSA benefits. For example, some 
non-working individuals, who are not actively looking for work, may claim job searching activities in order to fulfil 
the NSA participation requirements. These behaviours are difficult to identify using the sample data. In the analysis, 
all survey respondents are assumed to have disclosed the true extent of their efforts to search for work and their 
willingness to secure employment.  
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simultaneously in a single structural model. The equations of unemployment 
risk are parameterised with respect to observed individual characteristics and 
geographic variables and are estimated jointly with other parameters in the 
model. Second, the stochastic specification allows for fully unrestricted 
correlations of the unobserved components from the unemployment risk 
equations and those of the preference equations. This is important because the 
unobserved heterogeneity in the equations of household preferences and 
unemployment risk may be correlated and should be accounted for in an 
appropriate manner. For example, one may argue that individuals who are 
more likely to be unemployed have a lower preference for work, resulting in 
negative correlation between the stochastic terms in these two equations.67 The 
latent equations of unemployment risk are defined as follows: 
𝐸𝑓 = 𝑍𝑓𝛾𝑓 + 𝜀3,  and 
𝐸𝑚 = 𝑍𝑚𝛾𝑚 + 𝜀4, 
(6.6) 
where 𝑍𝑓  and 𝑍𝑚  represents a vector of observed characteristics for female 
and male respectively, which are thought to influence a market participant’s 
ability to enter into employment.68 The error terms 𝜀3 and 𝜀4 are assumed to 
follow independent standard normal distribution and capture unobserved 
heterogeneity. The risk of being unemployed is modelled similarly to a 
standard Probit model. 
For expositional purposes, assume that the hours worked by the spouse are 
fixed. This assumption will be relaxed later while presenting the likelihood 
function. Denote 𝑒  as an indicator that equals 1 if the individual is in the 
                                                 
67 As suggested by Duncan and MacCrae (1999), the effect from unemployment risk can be modelled jointly with the 
fixed cost of work. Fixed cost is unobservable to the researcher and plays an important role in predicting the 
likelihood that a non-participating individual will move into employment. The employment risk measures the 
probability of getting a job conditional on labour market participation.  
68 This study makes use of geographic information and information on age, educational attainment and employment 
history to facilitate the identification of a participant’s risk of being unemployed.  
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labour force, 0 otherwise; 𝑢 as an indicator that equals 1 if unemployed, and 0 
if working desired hours. In the double-hurdle process, the first hurdle to 
employment describes the decision to participate in market work. An 
individual would participate if the prevailing market wage exceeds one’s 
reservation wage; otherwise one remains inactive voluntarily. The probability 
of observing an individual who is not in the labour force is similar to that of 
the standard model, which is given as: 
Pr(𝑒 = 0) = Pr(𝑗 = 1) =
exp𝑈(ℎ1, 𝑦1|ℎ𝑠, 𝑋)
∑ exp𝑈(ℎ𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗|ℎ𝑠, 𝑋)
𝐽
𝑗=1
, (6.7) 
where ℎ𝑠 denotes the hours worked by the spouse.  
The second hurdle describes two market outcomes conditional on market 
participation: either working desired hours or being unemployed involuntarily. 
If the individual is unemployed, they remain jobless in their preferred labour 
market and waits for an appropriate wage offer to arrive. Otherwise, the 
individual is assumed to work desired hours. The probability of being 
unemployed conditional on labour force participation is given as: 
Pr(𝑒 = 1, 𝑢 = 1) =
exp𝑈(ℎ1, 𝑦1|ℎ𝑠, 𝑋)
∑ exp𝑈(ℎ𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗|ℎ𝑠, 𝑋)
𝐽
𝑗=1
[Φ(𝐸|𝜀)], (6.8) 
where Φ(. )  is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. The 
probability of working desired hours is given as: 
Pr(𝑒 = 1, 𝑢 = 0) = Pr(𝑗 = 𝑘, 𝑘 > 1)
=
exp𝑈(ℎ𝑘, 𝑦𝑘|ℎ𝑠 , 𝑋)
∑ exp𝑈(ℎ𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗|ℎ𝑠, 𝑋)
𝐽
𝑗=1
[1 − Φ(𝐸|𝜀)]. 
(6.9) 
Equation (6.9) represents the probability of being employed conditional on the 
intention to participate in the labour market.  
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If both spouses simultaneously choose their labour supply, conditional on the 
unobserved heterogeneity, 𝜀, the likelihood to observe a household choosing 
the alternative, 𝑘, is given as: 
ℒ = ∫(
exp𝑈𝑘
∑ exp𝑈𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
)
𝐼(𝐻=𝑘)
𝜀
∙ Φ(𝐸𝑓)
𝐼(𝑒𝑓=1,𝑢𝑓=1)
 
∙ (1 − Φ(𝐸𝑓))
𝐼(𝑒𝑓=1,𝑢𝑓=0)
∙ Φ(𝐸𝑚)
𝐼(𝑒𝑚=1,𝑢𝑚=1) 
∙ (1 − Φ(𝐸𝑚))
𝐼(𝑒𝑚=1,𝑢𝑚=0)
𝜙(𝜀)𝑑(𝜀),  
(6.10) 
where 𝐻 = 𝑘 indicates that the observed choice is the 𝑘th discrete hour point.  
The econometric specification assumes that each individual chooses from a 
discrete set of hours combinations to maximise a predefined utility function, in 
which the expected utility from market participation is weighted by the risk of 
being unemployed. It requires a joint estimation of the household preference 
for work, the fixed costs of work and risk of unemployment. The 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption is relaxed and the 
error terms of the random preferences and those of the unemployment 
equations are allowed to be correlated, without the imposition of any structural 
restrictions. The econometric specification of the model is suitable to carry out 
ex post simulations to evaluate the effects of the NSA jointly with other 
income support programs.  
The likelihood function in equation (6.10) is difficult to estimate since it 
requires the computation of a four-dimensional integral. Rather than using the 
traditional quadrature method, the Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) 
with Halton sequences is used to evaluate the integral (Train, 2009). The error 
terms 𝜀 = (𝜀1, 𝜀2, 𝜀3, 𝜀4)  are assumed to follow multivariate normal 
distribution, and the elements of their Cholesky matrix are estimated rather 
than those of the covariance matrix. Specifically, a set of 𝑅  draws of the 
stochastic terms 𝜀 are obtained by: 
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(
𝜀1̂
𝜀2̂
𝜀3̂
𝜀4̂
) = (
𝑐11 0 0 0
𝑐21 𝑐22 0 0
𝑐31 𝑐32 𝑐33 0
𝑐41 𝑐42 𝑐43 𝑐44
)(
𝑣1
𝑣2
𝑣3
𝑣4
), (6.11) 
where 𝑐𝑖𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, . . ,4 are elements of the Cholesky decomposition matrix of 
the covariance matrix of 𝜀. The elements of the Cholesky matrix are fully 
unrestricted and are jointly estimated with other parameters in the model. The 
Halton Sequences, 𝑣𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, . . . ,4, are obtained from the multivariate normal 
distribution using prime number 7, 11, 13 and 17 respectively. The simulated 
log-likelihood of equation (6.10) is given as: 
ln ℒ𝑖 =
1
𝑅
∑[𝑈(𝑋, ?̂?𝑟 , 𝜀1̂,𝑟 , 𝜀2̂,𝑟)𝑖𝑘 ∙ 𝐼
(𝐻 = 𝑘)
𝑅
𝑟=1
− ln∑ exp𝑈(𝑋, ?̂?𝑟 , 𝜀1̂,𝑟, 𝜀2̂,𝑟)𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
+ ln (Φ(Εf, 𝜀3̂,𝑟)) ∙ 𝐼(𝑒𝑓 = 1, 𝑢𝑓 = 1)
+ ln (1 − Φ(Εf, 𝜀3̂,𝑟)) ∙ 𝐼(𝑒𝑓 = 1, 𝑢𝑓 = 0)
+ ln (Φ(Εm, 𝜀4̂,𝑟)) ∙ 𝐼(𝑒𝑚 = 1, 𝑢𝑚 = 1)
+ ln (1 − Φ(Εm, 𝜀4̂,𝑟)) ∙ 𝐼(𝑒𝑚 = 1, 𝑢𝑚 = 0)]. 
(6.12) 
The estimation is carried out using Stata d1 Maximum Likelihood evaluator 
with the number of Halton draws, 𝑅, equals 20, which is generally assumed to 
be sufficiently large to yield robust estimates (Breunig et al., 2008; Van Soest 
et al., 2002).  
6.3. Descriptive Statistics 
The sample for this study consists of individuals in partnered households in 
the HILDA survey for the period 2009 to 2011. The decision making process 
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is modelled at the household level. The HILDA survey is an annual panel 
survey, which commenced with Wave 1 in 2001. To identify a large enough 
sample for the analysis, waves 9, 10 and 11 of HILDA collected in 2009 and 
2011 respectively are pooled to form a cross-sectional dataset. The sample 
dataset is restricted to partnered (married or de facto) households with both 
spouses aged between 25 and 59. Households in which one spouse is self-
employed, retired or a full-time student are excluded and the final sample 
consists of 2,712 partnered households. 
Table 6-1 provides a socio-demographic profile of the respondents in the 
sample. The average age of females and males is 40 years and 42 years 
respectively. Approximately 36 percent of females have a university 
qualification, with 30 percent having earned a vocational degree. The majority 
of males report to be full-time employed (90 percent), in contrast to 40 percent 
of females working full-time. The results suggest that on average males work 
longer hours (45 hours per week) compared to their spouses (32 hours per 
week).  
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TABLE 6-1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF SAMPLE DATA 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
FEMALE  MALE 
Mean Std.Dev.  Mean Std.Dev. 
Age Age in years 40.62 (8.80)  42.54 (9.08) 
Education       
University 1 if postgraduate, graduate, bachelor or honours  0.36 (0.48)  0.32 (0.47) 
Vocational 1 if diploma or certificates I/II/III/IV 0.30 (0.46)  0.43 (0.50) 
Year 12 1 if year 12 0.15 (0.35)  0.10 (0.30) 
Year 11 1 if year 11 or less 0.19 (0.40)  0.14 (0.35) 
Employment       
Employed 1 if currently employed 0.79 (0.41)  0.95 (0.22) 
Unemployed 1 if unemployed 0.02 (0.15)  0.02 (0.14) 
Full-time 1 if employed full-time 0.40 (0.49)  0.90 (0.31) 
Previous year 1 if employed full-time in the previous year 0.42 (0.49)  0.89 (0.31) 
2nd last year 1 if employed full-time in the second last year 0.44 (0.50)  0.88 (0.32) 
Part-time 1 if employed part-time 0.39 (0.49)  0.05 (0.22) 
Hours worked Hours worked per week if employed 31.79 (12.40)  44.58 (9.72) 
Gross wage Gross wage rate per hour if employed 28.62 (14.25)  35.33 (18.73) 
Work experience Time spent in paid work in years 17.62 (8.65)  23.44 (9.74) 
Non-labour Non-labour income p.a. (000s) 1.97 (6.22)  3.94 (19.34) 
Health       
Health improved 1 if reported health better than one year ago 0.18 (0.38)  0.13 (0.34) 
Health worsened 1 if reported health worse than one year ago 0.10 (0.30)  0.08 (0.27) 
Other        
Australian-born 1 if born in Australia 0.82 (0.38)  0.79 (0.41) 
Section of State       
Major urban 1 if resided in major urban area 0.64 (0.48)    
Other urban 1 if resided in other urban area 0.24 (0.43)    
Balance 1 if resided in neither major nor other urban 0.12 (0.33)    
Observations  2,712     
Households Number of households 1,333     
Source: HILDA wave 2009 – 2011. 
Note: Non-labour income is defined as the sum of business income, investment income, private pensions and 
private transfers as reported in the financial year preceding the interview. 
To identify unemployed individuals, this analysis makes use of the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics’ (ABS) definition of employment. 69  An individual is 
regarded as unemployed if one is aged 15 years and over, not employed, is 
available to start work and has undertaken job searching activities at some 
time during the previous four weeks. Non-participants, or those not in the 
labour force, are individuals who are neither employed nor unemployed. 
Following this definition, two specific questions in the HILDA data are used 
to distinguish the unemployed from non-participants: (1) whether at any time 
during the previous four weeks the respondent had looked for paid work, and 
                                                 
69 Note that this definition is consistent with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition adopted in 1982. 
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(2) whether the respondent could commence work in the next four weeks if a 
suitable job was offered. Individuals with affirmative answers to both 
questions are identified as unemployed. As indicated in Table 6-1, 
approximately two percent of females and males are unemployed. 
Figure 6-1 presents the histograms of hours worked by females and males. 
Among working females, the histogram shows significant spikes around 40 
hours per week, which corresponds to full-time employment. A few females 
(6.7 percent) reported hours worked beyond 45 hours per week. Conversely, 
working males typically do not work part-time and their hours worked are 
concentrated within the range of 35 and 50 hours per week. Working long 
hours is common for males, and approximately 10 percent of males reported to 
working more than 60 hours per week. 
 
FIGURE 6-1 HISTOGRAMS OF HOURS WORKED (PARTNERED HOUSEHOLDS)70 
In the empirical model, discrete hour points are formulated in equal distances 
between zero and an upper limit to capture the observed distribution of hours 
worked. The lower bound of zero working hours represents non-participation. 
The observed hours are rounded to their nearest discrete points. For females, 
ten discrete points are formulated at multiples of five hours, ranging from the 
choice of non-participation to working 45 hours per week. Individuals who 
                                                 
70 The density of zero working hours is hidden in the histogram. 
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report more than 45 hours are rounded to 45 hours and the rounding affects a 
total of 181 females (6.7 percent). For males, nine discrete points are 
formulated at multiples of eight hours, with the largest discrete point equal to 
64 hours per week. A total of 100 males (3.7 percent) who reported more than 
64 hours per week are rounded to the largest discrete point. The choice set for 
each household consists of a total of 90 combinations of hour-points for both 
spouses. 
6.4. Estimation Results 
Prior to estimating the labour supply model, wage rates for non-working 
individuals need to be imputed using the Heckman approach (Heckman, 
1979). The wage imputation method is discussed in detail in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.3. A selection criterion is used to improve the quality of income 
information, where individuals earning less than half of the minimum wage 
rate or more than the 99th percentile of the wage distribution are likely caused 
by measurement error.71 The observed wage rates for non-working individuals 
and those who meet the selection criterion are replaced by predicted values. 
The wage model is applied separately for females and males, with the 
estimation results presented in Appendix B.72 The extended model is estimated 
based on the actual wages for working individuals and imputed wage rates for 
non-working individuals and those who meet the selection criteria. 
Once the labour supply model is estimated, satisfaction of the monotonicity 
and concavity condition of the utility function is verified for all individuals in 
                                                 
71 The minimum wage is set to $14 per hour for both females and males, reflecting the level of standard Federal 
Minimum Wage (FMW) implemented in 2009 (Sloane, 2010). The 99th percentile of the wage distribution is $81.31 
per hour for females and $96.11 for males in the sample. 
72 To enforce appropriate variable exclusion, variables related to educational attainment are excluded from the wage 
estimation but included in the labour supply model.  
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the sample. Table 6-2 sets out the parameter estimates of the linear terms of 
the utility function.  
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TABLE 6-2 PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE EXTENDED LABOUR SUPPLY MODEL 
VARIABLES 
FEMALE  MALE 
Tastes for 
Work (1) 
Fixed Cost 
(2) 
Unemp. 
Risk (3) 
 
Tastes for 
Work (4) 
Fixed Cost 
(5) 
Unemp. 
Risk (6) 
Constant 17.68*** 1.617*** -0.618*  22.61*** 2.828*** -0.302 
 (4.183) (0.178) (0.323)  (4.130) (0.346) (0.455) 
Personal information       
Age/10 -1.239    7.617***   
 (1.890)    (1.783)   
Age 
squared/1000 
-1.446    -10.67***   
 (2.257)    (2.069)   
If aged 18-34   0.00843 -0.512**   -0.120 -0.430 
  (0.0874) (0.221)   (0.143) (0.284) 
If aged 35-40  -0.123 -0.168   -0.524*** -0.677*** 
  (0.0900) (0.186)   (0.165) (0.252) 
If aged 40-45  -0.328*** -0.370*   -0.169 -0.290 
  (0.103) (0.196)   (0.141) (0.203) 
If born in 
Australia 
 -0.243***    0.259**  
 (0.0823)    (0.126)  
Educational attainment       
University 4.537***  -0.353*  1.075**  -0.363** 
 (0.457)  (0.184)  (0.527)  (0.185) 
Vocational 1.939***  0.136  1.771***  -0.170 
 (0.423)  (0.166)  (0.476)  (0.161) 
Year 12 2.736***  -0.0609  0.662  -0.675** 
 (0.517)  (0.209)  (0.653)  (0.315) 
Household demographics       
If child aged 0-1 -11.98***       
 (0.609)       
If child aged 2-5 -8.709***       
 (0.514)       
If child aged 6-9 -4.792***       
 (0.534)       
Health        
Poor health -0.861**    -2.293***   
 (0.425)    (0.841)   
Health improved -1.100**    -0.320   
 (0.486)    (0.611)   
Health worsened -0.751*    -0.936*   
 (0.397)    (0.497)   
Employment        
Work experience   -0.529***    -0.304** 
   (0.114)    (0.122) 
Full-time last 
year 
  -0.256    -0.748*** 
  (0.166)    (0.162) 
Full-time 2 
years ago 
  -0.0766    -0.241 
  (0.166)    (0.163) 
Geographic variables (Omitted)       
σa 0.023  0.027  0.012  0.015 
 (0.124)  (0.145)  (0.053)  (0.055) 
Log likelihood -10,219.77       
Observations 2,712       
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; sample of couple households; model estimated by Maximum 
Simulated Likelihood (MSL) using Halton sequences (20 Draws); hours worked are divided by 100; 
household disposable income on weekly basis and divided by 1000. 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
a To ensure positive-definiteness of the covariance matrix, the Cholesky elements are instead estimated. The 
reported σs undoes the transformation where the standard error is calculated using the delta method. 
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The effects of age, educational attainment and characteristics of children in the 
‘Tastes for Work’ equations (column (1) for females and column (4) for males) 
are discussed first. The age coefficients are positive and significant in the 
preference for work for males (column (4) of Table 6-2), suggesting a 
quadratic age effect on their tastes for work, which peaks around the age of 55 
years. The effect of the education level is positive and significant for both 
females and males. The results suggest that the effect of having a university 
degree is greatest for females, whereas for males the effect from a vocational 
degree is greatest. In the ‘Taste for Work’ equation for females (column (1)), a 
set of binary indicators of the age of the youngest child is included since 
mothers are usually the dominant caregiver in households. As expected, the 
presence of young children significantly decreases their preference for work, 
with the larger effect coming from the presence of a younger child. This is 
consistent with the findings in earlier chapters and a number of studies in 
Australia (Doiron & Kalb, 2005b; Kalb et al., 2005; Kalb & Lee, 2008).  
The age coefficients in the ‘Unemployment Risk’ equation of females (column 
(3) of Table 6-2) suggest that females aged between 35 and 40 years have a 
higher risk of being unemployed. Part of the reason most likely relates to the 
need for a flexible work schedule to look after children during the childrearing 
phase of the lifecyle. The results of the ‘Unemployment risk’ equation of 
males (column (6)) suggest that males aged around their mid-30s are less 
likely to be unemployed, compared to younger or older males. For both 
females and males, the results indicate that education attainment and work 
experience reduce the risk of being unemployed. Furthermore, being 
employed full-time in the previous year significantly lowers the risk of being 
unemployed. The results suggest that individuals who work full-time are more 
likely to stay on existing employment contracts and are less likely to look for 
alternative work.  
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Finally, in the ‘Fixed Costs of Work’ (column (2) for females, column (5) for 
males), most of the coefficients are significant, suggesting the inclusion of the 
fixed costs of work is important in the labour supply model. In general, the 
estimated coefficients are consistent with a priori expectation. Interestingly, 
the indicator of Australian-born is significant and negative for females. This 
suggests that females born in Australia have lowered fixed costs to participate 
in the labour market compared to those born outside of Australia, whereas the 
effect is found to be opposite for males. Without further analysis, it is unclear 
whether this is related to heterogeneity across individuals or gender difference 
in work preferences.  
The remaining estimated parameters in the utility function and the correlation 
matrix of the error terms are reported in Table 6-3. There is no clear 
interpretation of these parameters, but they are essential in computing 
marginal utilities and effects. Note that none of the elements in the correlation 
matrix is significant. This suggests that the unobserved heterogeneity in 
preferences for work is not significantly related to those at risk of being 
unemployed.  
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TABLE 6-3 ESTIMATED PARAMETERS IN THE UTILITY FUNCTION 
(A) UTILITY PARAMETER     
Parameters Coef. Std. Err. Parameters Coef. Std. Err. 
𝛼1 -0.024**  𝛼4 -1.411***  
𝛼2 -11.67***  𝛼5 -6.621***  
𝛼3 -53.63***  𝛼6 1.849***  
𝛽1 -1.232***     
      
(b) Correlation Matrixa 
Errors 𝜀2 𝜀3 𝜀4   
𝜀1 0.799     
 (3.14)     
𝜀2 0.904 -0.529    
 (1.843) (5.566)    
𝜀3 -0.025 -0.512 -0.105   
 (3.532) (4.511) (5.365)   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
The fitted means and probability of each discrete choice are compared to the 
actual figures in Table 6-4 to evaluate model fitness. To incorporate the 
uncertainty associated with the parameter estimates, the expected values are 
calculated using 100 independent draws of the parameters from the estimated 
asymptotic distribution of their estimators. 
TABLE 6-4 ACTUAL AND FITTED LABOUR SUPPLY OF THE SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS 
FEMALES 
ACTUAL  FITTED  
MALES 
ACTUAL  FITTED 
Mean  Mean Std.Err.  Mean  Mean Std.Err. 
Hours per week 25.61  22.06 (0.27)  Hours per week 43.06  38.10 (0.23) 
Probability (in percent)     Probability (in percent)    
0 19.06  17.54 (0.55)  0 3.10  2.86 (0.21) 
0-5 1.14  1.74 (0.05)  0-8 0.29  0.01 (0.00) 
5-10 3.28  2.79 (0.06)  8-16 0.41  0.20 (0.01) 
10-15 4.24  4.22 (0.07)  16-24 1.44  1.88 (0.08) 
15-20 9.48  6.09 (0.06)  24-32 2.77  9.15 (0.23) 
20-25 9.55  8.28 (0.03)  32-40 41.15  22.79 (0.23) 
25-30 8.11  10.55 (0.05)  40-48 22.82  29.23 (0.14) 
30-35 7.89  12.55 (0.14)  48-56 18.29  19.38 (0.37) 
35-40 25.00  13.94 (0.25)  56+ 9.73  6.65 (0.22) 
40+ 12.24  14.45 (0.36)       
Notes: Sample of partnered households using HILDA 2009-2011. The standard deviation and confidence 
intervals are constructed using 100 independent draws from the estimated parameter distribution.  
In Table 6-4, the expected hours of labour supply are similar to the actual 
sample means, indicating a reasonable goodness of fit. Overall, the model 
slightly underpredicts the average weekly hours worked by approximately 
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three hours for females and five hours for males. In relation to the predicted 
probabilities associated with each discrete choice, the prediction is closely in 
line with the sample probability except for discrete points corresponding to the 
range of full-time employment. In particular, the model tends to underpredict 
the probability associated with working 40 hours per week. Nonetheless, the 
effects of underprediction are partially offset by overpredicted probabilities of 
the nearby discrete hour points. 
6.5. Comparison of Results 
The analysis in this chapter takes a somewhat different approach to previous 
analysis of unemployment in the literature and it is important to compare the 
empirical results of this model with those of the standard discrete choice 
model.73 Identifying unemployed individuals allows the extended model to 
incorporate the NSA payments in the budget set. This feature is temporarily 
disabled so that both models are subject to an identical budget constraint. 
To account for the uncertainty associated with the parameter estimates, a total 
of 100 independent draws of the parameters are taken from the estimated 
asymptotic distribution while calculating the average effects. In the simulation, 
an exogenous change is applied to the components of the budget constraint (a 
shock). Before and after a shock, the choice probabilities are calculated for 
each parameter draw on the basis of the model estimates. For each individual, 
the expected hours worked are derived from weighting the discrete hour points 
against corresponding choice probabilities. The marginal effects are then 
calculated from the proportional change in the expected hours. For example, 
the wage elasticities are obtained by evaluating employment responses before 
                                                 
73 The specification of the standard model is outlined in Section 3.1 and the parameter estimates are included in 
Appendix B.3. 
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and after a one-percent increase in the wage rate. The elasticities from using 
100 independent pseudo draws are then averaged across sample households 
and the associated standard errors are reported.  
Table 6-5 presents unconditional wage elasticities by education levels and the 
age of the youngest child. The estimated elasticities for both models are 
somewhat smaller in magnitude comparing to those found in recent studies on 
Australia, such as Breunig et al. (2008) and Bargain et al. (2010). 
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TABLE 6-5 UNCONDITIONAL WAGE ELASTICITIES FROM THE STANDARD MODEL AND THE EXTENDED 
MODEL 
(A) STANDARD MODEL FEMALE  MALE 
i) Hours worked (in percent) Own wage (1) Cross wage (2)  Own wage (3) Cross wage (4) 
All 0.325 (0.126) -0.091 (0.085)  0.087 (0.047) 0.000 (0.081) 
Education          
University 0.287 (0.119) -0.087 (0.081)  0.076 (0.036) 0.004 (0.076) 
Vocational 0.327 (0.126) -0.091 (0.087)  0.089 (0.045) -0.008 (0.082) 
Year12 0.324 (0.121) -0.088 (0.093)  0.085 (0.041) -0.025 (0.070) 
Year11 0.412 (0.147) -0.098 (0.085)  0.106 (0.062) 0.011 (0.092) 
Children           
With child <5 yrs 0.516 (0.138) -0.133 (0.112)  0.082 (0.031) 0.019 (0.051) 
Without children 0.270 (0.123) -0.075 (0.063)  0.088 (0.051) -0.012 (0.094) 
          
ii) Participation (in percentage points)      
All 0.155 (0.036) -0.027 (0.031)  0.050 (0.035) -0.001 (0.006) 
Education          
University 0.149 (0.044) -0.027 (0.030)  0.041 (0.027) -0.004 (0.007) 
Vocational 0.155 (0.034) -0.027 (0.030)  0.053 (0.034) -0.000 (0.005) 
Year12 0.152 (0.031) -0.025 (0.034)  0.049 (0.032) -0.001 (0.006) 
Year11 0.170 (0.03) -0.029 (0.031)  0.065 (0.044) 0.002 (0.006) 
Children           
With child <5 yrs 0.205 (0.022) -0.035 (0.042)  0.045 (0.025) 0.001 (0.005) 
Without children 0.136 (0.045) -0.024 (0.025)  0.052 (0.037) -0.003 (0.007) 
          
(b) Extended model          
i) Hours worked (in percent)      
All 0.299 (0.178) -0.148 (0.068)  0.110 (0.062) -0.018 (0.011) 
Education          
University 0.298 (0.196) -0.148 (0.073)  0.108 (0.055) -0.023 (0.011) 
Vocational 0.292 (0.168) -0.143 (0.066)  0.092 (0.053) -0.017 (0.010) 
Year12 0.286 (0.161) -0.141 (0.059)  0.102 (0.058) -0.017 (0.010) 
Year11 0.322 (0.178) -0.159 (0.072)  0.151 (0.094) -0.015 (0.015) 
Children           
With child <5 yrs 0.427 (0.178) -0.188 (0.057)  0.084 (0.042) -0.012 (0.009) 
Without children 0.262 (0.182) -0.136 (0.073)  0.115 (0.067) -0.021 (0.012) 
          
ii) Participation (in percentage points)      
All 0.091 (0.038) -0.033 (0.014)  0.052 (0.037) 0.000 (0.004) 
Education          
University 0.102 (0.050) -0.037 (0.017)  0.049 (0.035) -0.001 (0.003) 
Vocational 0.083 (0.034) -0.028 (0.013)  0.045 (0.034) 0.000 (0.003) 
Year12 0.085 (0.033) -0.033 (0.013)  0.055 (0.039) -0.001 (0.004) 
Year11 0.086 (0.036) -0.032 (0.017)  0.081 (0.051) 0.001 (0.006) 
Children           
With child <5 yrs 0.112 (0.036) -0.039 (0.016)  0.035 (0.027) 0.001 (0.002) 
Without children 0.083 (0.045) -0.031 (0.017)  0.058 (0.041) -0.001 (0.005) 
Notes: The elasticity is calculated for each individual and averaged across all individuals. The standard errors 
are constructed by averaging over the corresponding demographic group for each of the 100 independent 
draws from the asymptotic distribution of the estimated parameters. 
In Table 6-5, the own wage elasticities of females (column (1)) from the 
extended model are smaller in magnitude than those from the standard model, 
whereas the own wage elasticities of males (column (3)) are larger. Given a 
one-percent increase in wage rates, the standard model predicts an increase 
between 0.27 and 0.52 percent in hours worked for females, with the effect 
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being largest among mothers with children aged less than five years. In the 
extended model, the female own wage elasticities are smaller in magnitude 
and range between 0.26 and 0.43. The predicted own wage elasticities for 
males are similar to those found in the standard model and lie in a narrow 
range between 0.08 and 0.12. In relation to cross-wage elasticities (column (2) 
for females and column (4) for males), the overall cross elasticity for females 
is larger from the extended model (-0.15), compared to that from the standard 
model (-0.09), whereas the cross-wage elasticities for males are largely 
insignificant in both models.  
To investigate the discrepancy in the predicted responses from the standard 
model and those from the extended model, the simulated employment effects 
given a one-percent increase in own wage are evaluated in aggregate level. 
One issue identified in Duncan and MacCrae (1999) and Bargain et al. (2010) 
is that the estimated elasticities may be biased as a result of two opposing 
effects. First, the standard model regards non-participants and unemployed 
individuals in the same state, which likely leads a downward bias in the 
preference for work amongst the unemployed. However, unlike non-
participants, unemployed individuals are willing to work at the prevailing 
market wage. As such, it follows that the preference for work and the 
estimated wage elasticities are likely to be underestimated (Ham, 1982). 
Second, an upward bias arises if unemployed individuals were to freely adjust 
their labour supply if given a wage rise. The standard discrete choice model 
does not distinguish between unemployed individuals and non-participants. 
The outcome of the standard discrete choice model is to overpredict hours 
worked by the unemployed individuals in the event of a wage rise, a result that 
contradicts the fact that they are jobless and facing constraints from the 
demand side. The effects operate in opposite directions and the overall impact 
is unclear in ex ante.  
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In the extended model, the expected working hours have taken into account 
the probability of being employed in the job market. This is particularly 
important to obtain accurate employment responses for unemployed 
individuals. For example, given a wage rise an unemployed individual may 
wish to increase labour supply. Such increment in labour supply tends to be 
overstated because the unemployed individual cannot immediately commence 
work due to demand side constraints. Their employment responses must 
therefore be weighed against the probability of getting an employment offer in 
the labour market. To further our understanding of these biases, the labour 
supply effects are calculated in the aggregate level where the hours worked 
and the participation rate are summarised across all individuals in the dataset. 
The changes in the total number of hours and the average participation rate are 
summarised by employment status, namely, non-participants, unemployed and 
employed, in Table 6-6. 
TABLE 6-6 AGGREGATE LABOUR SUPPLY EFFECTS BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
AGGREGATE EFFECTS 
FEMALE  MALE 
Obs. (%) Standard Extended  Obs. (%) Standard Extended 
(a) Hours worked (change in aggregate weekly hours worked)     
Non-participants (1) 17.12% 18.72 18.37  2.79% 4.36 3.84 
Unemployed (2) 1.99% 2.07 0.11  1.89% 1.98 0.08 
Employed (3) 70.88% 79.18 72.07  85.32% 86.90 64.35 
        
(b) Participation (change in percentage points)     
Non-participants (4)  0.10 0.10   0.10 0.08 
Unemployed (5)  0.08 0.00   0.05 0.00 
Notes: Numbers are absolute changes in the participation rate (in percentage points) and the number of 
working hours (in weekly working hours) due to a one-percent increase in gross hourly wage. 
In Table 6-6, absolute changes in the participation rate (in percentage points) 
and the number of working hours (in aggregate weekly working hours) are 
presented. The results suggest that the upward bias dominates the downward 
bias for both male and female spouses. As expected, the upward bias is most 
significant amongst the unemployed individuals: switching from the standard 
model to the extended model results in the predicted effects of both intensive 
and extensive margin being largely insignificant. Specifically, the standard 
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model predicts an increase of 0.08 and 0.05 percentage points in the 
participation rate for females and males respectively, compared to no effect 
from the extended model (row (5) of Table 6-6).  
In relation to hours worked, given a one-percent increase in own wage rates, 
the standard model predicts an approximate aggregate increase of two hours in 
hours worked for females and males (row (2)), which is greater than the 
predicted effect of the extended model (an increase of 0.11 and 0.08 hours for 
females and males respectively). Amongst non-participants and employed 
individuals, the predicted changes from the extended model are somewhat 
smaller than those from the standard model. Part of the reason likely relates to 
the fact that the extended model weights the expected payoff from 
employment against the probability of obtaining employment. The return from 
employment is thus lowered, which in turn leads to lowered employment 
responses in the event of a wage rise.  
Overall, the estimated bias is relatively small given that only approximately 
two percent of sample individuals are unemployed. However, such bias may 
become more severe if the targeted sample is exposed to high unemployment 
risk, such as low-skilled labour. 
6.6. Simulation 
Newstart Allowance performs a similar role to welfare programs in the United 
States and is the dominant unemployment benefit in Australia. Unemployed 
individuals and those who were previously unemployed and wish to return to 
work may be eligible for NSA benefits, subject to participation requirements. 
The main feature of the NSA program is discussed in Appendix A. 74  To 
                                                 
74 In the simulations, the effects of NSA-related programs such as the DisabilityCare, Partnerships with Employers, 
Support to Skill Mismatch are not considered, since they are irrelevant for the sample data used. 
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analyse the employment sensitivity with respect to wage and the NSA benefits, 
the simulations presented in this section employ the estimation results of the 
extended model with the NSA benefits included in the budget constraint. NSA 
benefits likely increase the economic incentives for the unemployed and the 
discrete hour points associated with low wage earnings. However, for the 
purpose of the simulation, all individuals are assumed to have fulfilled their 
participation requirements and their NSA benefits are calculated according to 
their income and hours worked.   
In Table 6-7, the wage elasticities are presented by educational attainment of 
spouses and the presence of preschool children.  
TABLE 6-7 SIMULATED ELASTICITIES USING THE EXTENDED LABOUR SUPPLY MODEL 
ELASTICITY  FEMALE  MALE 
Hours worked (in percent)  Own wage Cross wage  Own wage Cross wage 
All  0.264 (0.112) -0.080 (0.047)  0.082 (0.069) -0.012 (0.008) 
Education           
University  0.276 (0.137) -0.077 (0.044)  0.082 (0.064) -0.016 (0.008) 
Vocational  0.252 (0.103) -0.079 (0.047)  0.070 (0.059) -0.012 (0.007) 
Year 12  0.249 (0.097) -0.080 (0.043)  0.078 (0.065) -0.012 (0.007) 
Year 11  0.273 (0.112) -0.092 (0.058)  0.110 (0.097) -0.009 (0.011) 
Children           
With child <5 yrs  0.371 (0.126) -0.130 (0.062)  0.068 (0.054) -0.008 (0.007) 
Without child <5 yrs  0.234 (0.114) -0.066 (0.043)  0.084 (0.071) -0.015 (0.009) 
 
Labour force participation (in percentage points)      
All  0.081 (0.034) -0.024 (0.016)  0.044 (0.044) 0.001 (0.003) 
Education           
University  0.094 (0.040) -0.024 (0.016)  0.042 (0.043) 0.000 (0.003) 
Vocational  0.074 (0.032) -0.022 (0.016)  0.038 (0.041) 0.001 (0.003) 
Year 12  0.073 (0.029) -0.024 (0.015)  0.044 (0.045) -0.001 (0.003) 
Year 11  0.072 (0.034) -0.026 (0.020)  0.065 (0.059) 0.002 (0.006) 
Children           
With child <5 yrs  0.092 (0.038) -0.038 (0.018)  0.033 (0.038) -0.001 (0.002) 
Without child <5 yrs  0.077 (0.036) -0.018 (0.017)  0.047 (0.046) 0.001 (0.004) 
Notes: The standard deviation is constructed by averaging over the corresponding demographic group the 
100 simulated transitions for each of the 100 independent draws from the estimated parameter distribution.  
As expected, once the effect of the NSA benefits is considered, the predicted 
wage elasticities are smaller in magnitude than the estimates presented in 
Table 6-5. The results from Table 6-7 suggest that a one-percent increase in 
wage rates for females leads to a 0.26-percent increase in the hours worked, or 
0.08-percent increase in labour force participation. The wage elasticities are 
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larger among mothers with preschool children (0.37 percent), compared to 
mothers without a preschool child. The own wage elasticity of males with 
respect to labour force participation is 0.04, and 0.08 for hours worked. The 
cross wage elasticities for the females lie within a narrow range between -0.13 
and -0.07, and they are largely insignificant for males.  
Next, parameter estimates of the extended model are used to simulate the 
employment effects of two hypothetical reforms in the NSA program. The 
structure of the NSA benefits consists of the maximum payment rate, the taper 
rate and the income thresholds at which the taper rate kicks in. The first 
hypothetical reform (Reform I) is motivated by the proposed Social Security 
Legislation Amendment Bill to Parliament in 2013 (Siewert, 2013). This Bill 
proposed an increase of $50 per week in the benefit level of NSA for single 
households.75 This proposed NSA increase is perceived as necessary to ensure 
a fairer social security for low-income households living on NSA. Though 
single households are not the research focus of this analysis, the aim of the 
simulation is to provide a useful insight into the policy implications where a 
similar increase is applied to partnered households. For the simulation 
purpose, the basic rate of the NSA benefits and associated taper thresholds are 
increased by a fixed amount of $50 per week for partnered households. The 
‘new’ NSA provides higher income support for unemployed individuals, and 
increases the economic incentives for choosing the discrete hour points at 
which wage earnings are sufficiently low to attract the NSA payments. 
Employment responses in this policy context are compared with the baseline 
estimates and changes in the labour supply are summarised at the level of the 
household. 
                                                 
75 The Bill also proposed increases to other income support benefits such as Youth Allowance and adjustments to the 
indexation arrangements 
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In the second simulation (Reform II), a reform is introduced to increase 
benefit transfers for eligible NSA recipients; however, the incremental change 
in Reform II is implemented through reducing taper rates rather than 
increasing absolute payments. As such, Reform II likely induces higher 
effective wage rates from work for recipients who are working and receive 
income within the NSA-eligible income threshold. Specifically, the taper rate 
is reduced by ten percentage points. That is, the taper rate is reduced from 50 
cents to 40 cents in a dollar if fortnightly income is between $62 and $250, 
and 60 cents to 50 cents in a dollar if fortnightly income is above $250. 
Reform II improves economic incentives for working relative to the choice of 
non-working.  
TABLE 6-8 SIMULATED EFFECTS OF POLICY REFORMS 
 FEMALE  MALE 
 Hours worked  Participation (ppts)  Hours worked  Participation (ppts) 
(a) Reform I Percent Std.Dev.  Percent Std.Dev.  Percent Std.Dev.  Percent Std.Dev. 
All -0.399 (0.227)  0.540 (0.479)  -0.093 (0.032)  -0.007 (0.013) 
Education            
University -0.431 (0.200)  0.294 (0.297)  -0.031 (0.015)  -0.007 (0.008) 
Vocational -0.446 (0.304)  0.614 (0.536)  -0.098 (0.030)  -0.008 (0.012) 
Year 12 -0.404 (0.308)  0.626 (0.541)  -0.112 (0.038)  -0.001 (0.013) 
Year 11 -0.244 (0.619)  0.813 (0.686)  -0.211 (0.067)  -0.008 (0.029) 
Children            
With child <5 
yrs 
-0.332 (0.589)  0.873 (0.643)  -0.083 (0.026)  -0.004 (0.011) 
Without child 
<5 yrs 
-0.434 (0.192)  0.400 (0.426)  -0.098 (0.034)  -0.010 (0.015) 
            
(b) Reform II            
All 0.260 (0.490)  0.213 (0.125)  -0.018 (0.012)  0.010 (0.010) 
Education            
University 0.122 (0.255)  0.142 (0.116)  -0.005 (0.007)  0.003 (0.005) 
Vocational 0.314 (0.622)  0.243 (0.138)  -0.022 (0.012)  0.008 (0.009) 
Year 12 0.281 (0.551)  0.240 (0.124)  -0.029 (0.013)  0.010 (0.010) 
Year 11 0.466 (0.768)  0.275 (0.138)  -0.034 (0.024)  0.029 (0.025) 
Children            
With child <5 
yrs  
0.386 (0.613)  0.287 (0.103)  -0.016 (0.005)  0.010 (0.008) 
Without child 
<5 yrs 
0.182 (0.460)  0.183 (0.139)  -0.020 (0.015)  0.009 (0.011) 
Notes: The standard deviation and confidence intervals are constructed using 100 independent draws from 
the estimated parameter distribution.  
Table 6-8 presents the simulated employment effects of two hypothetical NSA 
reforms. The results suggest that the NSA program can be an effective means 
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to encourage females to participate in the labour market, while its impact on 
males’ labour market activity is small.  
The simulated employment effects of Reform I suggest a negative effect on 
females’ hours worked and a positive effect on the participation. The size of 
the estimated effects is largely in line with a priori expectations. The absolute 
increase in the NSA benefits affects not only the net benefits received by the 
unemployed, but also low-income working individuals. The increase therefore 
leads to improved economic incentives for working a range of hours in which 
the NSA benefits are eligible. Specifically, the model predicts an increase of 
0.54 percentage points in female participation and a 0.40-percent decrease in 
the hours worked among working females. Across education levels, the effect 
of hours worked is largest for females without educational qualifications (0.81 
percentage points), followed by high-school graduates or vocational degree 
holders (approximately 0.62 percentage points), and university graduates (0.29 
percentage points). Also, the results suggest that 0.87 percent of mothers with 
at least one preschool child would join the labour force, whereas the average 
hours worked for those mothers in this group is predicted to fall by 0.33 
percent. However, the participation effects on the males are largely 
insignificant whereas the predicted effects on males’ hours worked are 
negative and significant. The results suggest that Reform I provides little 
incentive to induce male non-participants to enter the labour market, while 
discouraging the labour supply of employed males.  
Instead of an absolute increase in payment, Reform II introduces a reduction 
in the taper rate. The results suggest positive employment effects for females, 
but the effects for males are largely insignificant and close to zero. The 
employment responses for females consist of an increase of 0.26 percent in 
working hours and 0.21 percentage points in participation. Across education 
levels, female workers with an educational attainment of year 11 or below are 
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found to have the greatest effects (0.47 percent), followed by vocational 
degree holders (0.31 percent) and high-school graduates (0.28 percent).  
In short, the predicted effects from both reforms suggest that the NSA program 
can be an important means to facilitate the labour force attachment of females, 
while its impact on the employment decisions of males is small.  
6.7. Conclusion 
The main motivation of this study is to evaluate the employment effects of 
partnered households while correcting for the bias that results in treating 
unemployment and non-participation as equivalent labour market states. To 
this end, the analysis incorporates a double-hurdle model into the discrete 
choice labour market model. As such, the extended model developed in this 
chapter is readily available to evaluate the effects of unemployment benefits 
on hours worked and participation.  
This chapter makes use of Australian partnered household data sourced from 
the HILDA wave 9 to 11. The empirical specification of the model relaxes the 
Independent and Irrelevant of Alternatives assumption and requires the joint 
estimation of preference for work equations, the unemployment risk equations 
and the fixed costs of work equation. The predicted distribution over discrete 
hour points using the point estimates of the parameters is similar to the actual 
distribution, whereas the estimated wage elasticities are comparable to other 
estimates reported in earlier Australian studies. This leads to the conclusion 
that the extended model in this chapter provides reasonable fitness to the 
observed data and is a sound basis for policy simulations.  
The comparison of employment effects from the standard model and those 
from the extended model suggests that the upward bias dominates in predicted 
effects, and as such the estimated elasticities reported in the standard model 
would be inflated. By assuming full participation of the NSA program for all 
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unemployed individuals and low-income individuals who are NSA-eligible, 
the simulated own wage elasticity for females and males are 0.26 and 0.08 
respectively.  
The estimation results are further applied in two hypothetical reforms of the 
NSA program. The results suggest that an absolute increase in the NSA 
payment likely discourages the labour supply of working females while 
promoting more non-working females to participate in the labour market. A 
reduction in the NSA taper rate whereas leads to positive employment effects 
in both intensive and extensive margins. However, the impact of the NSA 
benefits on male labour supply is found to be largely insignificant.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusion and Remarks 
In recent decades, a novel type of labour supply modelling named ‘the discrete 
choice approach’ has received increasing attention in applications that require 
modelling household labour supply and evaluating the employment effects of 
public policy.  
The discrete choice approach is based on the principle of mapping the 
continuum of hours into a set of discrete points, where households choose the 
discrete choice that correspond to their highest utility. The major advantage of 
using a discrete choice model over neoclassical labour supply models, such as 
the Hausman (1979) model, is that non-linear tax, joint filing, fixed costs of 
working and income support benefits can easily be incorporated without 
affecting model tractability. Discretising the choice set removes the need to 
use a restrictive utility functional form or to impose Slutsky constraints on the 
parameters of the model, even in the presence of a non-convex or non-
piecewise linear budget set. Additionally, the effects on labour force 
participation and hours worked can be estimated jointly in the same utility 
maximization problem.  
In this thesis, the discrete choice method is first extended to take into account 
household childcare decisions, then an extended model is developed to 
integrate the employment outcome of unemployed individuals.  
7.1. Employment and Childcare Decisions of Parents 
There is a widespread consensus that childcare plays a crucial role in 
facilitating parents, transition to employment during the childrearing phase. 
The problem of interpreting causality between childcare and labour supply 
arises from the fact that these decisions are inter-related within the household. 
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This relationship may be weakened by income support programs aimed at 
relieving the financial burden of childcare. 
The first part of this thesis consists of two substantive analyses on modelling 
the labour supply of partnered parents and single mothers. In Australia, a 
number of policy initiatives have been designed to encourage parents, 
especially females, to return to the labour market following the birth of a 
child. A great deal of attention has been paid to parent households where 
income support programs were believed to discourage active participation in 
the labour market. The analysis of parents’ labour supply on parents is 
important to determine how different combinations of social and labour 
market policies designed to reconcile work and child rearing, such as 
subsidised childcare provision, affect employment decisions. These programs 
have a significant impact on the labour supply of females, not only in regards 
to them entering the labour force, but also in the number of hours worked. 
In this respect, it is necessary to incorporate household considerations of 
childcare arrangements to facilitate the analysis of the supply of labour. The 
analyses seek to evaluate household employment behaviour in the presence of 
children and to estimate the impact of childcare on female labour supply. 
Specifically, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 examine (i) the employment 
implications of childcare and the provision of parental care, (ii) the impact of 
the childcare subsidy and other income support programs on household labour 
market activities, (iii) the application of the discrete choice approach using 
panel data, and (iv) alternative designs of payment schemes of income support 
programs that promote the labour force attachment of parents. 
In particular, the theoretical models developed in the first two substantive 
analyses aim to capture the effect of time substitutions between parental care 
and work by incorporating a set of time constraints. The theoretical model is 
based on the idea that for parents to participate in market work, they may 
coordinate their parental care activities or organise childcare to relieve 
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themselves from care responsibilities. Mothers are usually the primary carers 
of their children and the provision of maternal care reduces their time 
available for work. The use of childcare services, whether of a formal or 
informal nature, frees up care responsibilities and time for mothers to engage 
in work and leisure activities, especially in the absence of care offered by the 
other parent. 
While a range of studies has sought to identify the responsiveness of the 
labour supply to wage rates and public transfers, there have been very few 
empirical studies of childcare usage, costs and subsidies. This is partly a result 
of the difficulty of collecting information on the time allocation of work and 
childcare and the incorporation of institutional details of income support 
programs, which makes it difficult to measure the employment effect of 
childcare benefits. To remedy these difficulties, this analysis uses five waves 
of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA). In the 
data, the time-spent in labour-market activities and parenting children are 
identified, which enables the theoretical model to incorporate a set of time 
constraints to capture household childcare decisions into the conventional 
utility framework in leisure and consumption space. 
The parenting and work decision-process of parents are simultaneously 
considered in the model, subject to the budget and time constraints that apply 
to the household. While some existing studies have modelled the use of 
childcare as an essential component of household preference, a key 
contribution of this research is its incorporation of a set of time constraints to 
capture the behaviours of parenting activities and labour supply in a single 
framework. Furthermore, the structural labour supply model incorporates 
details of taxation and income support programs in Australia, including Family 
Tax Benefit Part A, Family Tax Benefit Part B, Parenting Payment, Child Care 
Benefit and the Child Care Rebate. 
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The decisions of time allocation in work and parental care activities are jointly 
positioned in a single discrete choice labour supply framework and are 
estimated using the Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) technique. The 
use of a simulation method not only solves the problem of evaluating multiple 
integrals arising from limited dependent variable equations, it also solves the 
problem of the intractable analytic solution to the choice problem. Based on 
the fact that age, education and child characteristics are, in general, associated 
with household preference for parental care, variables related to these 
conditions are controlled for in the estimation. The feasibility of applying 
structural time constraints when modelling childcare decisions is examined by 
comparing the estimation results to estimates from the standard discrete choice 
model.  
7.1.1. Partnered Parents 
The analysis of partnered parents is based on a cross-sectional sample data, 
formed by pooling three waves of HILDA data between 2009 and 2011. 
The estimation results for partnered households show that in general, labour 
supply responses of females are more sensitive to a change in childcare prices 
and wage rates, compared to those of males. Using the dual-agent 
specification, an increase in own wage rate is predicted to yield a positive 
effect (an elasticity of 0.17) on labour force participation and hours worked 
(an elasticity of 0.45) and a negative effect on parental care (an elasticity of -
0.03). The model also finds negative effects on employment decisions from an 
increase in the cross wage rate. The price elasticity of childcare is found to be 
positive on parenting hours of both parents (0.19 on females and 0.13 on 
males), while negative on labour supply decisions (-0.07 on females and -0.02 
on males).  
The usefulness of this modelling approach is also illustrated by simulating the 
employment effects of four alternative payment schemes of the Child Care 
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Rebate. While these simulations offer some idea about the effectiveness of 
wage and childcare subsidies in increasing employment, they also provide 
insights into the relative cost-effectiveness of these reforms. Some insights can 
be gained regarding the implications of the government budget using the 
estimates obtained in this chapter and making a few simplifying assumptions. 
Specifically, the percentage budget savings and the predicted employment 
effects reported in the simulation may guide the design of future policy and 
further understanding of policy implications. 
The employment effects of four alternative payment schemes to the Child Care 
Rebate, which are less costly to implement, are simulated at the household 
level. Specifically, in the first two schemes, the rebate rate and the cap limit of 
the Child Care Rebate are reduced to their levels of 2007, and the simulation 
results show a negative impact on the female labour supply. The distortionary 
effects on labour supply can be reduced if the payment scheme targets more 
responsive subgroups, such as economically disadvantaged households, 
through the use of an income means test as illustrated in the other two 
schemes. The results show that these two schemes may lead to a small 
negative effect on the labour supply among high-income households or 
households with preschool children, but would lead to a larger increase in the 
supply of labour among other subgroups. Overall, the model predicts positive 
employment effects in the last two reforms. These simulations have illustrated 
the effectiveness of childcare policy in shaping employment behaviour of 
partnered parents, and suggest that public transfers that lower the financial 
burden of using childcare can be an effective means to facilitate female 
employment. 
For future work, it would be worthwhile to develop a collective model of 
labour supply that takes into account the bargaining process of parenting 
activities between spouses, and models the parenting activity collectively 
within the household. Although the analysis of the role of informal care is 
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beyond the scope of the thesis, for future work it would be fruitful to develop a 
structural labour supply model that takes into account the implicit prices and 
usage of informal care, together with household choices on formal childcare 
and parental care. 
7.1.2. Single Mothers 
In contrast to partnered parents, single mothers face diminished care options 
and income streams as the result of the absence of a spouse and their 
employment decisions are likely to differ from partnered mothers in a number 
of ways. They typically have less family income and use more informal care, 
while allocating a larger share of care hours to formal caregivers. While at 
work, children cannot be looked after by a spouse. Thus single mothers must 
use childcare to facilitate their engagement in market work. For these reasons, 
the structural model developed for partnered parents is extended explicitly to 
examine the employment behaviour of single mothers. 
The relatively small number of single parent households in any given wave of 
HILDA necessitates the pooling of data across waves. For the analysis of 
single mothers, an unbalanced panel dataset was constructed based on five 
waves of HILDA from 2006 to 2010. The time structure of the panel data 
imposes further challenges to the conventional estimation method and the 
econometric specification developed in this chapter corrects for the standard 
errors that result from the data being drawn from a panel dataset. In addition, 
the homogeneous assumption of childcare price is relaxed following Breunig 
et al. (2012), where the age-specific prices are obtained at the level of Labour 
Force Survey Region. In the analysis, a rolling window technique is applied to 
the childcare price calculation to preserve the possible time trend and regional 
variations. 
The estimation results confirm that childcare costs have a strong negative 
effect on the probability that a single mother works. The estimated wage 
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elasticities and childcare price elasticities for single mothers are slightly lower 
than partnered mothers. The model was used to perform simulations of the 
household responses to changes in the budget constraints. Simulations of the 
labour supply elasticities showed inelastic values, with an uncompensated 
wage elasticity of 0.35 and income elasticity of 0.05. The elasticity between 
childcare price and welfare participation on the labour supply is of particular 
interest, and the estimated elasticity of overall employment with respect to the 
price of childcare is -0.07, which is comparable to other estimates found in 
Australia but smaller than estimates from overseas studies. 
By simulating the employment responses from adjusting a number of 
components in the budget set, this analysis also investigates the sensitivity of 
single mothers’ labour supply to individual income support programs and tax 
rules. In particular, the simulation inspects the employment effects of lowering 
the Parenting Payment rate to the Newstart Allowance benefit for single 
mothers with older children. Such a policy has been in effect since January 
2013. 
Performed simulations suggest that an increase in the social assistance norm 
has a relatively large labour supply effect. The simulations show that the 
abolition of the Parenting Payment transition arrangement results in an 
increase of 2.14 percent in hours worked among employed single mothers with 
children aged at least eight years old, and 2.69 percent among all single 
mother households. In addition, the results show the value of childcare 
subsidies at encouraging single parents to participate in market work. When 
Child Care Benefit and Child Care Rebate are increased by 10 percent, 
employment is increased by more than 1 percentage point. 
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7.2. Modelling Labour Supply and Unemployment Risk  
The second part of the thesis investigates the modelling issues related to 
unemployed individuals and integrates their employment effects into the 
discrete choice labour supply model. The employment decision process is 
modelled similarly to the double-hurdle model (Blundell et al., 1987; Cragg, 
1971; Duncan & MacCrae, 1999). The first hurdle to employment can be 
viewed as the decision to participate in market work. An individual would 
participate in the labour market if the market prevailing wage exceeded one’s 
reservation wage; otherwise one remains voluntarily inactive. The second 
hurdle describes two follow-up market outcomes conditional on market 
participation: working desired hours or being unemployed involuntarily. If an 
individual is unemployed, one remains jobless in their preferred labour market 
and waits for an appropriate wage offer to arrive, otherwise the individual is 
assumed to work their desired hours.  
The econometric specification assumes that each individual chooses from 
amongst a set of discrete hour choices to maximise a predefined utility 
function, in which the expected utility from market participation is weighted 
by the probability of being unemployed. Within the single structural model, 
the household unemployment risk, preferences for consumption and leisure 
and the fixed costs of work are jointly estimated. The econometric 
specification of the model is suitable to carry out ex post simulations to 
evaluate the effects of the Newstart Allowance jointly with other income 
support programs. The estimation results obtained from the extended model 
are compared to the conventional discrete choice model. The effects of 
controlling for the unemployment risk are assessed by discussing the 
discrepancies in the estimation results at the aggregate level. 
The sample data is based on pooling three waves of the HILDA data between 
2009 and 2011 and contains partnered (married or de facto) households aged 
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between 25 and 59. The elasticities from the extended model are somewhat 
smaller in magnitude compared to estimates from the standard discrete choice 
labour supply model and those found in recent studies on Australia. In relation 
to marginal effects at the intensive margin, the average own wage elasticities 
for partnered females are found to be higher than those for males. They lie in a 
narrow range between 0.14 and 0.17, except for females with young children 
(about 0.29). The cross wage elasticities for females are negative and range 
between -0.12 and -0.07. Among males, the wage elasticities appear modest 
and range between 0.07 and 0.08, whereas the cross wage elasticities are 
largely insignificant. The analysis further compares the estimated employment 
effects of partnered households in Australia using the standard discrete choice 
model and the extended model, which takes into account the risk of being 
unemployed. The results indicate that the standard model overpredicts the 
employment responses of unemployed individuals, resulting in an upward bias 
in the overall simulated employment effects.  
The empirical results from the extended model are used to set up a micro-
simulation model to analyse the employment effects of two alternative 
payment schemes of Newstart Allowance. The results suggest that an absolute 
increase in the Newstart Allowance payment likely discourages the labour 
supply of working females while promoting more non-working females to 
participate in the labour market; whereas a reduction in the taper rate of 
Newstart Allowance leads to positive employment effects in both hours 
worked and participation. However, the impact of the Newstart Allowance 
benefits on male labour supply is found to be largely insignificant. 
Although the extended model presented in Chapter 6 seems to offer an 
improved framework over the standard model for analysing both employment 
decisions and unemployment risk, it would be fruitful for future research to 
further identify the work preferences of discouraged workers and to examine 
the impact of their employment decisions on the model estimates. 
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  Income Support Programs for Families 
with Dependent Children 
The primary objective of this section is to present a discussion of the 
institutional context of the major childcare subsidies and income support 
programs in Australia, which are essential components of the household 
budget constraint. In particular, an examination of these programs helps to 
identify the extent to which income support programs determine the degree of 
willingness to supply labour, to use childcare and to determine the type of care 
purchased. 
The key elements of the household budget constraint include wage earnings, 
non-labour income, tax liabilities and transfers from income support programs. 
In the labour supply analyses, wage earnings are calculated using information 
on hours worked and wage rates. Non-labour income is assumed to be 
exogenous to the model. This section aims to provide a brief overview of the 
remaining two elements of the budget constraint, the tax and income support 
programs, to provide readers with full information on the construction of the 
budget set. 
This section first provides an overview of policy objectives of the Australian 
family assistance policies, followed by an outline of the major elements of the 
design of income support payments. The discussion focuses on how these 
elements may influence an individual’s employment and childcare decisions, 
especially amongst those with dependent children. Unless otherwise cited, 
descriptions of these income support programs are sourced from the website of 
the Department of Social Services (2013a).76 
                                                 
76 The formulas used in this thesis to calculate income support transfers are available at the website of the Department 
of Social Services’ website: http:// http://guidesacts.fahcsia.gov.au/guides_acts/fag/fag-rn.html.  
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A.1. Overview 
Amongst developed countries, the Commonwealth Government of Australia 
has been a frontrunner in committing to support families with children 
responsibilities and to promote female workforce participation. During the last 
decade, the most significant move in this direction has been the Welfare-to-
Work reform enacted by the Howard Government in 2006.77 There is wide 
agreement that childcare costs may be an important barrier to employment, 
especially for single mothers, and thus an impediment to the success of 
Welfare-to-Work reforms (Department of Employment and Workplace 
Relations, 2008).  
The need to shape governmental policies to encourage higher female 
workforce participation is multifold and has been recognised in a number of 
empirical studies. Income support programs increase wage earnings to help 
families achieve better living standards, and become less vulnerable to job 
losses. At the aggregate level, increased labour activities likely increase 
overall social welfare and production and reduce government welfare 
expenditure, which is important to better cope with an aging population. For 
females during their childrearing phase, better labour market attachment 
reduces the detrimental effects of human capital loss and increases their 
likelihood of returning to the workforce (Connelly & Kimmel, 2003a). Next, 
promoting female labour supply is consistent with promoting gender and 
income equity. There is also evidence that the reduced income cap between 
married partners may be an important factor to reduce the likelihood of family 
dissolution (Becker, Landes, & Michael, 1977; Chiappori et al., 2002; 
Greenwood, Guner, & Knowles, 2003). 
                                                 
77 These reforms included (but were not restricted to): reconfiguring employment services to better cater to the needs 
of disadvantaged job seekers; increasing the Child Care Rebate; introducing paid parental leave; increasing from 2017 
the age at which people can access the Age Pension; and tightening access to the Disability Support Pension. 
 - 200 - 
The majority of Australian Government transfers consist of both non-means 
tested and means-tested payments, including the Age Pension, the Parenting 
Payment (PP), Family Tax Benefit Part A [FTB (A)], Family Tax Benefit Part 
B [FTB (B)], Child Care Benefit (CCB), Child Care (Tax) Rebate (CCTR or 
CCR) and Newstart Allowance (NSA). Unlike non-means tested programs, the 
means-tested payments make use of an income test and/or an asset test to 
identify individuals who are unable to support themselves through work or 
savings. Overall, the net transfers made in FTB (A), FTB (B), PP, NSA, CCB 
and CCR (CCTR) account for more than half of total benefits in the Australian 
transfer payment system.78 
In the income test and the assets test, the payment calculation depends on two 
important parameters: the maximum payment rate and the taper rate. The 
actual payment is calculated by applying the test that results in the lowest 
payment amount. The maximum payment rate allows an individual to have a 
threshold level of income or assets before eligibility for the full rate of 
payment are affected. The taper rate describes the percentage reduction of the 
payment at which a payment is made, as income and/or assets increase 
(Department of Social Services, 2013a). The income test allows an individual 
to earn some employment income while receiving an income support payment. 
The settings of the income test differ between types of payments, reflecting the 
different grounds upon which payments are made. For example, because 
Parenting Payment recipients are not expected to support themselves through 
paid work, Parenting Payment tapers out more slowly than most of the 
benefits.  
                                                 
78 As newer figures are not available at the time of writing, the government budget 2006 (Treasury, 2006) shows that 
FTB (A) and FTB (B) deliver the largest share of transfer ($19 billion) among all income support programs, followed 
by the PP for single households ($4.7 billion), the NSA ($4.5 billion), CCB (1.5 billion), PP for partnered households 
($1.2 billion) and CCTR (450 million). 
 - 201 - 
A.2. Family Tax Benefit Part A and Part B 
The aim of Family Tax Benefit is to partially recover the expense of raising 
children. FTB (A) is available to all families with a dependent child up to the 
age of 16, or the age of 24 if the child remains in full time education. The 
payments of FTB (A) are income tested and dependent on the number and 
ages of the children in the family. The benefits can be claimed as an annual 
lump sum or as a regular fortnightly payment. The maximum rate of FTB (A) 
is payable if family income is equal to or less than the income free threshold 
during the financial year. FTB (A) payment is tapered for family income 
above the lower income free area until the base rate of FTB (A) is reached.  
FTB (B) is available for single parent families or partnered families with sole 
income earners. The FTB (B) payments can be claimed if the family has a 
dependent child up to the age of 16, or 18 if the child is in full-time education. 
Like FTB (A), an income test is used to determine the benefit amount, which 
depends on the age of the youngest child in the household. 
A.3. Child Care Benefit and Child Care (Tax) Rebate 
The two major payments that directly recover childcare costs are the CCB 
(introduced in 2001) and the CCTR (introduced in 2004).  
CCB is an income-tested payment that assists eligible parents and non-parent 
carers with the cost of childcare (Harmer, 2008). Other CCB objectives are to 
provide incentives for parents and carers in low and middle-income groups to 
participate in the workforce and community and to support parents and carers 
to balance work and family commitments (Australian Law Reform 
Commission, 2012). The CCB is eligible for individuals who pay childcare 
fees and who use a registered childcare service. The CCB-eligible childcare 
services include approved long day care, family day care, occasional care, 
outside-school-hours care, and in-home care delivered by registered carers 
(Harmer, 2008). All eligible parents can receive up to 24 hours of benefit per 
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week for approved childcare for each child.79 The amount of CCB received is 
income tested. Like FTB, the benefits can either be claimed as a lump sum at 
the end of the year or paid directly to the chosen childcare service to reduce 
childcare fees. 
Parents and carers who are eligible for CCB are also eligible for CCTR, even 
if their CCB entitlement is nil due to their income (Harmer, 2008). The policy 
aims of CCTR are to assist families with the cost of approved childcare, 
provide incentives for families with dependent children to participate in the 
community and support parents in balancing work and family commitments. 
Between 2004 and 2008, the CCTR provided income support complementary 
to the CCB in the form of rebating childcare expenses through tax exemptions 
in annual tax. From 1 July 2009, the rebate for childcare expenses is no longer 
a tax offset under taxation legislation but is paid under the Family Assistance 
Office. CCTR was renamed Child Care Rebate (CCR), but the eligibility and 
entitlement criteria remain unchanged. In this thesis, CCR is used to refer to 
both Child Care Tax Rebate and Child Care Rebate.  
With CCR, eligible families are able to claim a percentage of their out-of-
pocket childcare expenses in excess of CCB payments received for approved 
childcare, up to a capped limit per child per annum (30 percent before 2008 or 
50 percent afterwards).80 There are no means tests applied to CCR payments. 
CCR is only available to families who are current recipients of CCB and who 
use approved childcare. With CCB and CCR, formal childcare services have 
become more affordable. 
                                                 
79 Parents are eligible for up to 50 hours of CCB a week when children are cared for by approved childcare services, 
while parents meet the conditions outlined in a work or training or study test. To satisfy the test, parents must 
undertake 30 hours per fortnight of work (voluntary work is allowed in certain circumstances), training, or study. If 
parents do not meet this test, they may receive CCB at a lower weekly limit of 24 hours. 
80 The cap limit per child per annum was initially $4,000 in 2004 and was increased to $7,500 in 2012. 
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A.4. Parenting Payment 
Unlike FTB, CCB and CCR, PP has historically been categorised as a pension 
payment and eligible recipients are generally not required to seek work as a 
condition of payment. It is paid at a higher rate to reflect the expectation that 
the payment will be the recipient’s sole source of income for an extended 
period. PP’s primary objective is to provide income support for parents or 
guardians to help with the cost of raising children. PP is both income and 
assets-tested, and may be paid to single parents or guardians of a child under 
the age of eight, or to partner parents of a child under the age of six. Note that 
the income tests applied to partner parents are stricter than those applied to 
single parents, which effectively makes PP payments less relevant to 
households with two working heads.  
PP was introduced in 1998 and amalgamated with the former Single Parent 
Pension. From 2006, the definition of the PP child was amended so that single 
parents claiming PP on or after that date would receive PP until their youngest 
child turns 8. People who have been receiving PP since before 2006 can 
remain on this payment until their youngest child turns 16, subject to 
continued eligibility and work participation requirements that commence when 
their youngest child turns 7. From 2013, the transitional arrangements were 
abolished. This means that regardless of when they claimed payments, all 
single parents may only receive PP until their youngest child turns 8 and 
couple parents are eligible until their youngest child turns 6. The reform has 
induced compulsory employment-related requirements for existing benefit 
recipients with school-age children or older. It has also made NSA paid at a 
lower rate and withdrawn more sharply with increases in earnings compared to 
PP (Department of Social Services, 2013b). These changes accentuated the 
expectation that such recipients should be seeking work. 
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A.5. Newstart Allowance 
The Australia government created NSA in 2001 to provide temporary financial 
support to individuals who are unemployed and at the lower end of income 
distribution.81 The policy objective is to provide financial help for individuals 
during the job transition period and increase their chances of finding a job. 
The benefits of NSA are conditional on the intention to participate in the 
labour market, where eligible recipients are required to actively look for work 
subject to interviews, training and income means tests. Eligible recipients must 
be aged 22 years or more but under the Age Pension age, meet an income test 
and an assets test, and actively look for paid work. They are also subject to 
activity tests and interviews. To continue receiving NSA, a recipient must 
engage in a variety of activities, including applying for a specific number of 
jobs per fortnight, undertaking vocational education or training, paid work 
experience and participation in specific labour market programs. If the 
recipient remains unemployed longer than 12 months, they are then subject to 
the Work Experience Phase (WEP) of their Employment Pathway Plan (EPP), 
which consists of more intensive assistance involving activities such as Work 
for the Dole, accredited study, part-time work or volunteer work.  
Since early 2013, it has been argued that the current Newstart Allowance rate 
is set too low to achieve its primary purpose of providing an adequate 
minimum standard of living, as well as to enable effective job search activity. 
A number of stakeholders have argued that Newstart Allowance payment rate 
likely undermines an individual’s capacity to maintain their readiness for 
                                                 
81 Previously there existed other programs that served a similar purpose but had different job search requirements and 
support services. 
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work.82 This may be particularly so for parents with dependent children, who 
are likely to have more financial commitments (The Australian Association of 
Social Workers, 2012). 
A.6. Other Income Support Benefits 
In addition to the important income support programs discussed, a number of 
income support benefits also help to relieve the financial burdens of the 
targeted recipients. Payments from these programs are not incorporated in the 
labour supply models used in the preceding analyses for two reasons. First, 
they are less relevant to the targeted subgroups of households, for example, the 
Age Pension. Next, payment rates, such as the Working Credit, are less in 
magnitude and difficult to impute.  
The largest payout in the Australian government transfer system is the Age 
Pension, which aims to provide adequate income for retired individuals. The 
pensionable age for men in Australia is 65, which is beyond the research scope 
of this thesis. 83  Next, the Working Credit aims to encourage people of 
workforce age who receive income support payments to take up full-time, 
part-time or casual work, and allow persons with fluctuating earnings to 
combine work and income support. When a person’s total income (including 
employment income) is less than $48 per fortnight, working credits are 
automatically accrued, up to a maximum of 1,000 (Harmer, 2008). Accrued 
working credits are then used to offset employment income, effectively 
increasing the income-free area for a payment. The Paid Paternal Leave 
scheme for working parents is available in a unified Australia-wide system. It 
                                                 
82 Stakeholders who advocate this claim include the Australian Council of Social Service, the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions, the Business Council of Australia, the National Employment Services Association and the Western 
Australian Council of Social Service. 
83 Eligible women are those aged 65 if born on or after 1 January 1949, and 64.5 years if born on or between between 
1 July 1947 and 31 December 1948. 
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allows eligible individuals to be paid the National Minimum Wage for up to 18 
weeks. Parental Leave Pay is available to Australian residents who are the 
primary carer of a newborn or recently adopted child. 
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 Results of Wage Estimation 
This section provides wage estimation results which are relevant to the 
analyses in the thesis. The sample data in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 consist of 
both female and male individuals and the Heckman (1979) model is applied 
separately for the wage rates of females and males. Chapter 5 consists of only 
single mother households, and thus a single wage model is estimated for this 
data sample. 
Careful consideration is made in choosing the exogenous variables in the wage 
and selection equations to meet the exclusion restrictions and facilitate model 
identification. The wage equation includes the age of the respondent, the 
individual’s work experience and its quadratic, binary indicators of 
educational attainment, and a set of binary indicators of geographic regions 
and time. The variables in the selection equation include age and age squared, 
non-labour income, binary indicators of education attainment and the number 
of children. In particular, the selection equation includes indicators of the age 
of the youngest child to control for the presence of children. The binary 
indicators of time are defined on a yearly basis with 2009 as the reference 
year. The set of geographic indicators is constructed based on the Major 
Statistical Region (MSR), which is a spatial boundary unit that differentiates 
state capital cities and the rural balance. A total of 13 regions are defined by 
MSR, among which ‘Sydney’ is set to be the reference category and omitted in 
the estimation. 
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B.1. Results of the Wage Estimation for Chapter 4 
TABLE B-1 RESULTS OF THE WAGE ESTIMATION FOR PARTNERED PARENTS 
VARIABLES  PARTNERED MOTHERS  PARTNERED FATHERS 
  
Wage 
Equation 
 
Selection 
Equation 
 
Wage 
Equation 
 
Selection 
Equation 
Constant  2.779***  -0.375  3.210***  1.095*** 
  (0.112)  (0.928)  (0.078)  (0.173) 
Personal information         
Age  -0.023  0.435  -0.060*  0.896 
  (0.029)  (0.501)  (0.031)  -0.596 
Age squared    -0.540    -1.264* 
    (0.667)    (0.725) 
Employment information         
Work experience  0.122*    0.120***   
  (0.073)    (0.029)   
Work experience squared  0.003       
  (0.021)       
Non-labour income    -0.000**    -0.000*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Educational attainment         
University  0.508***  0.898***  0.451***  1.021*** 
  (0.037)  (0.100)  (0.038)  (0.150) 
Vocational  0.159***  0.476***  0.140***  0.805*** 
  (0.037)  (0.099)  (0.034)  (0.124) 
Year 12  0.092**  0.451***  0.081**  0.737*** 
  (0.041)  (0.111)  (0.040)  (0.179) 
Household demographics         
Number of children    -0.127**     
    (0.050)     
If youngest child aged 0-1    -0.681***     
    (0.084)     
If youngest child aged 2-5    -0.407***     
    (0.077)     
If youngest child aged 6-9    0.129     
    (0.081)     
Geographic indicators (omitted)         
Year indicators (omitted)         
         
Other parameters         
Rhoa  0.280    0.415   
  (0.200)    (0.220)   
Sigmab  0.386    0.337   
  (0.008)    (0.009)   
Lambdac  0.108    0.140   
  (0.079)    (0.077)   
Log likelihood  -1134.231    -866.522   
Observations  1,777       
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; sample of partnered parents with children 0-12 years old 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
a In order to constrain ρ within its valid limits, the inverse hyperbolic tangent of ρ is instead estimated: 
1
2
ln (
1+ρ
1−ρ
). The reported ρ undoes the transformation where the standard error is calculated using the delta 
method. 
b The standard error of the residual in the wage equation, σ𝓌  is not directly estimated. For numerical 
stability, ln σ𝓌 is instead estimated. The reported σ𝓌 undoes the transformation where the standard error is 
calculated using the delta method. 
c Lambda is reported as the product of ρ and σ𝓌, along with its estimated standard error using the delta 
method. 
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B.2. Results of the Wage Estimation for Chapter 5 
TABLE B-2 RESULTS OF THE WAGE ESTIMATION FOR SINGLE MOTHERS 
VARIABLES  SINGLE MOTHERS 
  Wage Equation  Selection Equation 
Constant  2.700***  0.840 
  (0.175)  (1.012) 
Personal information     
Age  -0.005  0.079 
  (0.032)  (0.522) 
Age squared    -0.067 
    (0.725) 
Employment information     
Work experience  0.198***   
  (0.071)   
Work experience squared  -0.028   
  (0.021)   
Non-labour income    0.000 
    (0.000) 
Educational attainment     
University  0.353***  0.875*** 
  (0.052)  (0.176) 
Vocational  0.127***  0.511*** 
  (0.043)  (0.127) 
Year 12  0.145***  0.0582 
  (0.047)  (0.144) 
Household demographics     
Number of children    -0.145 
    (0.0924) 
If youngest child aged 0-1    -0.950*** 
    (0.188) 
If youngest child aged 2-5    -0.515*** 
    (0.129) 
If youngest child aged 6-9    0.004 
    (0.126) 
Geographic indicators (omitted)     
Year indicators (omitted)     
     
Other parameters     
Rhoa  0.184   
  (0.252)   
Sigmab  0.310   
  (0.012)   
Lambdac  0.057   
  (0.079)   
Log likelihood  -557.73   
Observations  738   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; sample of single mothers with children 0-12 years old 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
a In order to constrain ρ within its valid limits, the inverse hyperbolic tangent of ρ is instead estimated: 
1
2
ln (
1+ρ
1−ρ
). The reported ρ undoes the transformation where the standard error is calculated using the delta 
method. 
b The standard error of the residual in the wage equation, σ𝓌  is not directly estimated. For numerical 
stability, ln σ𝓌 is instead estimated. The reported σ𝓌 undoes the transformation where the standard error is 
calculated using the delta method. 
c Lambda is reported as the product of ρ and σ𝓌, along with its estimated standard error using the delta 
method. 
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B.3. Results of the Wage Estimation for Chapter 6 
TABLE B-3 RESULTS OF THE WAGE ESTIMATION FOR PARTNERED HOUSEHOLDS 
VARIABLES  PARTNERED FEMALES  PARTNERED MALES 
  
Wage 
Equation 
 
Selection 
Equation 
 
Wage 
Equation 
 
Selection 
Equation 
Constant  3.118***  -0.464  3.201***  1.472*** 
  (0.067)  (0.663)  (0.068)  (0.167) 
Personal information         
Age  -0.100***  0.824**  -0.060**  1.729*** 
  (0.017)  (0.331)  (0.028)  (0.428) 
Age squared    -1.154***    -2.218*** 
    (0.402)    (0.492) 
Employment information         
Work experience  0.315***    0.115***   
  (0.045)    (0.027)   
Work experience squared  -0.049***    -0.049***   
  (0.010)    (0.008)   
Non-labour income    -0.000***    -0.000*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Household demographics         
Number of children    -0.160***     
    (0.055)     
If youngest child aged 0-1    -0.851***     
    (0.097)     
If youngest child aged 2-5    -0.527***     
    (0.094)     
If youngest child aged 6-9    -0.022     
    (0.103)     
Geographic indicators (omitted)         
Year indicators (omitted)         
         
Other parameters         
Rhoa  0.302    0.453   
  (0.078)    (0.108)   
Sigmab  0.366    0.388   
  (0.006)    (0.006)   
Lambdac  0.111    0.176   
  (0.030)    (0.044)   
Log likelihood  -2022.473    -1661.333   
Observations  2,712       
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; sample of partnered households aged between 25 and 59 years. 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
a In order to constrain ρ within its valid limits, the inverse hyperbolic tangent of ρ is instead estimated: 
1
2
ln (
1+ρ
1−ρ
). The reported ρ undoes the transformation where the standard error is calculated using the delta 
method. 
b The standard error of the residual in the wage equation, σ𝓌  is not directly estimated. For numerical 
stability, ln σ𝓌 is instead estimated. The reported σ𝓌 undoes the transformation where the standard error is 
calculated using the delta method. 
c Lambda is reported as the product of ρ and σ𝓌, along with its estimated standard error using the delta 
method. 
 
